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Abstract 
 
Eyewitness memory is not perfect. However, recent research suggests that 
eyewitnesses remember more about a witnessed event if they close their eyes 
during the interview. The experiments reported in this thesis investigated 
applied and theoretical aspects of the eye-closure effect. Experiments 1-2 
examined whether the effect extended to recall of violent events. Eye-closure 
was found to be as beneficial for recall of physiologically arousing violent 
events as it was for non-violent events, extending the generalisibility of the 
effect. Experiment 3 examined recall after a delay and repeated recall 
attempts, and found no benefits of eye-closure during immediate free recall, 
but substantial benefits in both free and cued recall after one week. 
Experiments 4-5 examined the theoretical underpinnings of the eye-closure 
effect. No evidence was found for an “ear-closure” effect on a written recall 
test. Nevertheless, meaningless visual and auditory distractions during an oral 
interview impaired recall performance, particularly for information presented 
in the same modality as the distraction. These impairments could be 
overcome by eye-closure or, to a lesser extent, by looking at a blank screen. 
The data were fitted to the newly proposed Cognitive Resources framework, to 
estimate the relative importance of general and modality-specific processes. 
Experiment 6 enhanced the ecological validity of the research. A forensically 
relevant event was staged on the street, after which witnesses were 
interviewed either in a quiet interview room or on a busy street. Eye-closure 
had substantial benefits in free recall and helped witnesses to provide detailed 
correct answers about visual aspects of the event. It was most effective for 
witnesses interviewed inside, suggesting that mental context reinstatement 
might play a role in the eye-closure effect. Taken together, the findings suggest 
that the eye-closure instruction could provide a simple alternative to the 
Cognitive Interview, particularly when police resources are limited. 
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Chapter 1 
Overview of Thesis 
The present chapter is intended to help the reader navigate through the thesis, 
providing a brief overview of each chapter. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
On popular TV programmes, police investigations of crime are typically 
portrayed as glamorous undertakings, in which state-of-the-art techniques are 
used to obtain unequivocal proof of the perpetrator’s guilt. In the real world, 
things are unfortunately less clear-cut. The police are often forced to rely on 
the imperfect memory of eyewitnesses, and the evidence against a perpetrator 
is rarely unequivocal. To aid the police in their investigations, a number of 
interview methods have been developed to improve the quality and quantity 
of information obtained from eyewitnesses. The present thesis investigates the 
effectiveness of a relatively new interview instruction, namely, asking 
witnesses to close their eyes during the interview. The eye-closure instruction 
may have a number of advantages over existing interview methods, as will 
become clear over the course of this thesis.  
 
1.2 Overview of Chapters 
 
Chapter 2: Helping Witnesses Remember 
This chapter comprises the literature review for the thesis, which is organised 
in three sections. The first section addresses the fallibility of eyewitness 
memory. The second section outlines a number of interview methods 
intended to help witnesses remember, with a special focus on mental context 
reinstatement and the Cognitive Interview. The final section explores recent 
research into the eye-closure instruction, and speculates about the theoretical 
underpinnings of the eye-closure effect. 
Chapter 1  Overview of Thesis 
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Chapter 3: Memory for Violent Events 
This chapter presents two experiments extending the eye-closure effect to 
memory for violent events. Experiment 1 replicated previous research on eye-
closure with a violent event. Experiment 2 generalised the eye-closure effect 
across a number of different violent events, and included subjective and 
physiological measures of emotional arousal.  
 
Chapter 4: Memory after a Delay 
This chapter presents Experiment 3, which compared the effect of eye-closure 
in free and cued recall, and examined whether eye-closure was still effective 
after a one-week delay and repeated recall attempts. 
 
Chapter 5: Environmental Distraction 
This chapter presents two experiments assessing the theoretical 
underpinnings of the eye-closure effect. Experiment 4 examined whether the 
eye-closure effect has an auditory counterpart. Experiment 5 independently 
manipulated visual and auditory distractions in the interview environment, to 
assess the relative impact of general and modality-specific processes in the 
eye-closure effect. 
 
Chapter 6: Memory for a Live Altercation 
This chapter presents the final study, Experiment 6, which enhanced the 
ecological validity of the research. The experiment assessed the effect of eye-
closure on recall of a forensically relevant live event in a racially diverse 
sample of witnesses, who were interviewed in different locations varying in 
the degree of realistic environmental distractions.  
 
Chapter 7: Summary and General Discussion 
This chapter assesses the theoretical and practical implications of various 
themes reoccurring throughout the thesis, presents findings from a survey of 
experienced police interviewers, addresses limitations of the research, and 
provides directions for future research.   
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Chapter 2 
Helping Witnesses Remember 
 
This chapter will provide a brief introduction into the topic of eyewitness 
memory, addressing effects of delay, stress, and intervening events. It will then 
review prominent interview methods, including the Reid Technique, 
hypnosis, mental context reinstatement, and the Cognitive Interview. Finally, 
it will explore the effect of eye-closure on eyewitness memory, outlining 
previous findings and addressing the theoretical underpinnings of the eye-
closure effect. 
 
 
2.1 Eyewitness Memory 
 
The topic of memory has inspired poets, politicians, philosophers, and 
psychologists alike. Some writers have suggested that memory holds an 
objective record of our experiences. For instance, Oscar Wilde described 
memory as “the diary that we all carry about with us”, and Francis Fauvel-
Gouraud conceived of memory as “the library of the mind”. Nevertheless, 
everyday experience suggests that memory is not, in fact, perfect. Schacter 
(1999) identified seven “sins” of memory: transience, absentmindedness, 
blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence. The first three 
are sins of omission, occurring at different stages of the memory process. One 
example of a failure at the encoding stage is absentmindedness (though this 
may also occur at the retrieval stage). Thus, if no attention is paid to a certain 
piece of information, it will not be entered into memory. Or, in the words of 
English lexicographer Samuel Johnson, “the true art of memory is the art of 
attention”. Whether a piece of information is encoded depends, amongst 
other factors, on the level of emotional stress experienced during the event, as 
will be explained in section 2.1.3. Transience reflects a failure at the storage 
stage of memory: with the passage of time, gradual forgetting occurs. In 
Chapter 2  Helping Witnesses Remember 
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Othello, William Shakespeare highlighted the apparent inevitability of this 
process: “But men are men: the best sometimes forget”. This phenomenon 
will be further discussed in section 2.1.2. Finally, blocking occurs at the 
retrieval stage: even though information may be stored in memory, we are not 
always able to retrieve it. As once noted by German philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche: “the existence of forgetting has never been proved: we only know 
that some things don’t come to mind when we want them”. Some of the 
methods to help witnesses remember more, described in sections 2.2 and 2.3, 
probably operate at the retrieval stage of memory.  
The next two sins described by Schacter (1999) are sins of commission. 
Misattribution involves attributing an item in memory to an incorrect source. 
For instance, American humorist Josh Billings noted that people might 
“mistake their imagination for their memory”. This type of mistake will be 
discussed in section 2.1.2.4. Suggestibility means that memory can be affected 
by external influences. Thus, according to Albert Einstein, “memory is 
deceptive because it is coloured by today’s events”. Suggestibility will be 
further explored in section 2.1.4. The sin of bias reflects the fact that memory 
is shaped by one’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectations. For instance, memory 
may be shaped to fit with one’s perception of self: “Memory says, I did that. 
Pride replies, I could not have done that. Eventually memory yields.” 
(Friedrich Nietzsche). The prevalence of memory bias will be apparent 
throughout this review of eyewitness memory. Finally, persistence is explained 
best in the words of Michel de Montaigne: “Nothing fixes a thing so intensely 
in the memory as the wish to forget it.” Persistence will not be explicitly 
addressed in the present thesis; to learn more about intrusive memories, the 
reader is referred to the literature on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD; 
e.g., Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Bryant & Harvey, 1998; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000; Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004). This 
chapter will begin with a brief history of the research that has been conducted 
on the topic of eyewitness memory.  
 
  
Chapter 2  Helping Witnesses Remember 
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2.1.1 A Brief History of Eyewitness Research 
Alfred Binet (1900) was one of the first scholars to write about the effects of 
suggestion on memory. Based on his observations, Binet encouraged the 
development of a “science of testimony”. Several of his contemporaries 
followed this advice by publishing on the topic of eyewitness testimony (e.g., 
Arnold, 1906; Stern, 1904; Whipple, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1918). Perhaps the most 
influential early work on the topic was Münsterberg’s (1908) book On the 
Witness Stand. Even though his book was met with fierce criticism (Wigmore, 
1909; see also Doyle, 2005), several issues addressed in the book are still 
relevant today (e.g., the impact of suggestive questioning and the relation 
between witness confidence and accuracy). After a period of relative inactivity 
in eyewitness research from the 1920s to the 1960s (but see Burtt, 1931; Snee & 
Lush, 1941; Stern, 1939), the 1970s witnessed a renaissance in the eyewitness 
literature with researchers such as Robert Buckhout, Elizabeth Loftus, and 
Gary Wells picking up where Münsterberg had left off.  
Buckhout (1974) pioneered the experimental methodology of mock 
crimes to study eyewitness memory. Loftus discovered the misinformation 
effect (Loftus, 1975; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) and the concept of false 
memories (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), which will be discussed in more detail in 
section 2.1.4. Finally, Wells (1978) coined the distinction between system and 
estimator variables, fuelling a more systematic approach to eyewitness 
research (see also Wells et al., 2000). Whereas estimator variables are beyond 
the control of the justice system (e.g., viewing conditions during the witnessed 
event); system variables can be influenced by the justice system (e.g., 
interview instructions). The present thesis is concerned with a system variable 
that has received relatively little attention to date, namely, eye-closure during 
the investigative interview.  
Because the experiments presented in this thesis did not involve 
identification of perpetrators from a line-up, the present literature review is 
primarily concerned with variables affecting recall of events (including person 
descriptions) rather than face recognition. Issues that are solely relevant to 
eyewitness identifications (such as line-up fairness, own-race bias, and 
weapon focus) will not be reviewed here, but reviews are available elsewhere 
Chapter 2  Helping Witnesses Remember 
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(e.g., Brewer & Palmer, 2010; Brewer, Weber, & Semmler, 2005; Brewer & 
Wells, 2011; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Shapiro & Penrod, 1986; Steblay, 1992; 
Wagenaar & Loftus, 1990; Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). This literature review will 
explore in detail three phenomena central to eyewitness recall. First, it will 
explain how memory changes naturally over time. Second, it will address the 
impact of emotional stress on memory. Third, it will discuss how intervening 
events may interfere with memory. The section will conclude by highlighting 
the practical relevance of memory research in legal contexts. 
 
2.1.2 Memory over Time 
In court cases, witnesses and victims are often questioned weeks, months, or 
even years after the witnessed crime (Flin, Boon, Knox, & Bull, 1992; 
Plotnikoff, 1990; Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 1995; Poole & White, 1993). 
Unfortunately, with the passage of time, our ability to retrieve information 
from long-term memory declines. Ebbinghaus’s (1885/1964) classic research 
with lists of nonsense syllables found a steep curve of forgetting within the 
first hour after learning, after which the rate of forgetting became increasingly 
gradual. In the present section, I will examine whether Ebbinghaus’s simple 
finding of memory deterioration over time also applies to recall of complex 
events. The effects of retention interval will be discussed in terms of quantity, 
specificity, and potential distortions in eyewitness memory.  
 
2.1.2.1 Gist 
Reviewing the eyewitness literature, Penrod, Loftus, and Winkler (1982) found 
that eyewitness memory followed an Ebbinghaus-like pattern, deteriorating 
rapidly over time. After a delay, witnesses are less likely to make a correct 
identification of the perpetrator (Shapiro & Penrod, 1986; Sporer, 1992; Wixted 
& Ebbesen, 1991, 1997), and they remember fewer event details (e.g., Cassel & 
Bjorklund, 1995; Fivush, Hudson, & Nelson, 1984; Flin et al., 1992; Poole & 
White, 1993). For instance, Lipton (1977) found that participants remembered 
18% less information about a filmed murder after a one-week delay than when 
tested immediately. Turtle and Yuille (1994) introduced a delay of three weeks 
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and found a 43% decrease in the number of accurate details reported about a 
simulated armed robbery. Burke, Heuer, and Reisberg (1992) also observed a 
strong effect of delay, but found no difference between one- and two-week 
testing, suggesting that “for these materials, forgetting had reached its 
asymptote by 1 week” (p. 283). Indeed, at first sight, it seems that eyewitness 
memory follows an Ebbinghaus-like curve of forgetting, with a sharp initial 
decline and more gradual forgetting over time. Nevertheless, the matter is not 
as simple as it seems. 
It has long been recognised that memory is not an exact reproduction 
of our experiences—instead, it relies on constructive processes that are prone 
to simplification, distortion, and error (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Koffka, 1935; Piaget, 
1968; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). After these constructive processes, what 
remains is the gist of the original experience (potentially accompanied by a 
few details). As noted by Sanford and Garrod, “gist is a most elusive thing to 
define” (1981, p. 67), yet people often intuitively agree on what constitutes the 
gist of a story. In inevitably vague terms, gist can be thought of as a basic 
semantic representation of the original story or event. Research on memory 
for sentences, stories, and conversations has established that memory for gist 
(i.e., the semantic content) is better retained over time than memory for 
details (i.e., the verbatim form; e.g., Bransford & Franks, 1971; Kintsch, 
Welsch, Schmalhofer, & Zimny, 1990; Neisser, 1981; Sachs, 1967; Stafford, 
Burggraf, & Sharkey, 1987).  
Thorndyke (1977) proposed a systematic approach for the analysis of 
story content, which is shown in Figure 2.1. Thus, all stories are thought to 
have components relating to setting, theme, plot, and resolution. The 
numbers 1 to 4 in the figure represent different levels of information, ranging 
from the top-level information or gist (e.g., the main goal of the story) to 
peripheral details (e.g., attempts to achieve a subgoal in one of the 
subordinate episodes). In Experiment 3 of the present thesis, memory for a 
witnessed event was tested in a free recall format. To score the centrality of the 
reported information, I developed a coding scheme that was inspired by 
Thorndyke’s plot structure approach (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 2.1  Plot structure for “Circle Island” story. A schematic depiction of 
Thorndyke’s plot structure approach (adapted from Thorndyke, 1977, p. 81).  
 
2.1.2.2 Grain Size 
Just like memory for stories, memory for events is subject to “gistification” 
(Heuer & Reisberg, 1990, p. 498). For instance, Fisher (1996) was surprised to 
find that participants maintained an equivalent level of accuracy, regardless of 
whether they were tested soon after the event or 40 days later. A closer 
inspection of his data, however, showed that the degree of accuracy was 
maintained at the expense of specificity: the information reported after a 
longer delay was less precise than the information reported soon after the 
event. Consistent with this observation, Pinto and Baddeley (1991) found that 
people could still recall with a good degree of accuracy where they had parked 
their car a month earlier, but only because they responded with significantly 
larger parking areas. Similarly, even though witnesses of crimes tend to 
remember the basic facts of the criminal event very well, they tend to forget 
certain details, such as dates, names (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990), and the 
colour of clothing (Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). Thus, whereas the basic elements 
of an event tend to be remembered well, details often get lost.  
Koriat and Goldsmith have emphasised the strategic control of the 
rememberer in choosing what type of information to report (Goldsmith & 
Koriat, 1999; Goldsmith, Koriat, & Pansky, 2005; Goldsmith, Koriat, & 
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Weinberg-Eliezer, 2002; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994, 1996; Koriat, Goldsmith, & 
Pansky, 2000). As noted by Neisser (1988), people often choose “a level of 
generality at which they [are] not mistaken” (p. 553). When people are 
pressured to provide more information than they would have volunteered 
spontaneously, however, they will shift their response criterion, providing a 
greater amount of information at the expense of accuracy (i.e., the quantity-
accuracy trade-off model; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). One way of studying this 
phenomenon is to examine the grain size of responses provided by witnesses 
(Goldsmith et al., 2002). Grain size or “graininess” (Yaniv & Foster, 1995) refers 
to the level of specificity at which a person chooses to report information. For 
instance, when asked how much you paid for the groceries bought yesterday, 
you could answer “£34.78” (fine-grain response) or “between 30 and 40 
pounds” (coarse-grain response). As observed by Fisher (1996), with the 
passage of time, people choose to provide progressively vaguer responses. 
This observation was confirmed in a more controlled study by Goldsmith et al. 
(2005), who found that after a delay, participants boosted the accuracy of their 
testimony by strategically adjusting the grain size of their reports (e.g., 
reporting the weight of the victim as “70-80 kg” instead of “73 kg”). To obtain a 
more detailed picture of the eye-closure effect, I will distinguish between fine- 
and coarse-grain answers in the experiments presented in this thesis. 
 
2.1.2.3 Schemata and Scripts 
What we remember is not a random collection of disparate details. Instead, 
people organise and remember their knowledge and experiences in line with 
pre-existing knowledge and beliefs. For instance, Gestalt psychologists noted 
that memory becomes distorted toward “better form” (Goldmeier, 1982; 
Koffka, 1935; Riley, 1962; see also Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000). Bartlett 
(1932) used the term schema to refer to a generalised mental representation, 
or concept, of an object, place, or person. The basic features of such a concept 
are usually shared amongst members of a particular culture. For example, a 
common schema of a classroom in Western society would probably include 
desks, chairs, pencils, pens, notebooks, a black- or white-board, students, and 
a teacher.  
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A schema that involves the organisation of events in time rather than 
objects in space is commonly referred to as a script (Schank & Abelson, 1977). 
Vicki L. Smith (1991, 1993) found that jury decisions are affected by jurors’ 
scripts of how typical crimes occur. For instance, we have scripts for typical 
robberies (Aizpurua, Garcia-Bajos, & Migueles, 2009; García-Bajos & Migueles, 
2003; Greenberg, Westcott, & Bailey, 1998; Holst & Pezdek, 1992), burglaries 
(V. L. Smith & Studebaker, 1996), and shoplifting (Akehurst, Milne, & Köhnken, 
2003; List, 1986). We use these scripts to fill in the gaps in our memory. 
Although schemata and scripts are a convenient and necessary way of 
organising our experiences, they also carry the danger of incorporation of 
schema-consistent errors into memory, which will be discussed in the next 
section. To sum up, what tends to be retained in memory is the gist of an 
event, which is shaped by pre-existing knowledge and beliefs.  
 
2.1.2.4 Naturally Occurring Memory Distortions 
Painter Anna Mary Robertson Moses once said: “memory is a painter: it paints 
pictures of the past and of the day”. The research reviewed above suggests that 
over time, the colours of the paint may begin to fade and sharp lines may 
become blurry. This blurring process is not restricted to the loss of accurate 
details; it may also involve incorporation of inaccurate details. Borrowing 
Mazzoni’s (2002) helpful distinction, this section will focus on memory 
distortions that occur naturally, whereas sections 2.1.4.2 and 2.1.4.3 will 
address suggestion-dependent memory distortions. 
 A specific type of error that may occur naturally in memory is source 
confusion. According to the source-monitoring framework (M. K. Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), we do not always accurately store the source 
from which a particular memory stems. Thus, for instance, we may remember 
that aunt Muriel is now going out with a man half her age, but we might 
remember hearing this information from our sister, whereas in fact our 
brother told us (external-external source confusion). Furthermore, we may 
sometimes confuse something that was imagined for something that was 
experienced (internal-external source confusion). Studies on imagination 
inflation have found that the simple act of imagining an event increases the 
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perceived likelihood of having experienced that event (Garry, Manning, 
Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Garry & Polascheck, 2000; Garry, Sharman, Wade, 
Hunt, & Smith, 2001; Heaps & Nash, 1999; but see Pezdek & Eddy, 2001). 
Research using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) has shown that people naturally develop 
false memories of having seen lure words that were never presented, provided 
that the lures were semantically associated to words that were presented (see 
also Anisfeld & Knapp, 1968; Underwood, 1965).  
In eyewitness contexts, source confusion may lead to mistakes, both in 
recall of events and in eyewitness identifications. For instance, a considerable 
number of criminal cases have concerned alleged victims who genuinely 
remembered having been sexually abused as a child, whereas they had in fact 
only imagined it (for an example, see section 2.1.5). One fascinating real-life 
example of source confusion resulting in mistaken identification is the case of 
respected psychologist Donald Thomson, who was accused of rape on the 
basis of the victim’s detailed description of her assailant (Thomson, 1988). The 
victim had been watching an interview with Thomson on television (ironically, 
on the topic of memory distortion), and confused her recollection of him with 
the rapist who attacked her moments after watching the interview. Because 
Thomson had such a strong alibi (he was giving a live television interview 
when the crime occurred), the charges were dropped quickly. In sum, 
eyewitnesses may falsely report criminal actions because they think they 
experienced them, when they actually only imagined them (Goff & Roediger, 
1998; see also D. B. Wright & Schwartz, 2010); and they may make false 
identifications because they unconsciously “transfer” a person seen in one 
context to another context (D. R. Ross, Ceci, Dunning, & Toglia, 1994).  
Eyewitness testimony may also suffer from more subtle distortions, 
such as the incorporation of inaccurate details into otherwise accurate 
memories. As explained in the previous section, we organise our experiences 
in line with pre-existing knowledge and beliefs. Schemata and scripts perform 
important structuring functions in memory, but have the unfortunate 
potential side-effect of introducing schema-consistent errors into our 
memories for events. For instance, the source-monitoring errors described in 
the previous paragraph are especially likely to occur when they conform to 
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stereotypes (e.g., Kleider, Pezdek, Goldinger, & Kirk, 2008). In an eyewitness 
context, Smith and Studebaker (1996) found that spontaneous intrusion errors 
in memory for a burglary typically involved script-consistent details (e.g., the 
burglar wore a dark jacket) rather than script-inconsistent details (e.g., the 
burglar wore a suit jacket). In a similar vein, García-Bajos and Migueles (2003) 
found that participants were significantly more likely to falsely incorporate 
script-consistent actions into their testimony about a robbery (e.g., 
threatening the victim with a weapon), than script-inconsistent actions (e.g., 
covering the victim’s mouth).  
 
2.1.2.5 Conclusion 
This section has shown that our memories naturally evolve to align with our 
existing knowledge and beliefs about certain events. This process may lead to 
the forgetting of details as well as the incorporation of false information into 
our memory. An additional factor that may influence our memory for events is 
emotional arousal, which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
2.1.3 Memory under Stress 
Memory for particular events can be influenced by the level of stress 
experienced during the event (Christianson, 1992; Deffenbacher, Bornstein, 
Penrod, & McGorty, 2004; Heuer & Reisberg, 1992). However, exactly in what 
way stress affects memory is still a matter of debate. The type of stress under 
consideration in the present thesis is emotional stress, defined by Christianson 
(1992, p. 285) as “a consequence of an [sic] negative emotional event, in which 
the person experiences a certain degree of stress or distress with concurrent 
autonomic–hormonal changes.” Some studies have shown that emotional 
stress during an event impairs memory for that event (e.g., Brigham, Maass, 
Martinez, & Whittenberger, 1983; Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Clifford & Scott, 
1978; Deffenbacher et al., 2004; Valentine & Mesout, 2009). Other studies, 
however, have shown that emotional stress enhances memory, at least for the 
central details of the event (e.g., Bornstein, Liebel, & Scarberry, 1998; Burke et 
al., 1992; Christianson, 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 
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1990, 1992). A better understanding of the apparent inconsistency in findings 
requires a brief explanation of the physiology behind emotional stress (for a 
more elaborate discussion, see Appelhans & Luecken, 2006).  
 
2.1.3.1 Physiology of Emotional Stress 
Emotional events have the potential to elicit varying degrees of physiological 
arousal (Levenson, 2003). Specifically, exposure to emotive and arousing 
stimuli may cause changes in the activity of the autonomic nervous system. 
The autonomic nervous system comprises of an excitatory system, which is 
activated in response to a stressor (the sympathetic nervous system), and an 
inhibitory system, which is dominant during periods of relaxation (the 
parasympathetic nervous system). An increase in sympathetic activity is 
associated with heightened physiological arousal, reflected in accelerated 
heart rate (Wallin, 1981) and increased electrodermal activity (EDA; i.e., 
changes in the sweat response; Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000; Vetrugno, 
Liguori, Cortelli, & Montagna, 2003). Parasympathetic activity, on the other 
hand, is associated with lowered physiological arousal, reflected in reduced 
EDA (Dawson et al., 2000) and heart rate deceleration (Appelhans & Luecken, 
2006).  
In the literature on memory and emotion, physiological activity is often 
discussed in terms of the orienting response versus the defensive response 
(Lacey & Lacey, 1970, 1974; see also Sokolov, 1963). An orienting response is a 
reaction of cortical activation to novel, unexpected, or salient stimuli. 
Physiological correlates of the orienting response are increased EDA (a sign of 
sympathetic activity) and decreased heart rate (a sign of parasympathetic 
activity). Thus, it is likely that the orienting response is associated with both 
sympathetic and parasympathetic influences (cf. Deffenbacher, 1994, Note 4). 
In contrast, a defensive response (similar to the “fight or flight” response) is a 
response to threatening or painful stimuli, and is associated with increased 
EDA and increased heart rate (both indicators of increased sympathetic 
activity). According to the Lacey and Lacey (1970) model, intense emotional 
stimulation should trigger a defensive response, whereas milder emotional 
stimulation should trigger an orienting response. Graham and Clifton (1966) 
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reviewed the literature and found that the physiological data observed across 
studies confirmed this pattern.  
Interestingly, the type of physiological response that is evoked by 
emotional stimuli seems to depend on individual characteristics. For instance, 
Klorman, Weissberg, and Wiesenfeld (1977) found that photos of mutilated 
bodies evoked a defensive response in fearful participants (i.e., those scoring 
high on the Mutilation Questionnaire), but an orienting response in less 
fearful participants. Similarly, Lumley and Melamed (1992) found that 
watching a surgery scene of an incision significantly increased heart rate in 
blood phobics, but not in non-phobics. The finding that individuals respond 
in different ways to identical stimulation corresponds with the idea that 
distinct motivational systems are dominant in different individuals (Carver & 
White, 1994; Gray, 1981, 1982, 1987, 1990). Gray distinguished between a 
behavioural activation system (BAS) and a behavioural inhibition system 
(BIS). The function of the BAS is to initiate goal-directed behaviour, in order to 
achieve positive outcomes, whereas the function of the BIS is to regulate and 
inhibit behaviour, in order to avoid negative outcomes. In terms of personality 
research and the introversion-extraversion distinction (H. J. Eysenck, 1967): 
the BIS is believed to be stronger in introverts, whereas the BAS is thought to 
be stronger in extraverts (Deffenbacher, 1994; see also Gray, 1970). In sum, the 
type of physiological response elicited by an event likely depends on the 
individual’s motivational system. 
 
2.1.3.2 Deffenbacher’s Theory 
Given that emotional stimuli have the potential to evoke different types of 
physiological responses in different individuals, the effect of stress on memory 
is likely to depend on what type of response is elicited. With this in mind, 
Deffenbacher (1994) developed a theory to explain the apparent discrepancy 
in findings regarding the effects of emotional stress on memory. Rejecting his 
earlier notion of a unidimensional continuum of arousal based on the Yerkes-
Dodson law1 (Deffenbacher, 1983, 1991), he proposed a theoretical framework 
                                                      
1 The Yerkes-Dodson law (1908), also known as the inverted-U curve, holds that increased 
levels of arousal facilitate performance until an optimal level is attained, after which further 
increases in arousal will gradually impair performance (see also M. W. Eysenck, 1979; Zajonc, 
1965). 
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incorporating Gray’s (1987) distinct arousal systems, Tucker and Williamson’s 
(1984) dual-control model, and Fazey and Hardy’s (1988) catastrophe model.  
In short, Deffenbacher’s (1994) theory highlights the importance of 
distinguishing between the arousal mode (related to a responsiveness to novel 
stimulation) and the activation mode (related to a readiness for action), as 
defined by Tucker and Williamson (1984). Which mode is active depends on 
what type of stimulus is presented (interesting or aversive), and on which 
motivational system is dominant in the individual (BIS or BAS). When the 
arousal mode is dominant, attention to interesting aspects of the stimulus 
array will be enhanced, and as a result, memory for those aspects will be 
superior. This is in line with Christianson’s (1992) argument that emotional 
stress causes attentional narrowing (cf. Easterbrook, 1959), resulting in 
memory enhancement for the central aspects of an event. However, 
Deffenbacher et al. (2004) argue that the attentional narrowing phenomenon 
observed by Christianson is irrelevant to the assessment of the impact of stress 
on eyewitness memory, since the activation mode (rather than the arousal 
mode) is assumed to be dominant in threatening situations. When the 
activation mode is dominant, memory performance is said to follow the 
catastrophe model (Fazey & Hardy, 1988; see also Hardy & Parfitt, 1991). Thus, 
when cognitive anxiety is high, gradual increases in arousal will improve 
attention to (and subsequent recall of) the event details, up to a certain point, 
after which a dramatic drop in performance will occur.  
A number of field studies provide evidence for the prediction that 
memory for an event will be dramatically impaired if physiological arousal 
during the event is high. First, Peters (1988) found that witnesses who were 
highly physiologically aroused during an inoculation were significantly worse 
at identifying the nurse who had just inoculated them (31% accurate) than 
witnesses who were less physiologically aroused during the inoculation (59% 
accurate). Second, Morgan et al. (2004) investigated the memory of soldiers 
who had been confined in a mock prisoner of war camp for 12 hours. They 
found that soldiers were significantly more likely to identify the person who 
had interrogated them under low-stress conditions (no physical 
confrontation) than the person who had interrogated them under high-stress 
conditions (involving physical confrontation). Furthermore, Bothwell, 
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Brigham and Pigott (1987) provided support for the idea that increases in 
arousal will impair memory only if cognitive anxiety is high. They found that 
witnesses scoring low on a neuroticism scale (i.e., low cognitive anxiety) 
became more accurate in their identifications of a live male target with 
increasing levels of arousal, whereas witnesses scoring high on neuroticism 
(i.e., high cognitive anxiety) suffered a catastrophic loss in identification 
accuracy, from 68% in the low and moderate arousal conditions to 32% in the 
high arousal condition. 
In summary, Deffenbacher (1994) argued that memory will be enhanced 
if experimental stimuli elicit an orienting response, but impaired if they elicit a 
defensive response. In 2004, Deffenbacher et al. conducted a meta-analysis on 
the effects of stress on eyewitness memory. They only included studies that 
(supposedly—see below) succeeded in eliciting a defensive response rather 
than an orienting response, since the former is likely more representative of 
the type of arousal experienced by real witnesses of crime. Across these 
studies, they found a small to moderate debilitating effect of high stress on the 
accuracy of eyewitness recall (d = -.31).   
 
2.1.3.3 Problems with Deffenbacher’s Theory 
Although Deffenbacher presents a convincing account, a number of problems 
arise. First of all, Deffenbacher et al.’s (2004) classification of studies as 
eliciting a defensive or an orienting response was not corroborated by 
physiological manipulation checks. Their selection criteria allowed inclusion 
of studies with self-ratings of perceived violence level as sole manipulation 
check (e.g., Clifford & Scott, 1978; Loftus & Burns, 1982), even though they 
noted themselves that higher ratings of negative emotionality do not 
necessarily signify a successful manipulation of emotional arousal. At the 
same time, they excluded other studies which also provided only self-ratings 
as manipulation check (e.g., Johnson & Scott, 1974; Shepherd, Davies, & Ellis, 
1980, both cited in Deffenbacher, 1983), on the basis of a ‘belief’ that these 
studies “were generating facilitation of eyewitness memory for central details, 
because their principal experimental manipulations likely generated an 
orienting response” (Deffenbacher et al., 2004, p. 690). This selection 
procedure rendered the argument rather circular: if memory enhancement 
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was found, the experimental stimuli must have failed to produce a defensive 
response; conversely, if memory impairment was observed, the stimuli must 
have successfully elicited a defensive response. Thus, even though 
Deffenbacher’s (1994) theory has the potential to explain the apparent 
inconsistency in findings regarding the effects of emotion on memory, it 
requires confirmation by physiological manipulation checks before firm 
conclusions can be drawn.  
A second problem with Deffenbacher’s (1994; Deffenbacher et al., 2004) 
position is that it cannot account for various findings showing that real 
eyewitnesses are in fact quite good at remembering highly emotional events. 
For instance, Yuille and Cutshall (1986) found that both the amount and 
accuracy of witness reports about a fatal shooting that had occurred 4-5 
months earlier was much higher than would have been expected on the basis 
of Deffenbacher’s theory. Yuille and Cutshall suggest that their findings “raise 
some questions about the image of the eyewitness that has emerged from 
laboratory work” (p. 299). Other field studies have reported similarly accurate 
memories of highly emotional events, ranging from bank robberies 
(Christianson & Hübinette, 1993), a ferry sinking (Thompson, Morton, & 
Fraser, 1997), being kidnapped (Terr, 1983), distressing medical procedures 
(Peterson & Whalen, 2001; Quas et al., 1999), to child sexual abuse (Bidrose & 
Goodman, 2000; Orbach & Lamb, 1999). Perhaps the most striking finding was 
that 78 survivors of a concentration camp still remembered many of their 
camp experiences very well, even after 40 years had passed (Wagenaar & 
Groeneweg, 1990). According to Deffenbacher’s theory, these highly 
emotional experiences should have caused severe cognitive anxiety and high 
levels of physiological arousal—yet, memory for the events did not show the 
corresponding dramatic drop predicted by the theory2.  
The discrepancy between these real-world observations and 
Deffenbacher et al.’s (2004) meta-analytic findings might be explained by the 
retention interval between the event and the memory test. Because arousal 
can enhance memory consolidation (Joëls, Pu, Wiegert, Oitzl, & Krugers, 2006; 
                                                      
2 It is possible that Deffenbacher’s theory only applies to single traumatic events, as opposed 
to repeated traumatic occurrences such as concentration camp experiences or child sexual 
abuse (cf. Brubacher, Roberts, & Powell, 2011; Connolly, Price, Lavoie, & Gordon, 2008; 
Powell, Roberts, & Guadagno, 2007). This possibility warrants further investigation.  
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McGaugh, 2004; see also Finn & Roediger, 2011), the benefits of arousal on 
memory could well increase over time, and may thus not be observed when 
participants are tested after only brief delays (Heuer & Reisberg, 1992). Indeed, 
studies showing that stress impairs memory typically used retention intervals 
of an hour or less (e.g., Brigham et al., 1983; Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Clifford & 
Scott, 1978; Kramer, Buckhout, & Eugenio, 1990; Loftus & Burns, 1982; Maass 
& Köhnken, 1989; Siegel & Loftus, 1978), whereas many studies showing that 
stress improves memory (for central details) employed intervals of two weeks 
or more (e.g., Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992; Burke et al., 1992; 
Christianson, 1984; Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). 
Crucially, most of the studies included in Deffenbacher et al.’s (2004) meta-
analysis belonged to the former group. This sheds some doubt on the 
generalisibility of their findings to real-world settings. It is recommended that 
future work concerning the effects of stress on eyewitness memory employ 
delays of more than a few hours or even a few days (cf. Bull, 2010).  
 
2.1.3.4 Conclusion 
Although the majority of eyewitness experts agree that high levels of stress 
impair the accuracy of eyewitness testimony (Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989; 
Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001; Yarmey & Jones, 1983), a review of the 
relevant literature shows that this view is too simplistic. In reality, the effects 
of emotional stress on memory depend on a number of factors, and 
“measurements of physiological reactions associated with emotional stress 
sometimes show a pattern of an orienting response and sometimes a pattern 
of a defensive or a rejection response” (Christianson, 1992, p. 285). In Chapter 
3 of this thesis, the role of emotional stress in the eye-closure effect will be 
examined in more detail. Hitherto, we have seen that our memories may 
naturally be affected by factors such as delay and stress. In the next section, 
we will see that our memories may also be manipulated by intervening events 
such as repeated questioning and misleading post-event information. 
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2.1.4 Memory after Intervening Events 
Memory researchers post-Ebbinghaus emphasised that forgetting is caused by 
interference from preceding and intervening stimuli, rather than mere 
passage of time. For instance, Baddeley and Hitch (1977) found that rugby 
players’ recall of their previous games was impaired as a function of the 
number of intervening games rather than as a function of elapsed time. In the 
context of criminal cases, intervening events are also likely to contaminate 
eyewitness memory. This section will highlight two potential sources of 
interference in legal settings, namely, repeated retrieval attempts and 
misleading post-event information.  
 
2.1.4.1 Repeated Retrieval 
A particularly striking event, such as witnessing a crime, is likely to be thought 
about and recounted often (Bohannon, 1988; Christianson & Safer, 1996; 
Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). Furthermore, in legal contexts, witnesses are often 
asked to provide testimony on multiple occasions (Gabbert, Hope, & Fisher, 
2009; Goodman & Quas, 2008; Henkel, 2004; La Rooy, Lamb, & Pipe, 2009; 
Odinot, Wolters, & Lavender, 2009). Repeated attempts to retrieve information 
from memory may have both positive and negative effects. 
 On the positive side, a considerable number of studies have shown that 
prior attempts to retrieve information makes the retrieved information more 
resistant to subsequent forgetting (e.g., Ebbesen & Rienick, 1998; Shaw, Bjork, 
& Handal, 1995) and suggestive questioning (e.g., Geiselman, Fisher, Cohen, 
Holland, & Surtes, 1986; Memon, Zaragoza, Clifford, & Kidd, 2010), and may 
even help witnesses remember new information (Chan, McDermott, & 
Roediger, 2006; Roediger & Payne, 1982). For instance, Carpenter, Pashler, and 
Vul (2006) found that a prior recall attempt was even more beneficial to later 
recall performance than an additional opportunity to study the material; an 
effect commonly known as the testing effect (Dempster, 1996; Karpicke & 
Roediger, 2008; Zaromb & Roediger, 2010).  
Repeated attempts to remember a witnessed crime may also lead to the 
retrieval of new, previously unreported information (e.g., La Rooy, Pipe, & 
Murray, 2005; Turtle & Yuille, 1994)—a phenomenon known as reminiscence 
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(Payne, 1987). A number of studies have even found that repeated recall of an 
event resulted in hypermnesia (Payne, 1987), which means that the total 
amount of information recalled during a subsequent interview was greater 
than the total amount recalled during the initial interview (e.g., Bornstein et 
al., 1998; Dunning & Stern, 1992; Scrivner & Safer, 1988). The experimental 
findings of gains in recall with repeated retrieval attempts are corroborated by 
diary studies showing that certain autobiographical events are retained well 
even over extended periods of time, provided that they are retrieved regularly 
(Baddeley, in press; Linton, 1975, 1978; Wagenaar, 1986). 
 On the negative side, however, repeated retrieval may cause a number 
of problems in memory. First, memory for details that are not retrieved during 
an initial recall attempt may suffer from the earlier attempt to retrieve the 
information, a phenomenon known as retrieval-induced forgetting (M. C. 
Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). A considerable number of studies have shown 
retrieval-induced forgetting in eyewitness contexts (e.g., MacLeod, 2002; 
Migueles & García-Bajos, 2007; Saunders & MacLeod, 2002; Shaw et al., 1995). 
Thus, when witnesses are questioned about some details but not others, 
retrieval of the unpractised details is impaired. Second, repeated attempts to 
retrieve information have the potential to introduce errors into the original 
memory (Bornstein et al., 1998; Turtle & Yuille, 1994). Similarly, repeated 
recall increases the likelihood of source confusions (Henkel, 2004), and may 
render memory more vulnerable to misleading suggestions from external 
sources (Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009; Saunders & MacLeod, 2002; but see 
Memon et al., 2010).  
 Taken together, the evidence suggests that repeated renditions of 
eyewitness experiences may prevent forgetting of the retold elements and lead 
to the retrieval of new information, but may at the same time impair memory 
for non-rehearsed elements of the event and introduce errors into memory for 
the event. Regardless of whether repeated retrieval is good or bad, it is a reality 
for the majority of witnesses of violent crime. Hence, we need to develop ways 
in which we can exploit the advantages of repeated retrieval while reducing its 
disadvantages. One attempt to do exactly this was proposed recently by Fiona 
Gabbert and collaborators, who developed the Self-Administered Interview 
(SAI). The SAI is distributed by the police at the scene of the crime, and is 
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intended to provide eyewitnesses with an initial good-quality recall attempt 
immediately after witnessing the crime. Gabbert and colleagues theorised that 
such a good-quality retrieval attempt would preserve memory for the details 
of the witnessed event, and prevent incorporation of false details. Limited 
evidence to date suggests that the SAI is indeed effective in improving 
subsequent recall (Gabbert et al., 2009; Gabbert, Hope, & Fisher, in 
preparation; Hope, Gabbert, & Fisher, 2011).  
 
2.1.4.2 Misinformation Effect 
We now turn to the type of distortions that emerge as a result of suggestions 
from external sources (Mazzoni, 2002). In keeping with Moses’ painting 
analogy of memory, research suggests that other painters may modify the 
pictures in our memory. The misinformation effect refers to the phenomenon 
that “misleading postevent information can alter a person’s recollection of an 
event” (Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986, p. 329). For instance, Loftus (1975) 
showed participants a video of a car driving along an empty landscape, and 
questioned them about it immediately after. For half of the participants, one 
of the questions contained misinformation: they were asked how fast the car 
was driving when it passed the barn, when in fact no barn had been shown. 
One week later, 17% of the participants in the misinformation group reported 
having seen the barn (compared to 3% in the control group). In the same way, 
researchers have led participants to mistake a stop sign for a yield sign (Loftus 
et al., 1978), a hammer for a screwdriver (Belli, 1989; Lindsay, 1990; McCloskey 
& Zaragoza, 1985; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989), and a white for a green teddy bear 
(Sutherland & Hayne, 2001). Misleading post-event information in the form of 
doctored photographs has also been shown to influence subsequent recall of 
famous past public events (Sacchi, Agnoli, & Loftus, 2007) and news reports of 
death and injury (Garry, Strange, Bernstein, & Kinzett, 2007).  
The misinformation effect has proven robust across a number of 
settings (for reviews, see Ayers & Reder, 1998; Gerrie, Garry, & Loftus, 2005; 
Loftus, 2005). It should be noted, however, that the original interpretation of 
the misinformation effect—that the suggested items “overwrite” the original 
items in memory (Loftus, 1975; Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Loftus et al., 1978)—is 
probably mistaken. Bekerian and Bowers (1983) showed that the original 
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information was in fact preserved in memory, but that participants in previous 
studies were unable to retrieve the original items due to a lack of retrieval cues 
available to them. Taking the argument one step further, McCloskey and 
Zaragoza (1985) argued that the effect does not reflect memory impairment at 
all; rather, participants simply assumed that the experimenter who provided 
the misleading information must have been correct. It is also possible that the 
effect is due to a combination of memory impairment and misinformation 
acceptance (Belli, 1989; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989).  
From an applied perspective, what matters is the consistent finding that 
people report inaccurate information as a result of misleading information. 
Misleading suggestions have also been found to impair recall of forensically 
relevant information, such as faces (Loftus & Greene, 1980) and criminal 
actions (Aizpurua et al., 2009; García-Bajos & Migueles, 2003). Such 
suggestions are especially likely to be incorporated into memory if they are 
consistent with the witness’s pre-existing script of the crime (García-Bajos & 
Migueles, 2003; Holst & Pezdek, 1992; V. L. Smith & Studebaker, 1996), and if 
they concern information about which the witness has not been questioned 
before (Saunders & MacLeod, 2002). In real life, witnesses are frequently 
exposed to misleading post-event information. For instance, witnesses are 
often asked suggestive questions (Clarke & Milne, 2001; Holst & Pezdek, 1992; 
Wheatcroft, Wagstaff, & Kebbell, 2004), which have the potential to alter their 
memory (Loftus, 1975; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001). In 
addition, they commonly discuss their experiences with other witnesses 
(Marsh, Tversky, & Hutson, 2005; Paterson & Kemp, 2006; Skagerberg & 
Wright, 2008), which may also influence their testimony (Gabbert, Memon, & 
Wright, 2006; Shaw, Garven, & Wood, 1997; see D. B. Wright, London, & 
Waechter, 2010, for an explanatory model of memory conformity).  
 
2.1.4.3 False Memories 
Not only can other painters modify elements of our own pictures in memory, 
they can even plant whole new pictures into our memory. Loftus and Pickrell 
(1995) moved from infusing inaccurate elements into accurate memories to 
implanting complete false autobiographical events in memory. Participants 
were falsely informed that they had got lost in a mall when they were young 
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(according to a trusted family member), and were encouraged to think about 
the event and remember as much as they could, on three separate occasions. 
By the end of the experiment, about a quarter of the participants reported 
remembering the false childhood event. Subsequent research showed that this 
effect was not restricted to relatively mundane events like getting lost in a 
mall. For instance, 26 % of Porter, Yuille, and Lehman’s (1999) participants 
falsely remembered being viciously attacked by an animal in 26% of their 
participants, and 37% of Heaps and Nash’s (2001) participants falsely 
remembered having nearly drowned as a child.  
Although most studies have implanted false events that supposedly 
occurred in participants’ childhood (for other examples, see Braun, Ellis, & 
Loftus, 2002; Garry & Wade, 2005; Hyman & Billings, 1998; Hyman, Husband, 
& Billings, 1995; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & 
Garry, 2004; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003; Otgaar, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2008; 
Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997; Strange, Sutherland, & Garry, 2006), some 
studies have shown that people can also develop false memories for more 
recent events. For instance, Crombag, Wagenaar and Van Koppen questioned 
people about a famous air crash that occurred in the Netherlands ten months 
earlier, asking whether they had seen the film of the plane crashing into the 
apartment building. In fact, no such film existed. Nevertheless, the majority of 
participants asserted that they had indeed seen the film, and often proceeded 
to provide details about what they had seen in the non-existing film. Similar 
findings have been obtained when questioning people about non-existing 
video footage of the 1997 fatal car crash of Princess Diana (Ost, Vrij, Costall, & 
Bull, 2002), the sinking of a Swedish ferry (Granhag, Strömwall, & Billings, 
2003), the bombing of a Bali night club (Ost, Hogbin, & Granhag, 2006; Wilson 
& French, 2006) and the assassination of a Dutch politician (Jelicic et al., 2006; 
Smeets et al., 2006).  
A final thought to consider is that false memories can have a real impact 
on people’s behaviour. Bernstein and colleagues found that people who 
falsely remembered getting ill from a particular food were significantly less 
likely to express an intention of eating that food in the future (Bernstein, 
Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005a, 2005b). Moreover, Geraerts et al. (2008) 
showed that participants were also significantly less likely to actually consume 
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that food when offered a choice of foods four months after the false memory 
had been implanted. In legal contexts, acting on false memories can have 
severe consequences, as the next section will illustrate. 
 
2.1.4.4 Conclusion 
In real life, eyewitnesses may be exposed to a wide range of potential 
intervening events, such as repeated attempts to remember, suggestions from 
other people, and misleading interview questions. These intervening events 
may have considerable impacts on eyewitness testimony, ranging from 
misremembering minor details of the witnessed event, to falsely remembering 
complete events that never happened. The next section will outline potential 
consequences of the shortcomings of eyewitness memory. 
 
2.1.5 Legal Consequences of the Fallibility of Memory 
2.1.5.1 Eyewitness Identifications 
Kirk N. Bloodsworth was convicted of sexually assaulting and murdering a 9-
year old girl (Maryland v. Bloodsworth, 1984). Bloodsworth became a suspect 
because his appearance closely matched the composite sketch based on the 
recollections of five eyewitnesses. Probably due to this similarity, one witness 
identified Bloodsworth from a photo line-up, and at trial, all five witnesses 
testified that they had seen Bloodworth with the victim. He was sentenced to 
death. Eight years later, DNA testing proved that Bloodsworth could not have 
been the source of the semen found in the victim’s underwear, and he was 
released from prison. Even though DNA evidence had excluded him, many 
people, including one of the original prosecutors, remained convinced of 
Bloodsworth’s guilt. After all, five eyewitnesses had identified him as the 
murderer. Nineteen years after Bloodsworth had been sentenced to death, the 
real perpetrator was found, and Bloodsworth could finally move on with his 
life (for more information about this case, see Innocence Project, 2011b; 
Junkin, 2004; Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006).  
The Bloodsworth case illustrates that even multiple eyewitnesses can be 
wrong, especially when the initial reason to arrest a particular suspect (i.e., 
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conformity to the witnesses’ descriptions of the perpetrator) subsequently 
influences identification decisions as well. Furthermore, the case highlights 
the persuasiveness of eyewitness identification evidence. Indeed, the 
overwhelming majority of wrongful convictions have involved mistaken 
eyewitness identifications (Connors, Lundregan, Miller, & McEwen, 1996; 
Gross, Jacoby, Matheson, Montgomery, & Patil, 2005; Innocence Project, 
2011a; Rattner, 1988; Scheck, Neufield, & Dywer, 2003; Wells et al., 1998). 
Witnesses may make false identifications as a result of naturally occurring 
memory distortions, for instance due to long delays (Shapiro & Penrod, 1986; 
Sporer, 1992), own-race bias (Gross et al., 2005; Meissner & Brigham, 2001), or 
weapon focus (Steblay, 1992). In addition, identification decisions may be 
influenced by misleading suggestions from external sources, such as biased 
line-up instructions (S. E. Clark, 2005; Malpass & Devine, 1981a) or co-witness 
influences (Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). 
 
2.1.5.2 False Memories of Criminal Events 
Even though mistaken identifications are probably the most frequent severe 
type of memory distortion in legal settings, people sometimes also falsely 
remember criminal events that never happened. The most harrowing 
examples of such instances involve the delayed report of “recovered” 
memories of childhood sexual abuse (see Gudjonsson, 1997; Loftus, 1993; 
Ofshe & Watters, 1996; Wakefield & Underwager, 1992). The 1980s and 1990s 
witnessed a surge in allegations from adults claiming to have been sexually 
abused as a child. The claims of abuse almost always emerged as a result of 
intensive “memory work” in psychotherapy (see Lindsay & Read, 1995, for 
more on suggestive memory recovery techniques). One particularly striking 
example of such a case is the Dutch case of Yolanda van B., or the “Eper incest 
case”. Yolanda accused her parents and various other people in her village of 
“continual sexual abuse, 23 illegal abortions, the murders of at least six babies, 
and the sexual abuse of her children” (Wagenaar, 1996, p. 182; see also 
Chapter 2 in Wagenaar, Van Koppen, & Israëls, 2009). Legal psychologists 
Wagenaar and Soppe testified that all of the verifiable facts reported by 
Yolanda were factually inaccurate; yet astonishingly, the suspects were 
convicted and some of them are still in confinement today. This example 
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illustrates that witnesses and victims do not only make false identifications, 
but can even come to remember horrific criminal events that never occurred.  
 
2.1.5.3 Errors in Eyewitness Testimony 
The present thesis is mostly concerned with somewhat less dramatic cases of 
distorted eyewitness recall. Witnesses often misremember certain details of 
the witnessed crime, which may turn out to be crucial in police investigations. 
For instance, Loftus (2003) highlighted a case of communal memory distortion 
during the sniper attacks that killed ten people in the Washington DC area. 
Initially, various witnesses reported seeing a white van fleeing the scene of the 
crime. After distribution of this information by the media, even more 
witnesses started remembering a white van (i.e., memory conformity; Gabbert 
et al., 2006; D. B. Wright et al., 2010; D. B. Wright & Schwartz, 2010). When the 
snipers were caught, however, they were driving a blue car. This case 
illustrates that the misremembering of certain details of a criminal event may 
have significant consequences for police investigations: as a result of the 
multiple eyewitness reports, the police were looking for a white van. The 
present thesis examines whether a new interview instruction, eye-closure, can 
help witnesses remember more event details, and at the same time reduce the 
number of incorrect details reported. Given that the information obtained 
from witnesses is often crucial in police investigations (Coupe & Griffiths, 
1996; Fisher, 1995; Kebbell & Milne, 1998; Milne & Bull, 2003b), an instruction 
with the potential to improve eyewitness memory could have a real impact in 
criminal investigations. 
 
2.1.6 Conclusion 
The main message to take away from this section on eyewitness memory is 
best captured in the words of Wagenaar: “Without falling into the trap of 
portraying autobiographical memory as a wholly inadequate device, we can 
safely say that it is not precise.” (1996, p. 180). 
 
 
Chapter 2  Helping Witnesses Remember 
27 
 
2.2 Investigative Interviewing 
 
The previous section highlighted the fallibility of eyewitness memory. Because 
information obtained from eyewitnesses may provide crucial leads for police 
investigations, many researchers have attempted to develop methods to help 
witnesses remember more. The most prominent of these interview methods 
will be discussed in this section. 
 
2.2.1 The Reid Technique 
About a century ago, it was perfectly acceptable in most Western countries to 
inflict physical pain in order to obtain information from suspects and 
witnesses. The use of such methods declined gradually in the first half of the 
twentieth century and was replaced by interview techniques that were more 
psychological in nature (Kassin, 2006). In 1962, Inbau and Reid published the 
first edition of the interrogation manual Criminal interrogation and 
confessions, which advocates “non-coercive” but psychologically manipulative 
interview tactics. On the website promoting the Reid Technique, the authors 
state that “the text has been referenced in U.S. Supreme Court decisions and is 
considered the ‘Bible’ of interrogation for the professional investigator” (Reid 
& Associates Inc., 2011a). Kassin and McNall (1991) identified two main 
approaches in the Reid Technique: maximisation, which includes 
intimidation, presentation of false evidence, and exaggeration of the 
seriousness of the crime and the charges; and minimisation, which includes 
downplaying the seriousness of the crime, offering face-saving excuses, and 
implying leniency. 
The Reid Technique is the most frequently used interview technique in 
the United States (Gudjonsson & Pearse, 2011; Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 
2001) and similar techniques have been used elsewhere, such as the United 
Kingdom (Shawyer, Milne, & Bull, 2009), France, Belgium, The Netherlands 
(Clément, Van de Plas, Van den Eshof, & Nierop, 2009), Norway, Sweden, and 
Finland (Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009). Although the Reid technique is mostly 
used for interviewing suspects, it is also advertised to be appropriate for “the 
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elicitation of information within forensic settings of depositions, jury 
selection, direct/cross examination, and witness statements” (Reid & 
Associates Inc., 2011b). Indeed, a number of notorious cases have recently 
come to light in which witnesses and victims were interrogated with coercive 
methods similar to the ones advertised by Reid and associates (for instance, 
the McMartin preschool case, Garven, Wood, & Malpass, 2000; and the 
Schiedam park murder case, van Koppen, 2008).  
Despite its prevalence, most academic scholars consider the Reid 
Technique highly inappropriate and potentially dangerous. First, the Reid 
technique increases the risk of false confessions, which may result in the 
incarceration of innocent persons (Gudjonsson, 2003; Gudjonsson & Pearse, 
2011; Kassin, 1997; Wakefield & Underwager, 1998). Second, a larger amount 
of accurate information can be obtained from suspects and witnesses by using 
less confrontational interview methods (Gudjonsson & Pearse, 2011; Milne & 
Bull, 1999; Powell & Bartholomew, 2003; Shepherd, 1988). In Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court found the practices described by 
Inbau and Reid (1962) to be inherently coercive. Similarly, Pearse and 
Gudjonsson (1999) found that evidence obtained with Reid-like interview 
tactics was less likely to be admissible in court. Nevertheless, the Reid 
technique is still often endorsed among law enforcement agencies and legal 
professionals (see, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 2004).  
 
2.2.2 Hypnosis 
Another relatively widespread, yet controversial, interview method is 
hypnosis. The use of hypnosis to help witnesses and victims remember more 
dates back at least 150 years (Lilienfeld & Landfield, 2008; Webert, 2003), and 
has been documented in many different countries, including the United States 
(Ault, 1979), Canada (C. Perry & Laurence, 1983), the United Kingdom 
(Haward, 1988), Belgium (Clément et al., 2009), and Israel (Clifford & Bull, 
1978). Although specific procedures may vary depending on the situation, 
hypnotic interviewing typically involves an initial phase of establishing 
rapport, a procedure to induce and deepen the hypnotic state (e.g., looking at 
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a moving visual display), and instructions to facilitate memory retrieval (e.g., 
“age regression”, in which the interviewee travels back in time to re-
experience the event; for more information see Kebbell & Wagstaff, 1998). 
Various studies examining the effectiveness of hypnosis have found that it 
helps witnesses to remember more (e.g., Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & 
Holland, 1985; Hibbard & Worring, 1981; Ready, Bothwell, & Brigham, 1997; 
Yuille & Kim, 1987). Indeed, in Beck v. Norris (1986), hypnosis helped five 
eyewitnesses to produce a new composite sketch that led to the apprehension 
of a suspect, who was later independently verified to be the perpetrator of a 
robbery (Webert, 2003). Nevertheless, the effects of hypnosis on eyewitness 
memory have not been uniformly positive. 
 Kebbel and Wagstaff (1998) identified three main problems associated 
with hypnosis. First, hypnosis may induce false memories (see Erdelyi, 1994, 
for a review). For instance, consider the case of State v. Mack (1980), in which 
a hypnotised individual remembered “eating pizza in a restaurant that did not 
serve pizza, seeing tattoos on someone who had none, and having been 
repeatedly stabbed where there was only evidence of a single cut.” (Webert, 
2003, p. 1301). In light of the finding that hypnosis encourages the report of 
both true and false information, it is imperative to establish whether it affects 
testimonial accuracy, that is, the proportion of correct to incorrect details 
provided by witnesses (cf. Gabbert et al., 2009; Ginet & Verkampt, 2007; 
Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010; Smeets, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2004). A 
number of studies have shown that the increase in incorrect recall associated 
with hypnosis is such that overall testimonial accuracy deteriorates 
significantly (Dinges et al., 1992; Dywan & Bowers, 1983; Sanders & Simmons, 
1983).  
Second, hypnosis tends to inflate confidence regardless of accuracy, 
resulting in false testimony that is reported with a high level of confidence 
(Dywan & Bowers, 1983; Sheehan, Grigg, & McCann, 1984; Zelig & Beidleman, 
1981). Given that jurors often decide whether testimony is reliable on the basis 
of the witness’s expressed confidence (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990; Wells, 
Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979; Wheatcroft et al., 2004), such misplaced 
confidence poses potential dangers in courtroom settings. Third, hypnosis 
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may increase an interviewee’s susceptibility to leading questions (Dywan & 
Bowers, 1983; Sheehan et al., 1984; Zelig & Beidleman, 1981).  
Taken together, the problems outlined above suggest that the forensic 
use of hypnosis is inadvisable. In the United Kingdom, the Home Office (1988) 
has issued guidelines discouraging the use of hypnosis in investigative 
interviews, and in the United States, many state courts have banned evidence 
obtained from victims and witnesses who have been interviewed with 
hypnosis (Webert, 2003). Nevertheless, hypnotic interviewing is still being 
used in some other countries, such as Belgium (Clément et al., 2009; see also 
Lilienfeld & Landfield, 2008). Even though the traditional approach to 
hypnosis may no longer be tenable, Wagstaff and collaborators present a 
convincing argument that certain components of the technique, related to 
attention, concentration, and imagination, may still prove valuable in police 
investigations (Wagstaff, 2008; Wagstaff et al., 2004; Wagstaff, Cole, 
Wheatcroft, Marshall, & Barsby, 2007; Wagstaff et al., 2010; Wagstaff, 
Wheatcroft, Caddick, Kirby, & Lamont, 2011).  
 
2.2.3 Context Reinstatement 
One procedure originating from the “revivication” technique in hypnotic 
interviewing is context reinstatement (Hibbard & Worring, 1981; Wagstaff et al., 
2007). Context reinstatement is based on the idea that recall of a certain event 
is better if the context of that event is recreated during the interview. In this 
section, the literature on context-dependent memory will first be reviewed, 
followed by a discussion of mental context reinstatement in eyewitness 
settings. 
 
2.2.3.1 Context-Dependent Memory 
The famous philosopher John Locke once told a story about a young man who 
had learnt to dance in a specific room containing an old trunk. He explained 
that “the idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself 
with the turns and steps of all his dances” (Locke, as cited in Dennis, 1948, p. 
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68), that he could dance excellently well only when the old trunk was there. 
Locke eloquently illustrated the idea of context-dependent memory.  
Context-dependent memory refers to the idea that information 
encoded in a certain context is best retrieved in that context. Although a few 
studies on context-dependent memory had been conducted previously (e.g., 
Jensen, Harris, & Anderson, 1971; Rand & Wapner, 1967), the seminal work on 
this phenomenon is generally considered to be Godden and Baddeley’s (1975) 
diver study. Godden and Baddeley had 18 divers study a list of 36 spoken 
words, either under water (‘wet’) or on land (‘dry’). After five minutes, they 
asked the divers to list as many words as they could remember, either under 
water (on a formica board) or on land. The experimental design was such that 
the learning and retrieval environment were matched for half of the divers 
(either wet-wet or dry-dry), and mismatched for the other half of the divers 
(either wet-dry or dry-wet). Godden and Baddeley found that what was 
learned under water was significantly better recalled under water, and what 
was learned on land was significantly better recalled on land.  
Subsequent research attempting to replicate the context effect in 
different settings has not always succeeded (Eich, 1980; Fernandez & 
Glenberg, 1985). For instance, Godden and Baddeley (1980) did not replicate 
their earlier findings when using a recognition test, and similar findings were 
reported by Smith, Glenberg, and Bjork (1978). Smith and Vela (2001) 
conducted a meta-analysis on context-dependent memory and found that the 
context effect is reliable, but modest in size (d = .28). Whether context 
dependency is observed depends on a number of factors. The principle of 
encoding specificity (Thomson & Tulving, 1970; Tulving, 1974, 1983) states that 
recall may be facilitated by cues that were encoded along with the to-be-
remembered material. Therefore, if no context information is encoded during 
the learning phase (e.g., due to effortful processing of the to-be-learned 
stimuli; Glenberg, 1997; Glenberg, Schroeder, & Robertson, 1998), then 
context cues during retrieval will not be helpful (overshadowing; cf. S. M. 
Smith & Vela, 2001). Conversely, if context information was encoded during 
the learning phase but is not used by the rememberer because stronger cues 
are available during retrieval, then context cues will not improve recall 
(outshining; cf. S. M. Smith, 1988). In sum, context effects are most 
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pronounced when participants do not have access to more effective cues 
during either encoding or retrieval.  
Recall is not only dependent on one’s physical environment, but also 
on one’s internal state. First, the mood experienced during retrieval biases the 
type of information that is most likely to be retrieved. For instance, if a witness 
is sad during the interview, she is more likely to retrieve sad memories than 
happy memories, a phenomenon called mood congruency (e.g., Blaney, 1986; 
Bower, 1981; Madigan & Bollenbach, 1982; Snyder & White, 1982). Second, it 
has been suggested that neutral information that was encoded in a particular 
mood is best retrieved in that mood, known as mood dependency. Although 
the evidence for mood dependency is not as robust as that for mood 
congruency (Baddeley, 2007; Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981; Schare, 
Lisman, & Spear, 1984), several studies have found support for the existence of 
mood-dependent memory (e.g., Balch, Myers, & Papotto, 1999; Eich, 
Macaulay, & Ryan, 1994; Eich & Metcalfe, 1989; Ucros, 1989). In addition, there 
are some indications that materials learned under the influence of marihuana, 
alcohol, or cigarettes may be best retrieved in the same drug-induced state 
(Darley, Tinklenberg, Roth, & Atkinson, 1974; Goodwin, Powell, Bremer, 
Hoine, & Stern, 1969; R. Peters & McGee, 1982; respectively), although the 
strength of the evidence regarding this issue is modest at best. In line with the 
findings on mood-dependent and state-dependent memory, Eich (1995) has 
suggested that the effects of external context on recall may be observed in part 
because the external context triggers the internal state that was experienced 
by the rememberer whilst in that environment (see also S. M. Smith, 1995; S. 
M. Smith & Vela, 2001). 
 
2.2.3.2 Mental Context Reinstatement 
The investigative interviewer can use the principle of context-dependent 
memory to his3 advantage by helping the witness to mentally reinstate the 
context of the witnessed event. Mental context reinstatement (MCR) involves 
the use of mental imagery to put oneself back into the context of a previous 
                                                      
3 Following in Fisher and Geiselman’s footsteps (1992; Note 2, p. 3), to avoid ambiguity the 
present thesis will refer to the eyewitness with feminine pronouns and to the interviewer with 
masculine pronouns. 
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experience (see also section 2.3.2.2). Perhaps the most readily apparent form 
of mental imagery is visual in nature (i.e., picturing a scene in the “mind’s 
eye”). Nevertheless, as sagaciously observed by Clifford and George (1996), 
MCR is not limited to visual imagery, but rather involves “inviting the witness 
to think back to all surrounding ‘events’, including visual, auditory, tactual, 
kinaesthetic, and emotional” (p. 245).  
Smith (1979) was the first to show that the context effects described in 
the previous section can be brought under cognitive control. His participants 
learned a number of words in a particular room, and were tested either in the 
same room or in a different room. Some of the participants who were tested in 
a different room were instructed to try to remember the input room, whereas 
others received no such instruction. Smith found that participants instructed 
to remember the input room performed as well as participants who were 
tested in the actual input room, and that both of these groups performed 
better than participants who were tested in a different room and received no 
MCR instructions.  
After Smith’s (1979) research on word recall, a number of studies 
investigated the use of MCR in eyewitness settings. For instance, Malpass and 
Devine (1981b) found that students who witnessed a staged vandalism were 
better at identifying the vandal after taking part in a “guided memory” 
procedure, in which “their feelings, their memory of details of the room, their 
memory of the vandal, and their immediate reactions to the events were 
explored” (p. 346). This finding was later replicated in both laboratory (Davies 
& Milne, 1982) and field settings (Krafka & Penrod, 1985). In follow-up 
research, Cutler, Penrod, and Martens (1987a) compared two types of context 
reinstatement procedures on identification of a robber: the “context 
interview”, which included mnemonic instructions, viewing snapshots of the 
crime scene, and rereading earlier descriptions of the event; and the “lineup 
context cues” procedure (cf. Cutler, Penrod, O'Rourke, & Martens, 1986), 
which involved being exposed to a number of cues, such as voice, gait, and 
posture of the perpetrator. They found that both types of context 
reinstatement improved identification accuracy, especially when the 
identification task was difficult (e.g., due to delay or disguise). These findings 
contrast with the earlier failures to find context effects with recognition tests 
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of words (Godden & Baddeley, 1980; S. M. Smith et al., 1978). This discrepancy 
might be observed because words tend to be more associable than faces, and 
the associations formed for words during the learning phase may overshadow 
the salience of context cues (S. M. Smith & Vela, 2001). However, even for 
recognition of faces, the benefits of MCR have not always been replicated (e.g., 
Davies & Milne, 1985; Sanders, 1984). 
Although most studies on context reinstatement in eyewitness settings 
have concerned facial recognition, there is some evidence that it helps recall 
of witnessed events. For instance, Hammond, Wagstaff, and Cole (2006) found 
that MCR increased the amount of information reported about a videotaped 
crime for both adult and child witnesses, in both free and cued recall. 
Furthermore, witnesses interviewed with context reinstatement outperformed 
those interviewed with focused meditation. Wagstaff et al. (2011) replicated 
the procedure with younger children, and found context reinstatement and 
focused meditation to be equally effective in improving their recall of a 
videotaped mundane event. Furthermore, Clifford and George (1996) found 
that the instruction to reinstate context is used consistently by police officers 
in the field, and that substantially more information is obtained when the 
instruction is given. They concluded that MCR “is clearly a powerful tool, and 
is effective in a real life setting” (p. 244). 
Krafka and Penrod (1985) report an additional potential benefit of 
context reinstatement: they found that the procedure increased the 
correlation between confidence and accuracy of line-up decisions. In contrast, 
however, Hammond et al. (2006) found that context reinstatement inflated 
confidence in erroneous recall. As noted by Hammond and colleagues, the 
impact of context reinstatement on witness confidence has received relatively 
little attention to date.  Given that jurors often judge witness credibility on the 
basis of their confidence (Cutler et al., 1990; Wells et al., 1979; Wheatcroft et 
al., 2004), this seems to be a fruitful area for further research.  
One might argue that, whenever possible, the investigative interviewer 
should take the witness back to the scene of the crime (i.e., physical context 
reinstatement), to maximise the overlap between encoding and retrieval 
context. Besides the practical concerns with such a procedure, one study 
suggests that physical context reinstatement is actually slightly less effective 
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than its mental counterpart. Hershkowitz et al. (2002) interviewed young 
alleged victims of sexual abuse, and found that children who were asked to 
mentally reconstruct the setting in which the incidents occurred reported 
more information in response to free-recall prompts than children who 
actually returned to the scene of the incidents. One potential explanation for 
this finding is that the physical environment may have changed between the 
time of encoding and the time of retrieval (Hershkowitz et al., 2002; Orbach, 
Hershkowitz, Lamb, Sternberg, & Horowitz, 2000). For instance, if the crime 
took place outside, there may be changes in weather, lighting conditions, 
parked cars, and passersby (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). Such changes would 
not only reduce the similarity between encoding and retrieval context, but 
could also expose the interviewee to additional distractions. With MCR, on the 
other hand, the witness is in control of her mental copy of the encoding 
environment.  
Several moderators of the effect of MCR on recall have been identified 
(Emmett, Clifford, & Gwyer, 2003; Memon & Bruce, 1985; Thomson & Davies, 
1988). For instance, MCR seems to be effective in free recall, but not cued 
recall (Emmett et al., 2003; Ready et al., 1997; Wagstaff et al., 2011; but see 
Hammond et al., 2006). This finding might be explained by the ‘outshining 
hypothesis’ (S. M. Smith, 1988): the strong cues provided by the questions 
themselves may ‘outshine’ or overpower the weaker cues provided by MCR. In 
addition, it has been suggested that certain individuals may benefit more from 
MCR than others (Emmett et al., 2003; McSpadden, Schooler, & Loftus, 1988; 
S. M. Smith & Rothkopf, 1984). For instance, Emmett and colleagues found 
that individuals who have difficulty separating essential information from its 
context benefit more from MCR than participants who are more selective in 
their information uptake.  
All in all, there is a broad evidence base for the effectiveness of MCR on 
eyewitness memory. It should be noted, however, that the actual context 
reinstatement component might not be the sole factor driving the effect. 
Given that context effects can be relatively weak (Fernandez & Glenberg, 1985; 
S. M. Smith & Vela, 2001), it is possible that other factors contribute to the 
effectiveness of MCR. For instance, the MCR procedure may improve recall by 
helping witnesses to concentrate and relax. Indeed, Wagstaff et al. (2011) 
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found that focused meditation was just as effective for adult witnesses as 
MCR. From an applied perspective, how MCR works is not as important as the 
fact that it works (although it might be useful to explain the rationale of the 
method to police interviewers). Thanks to its effectiveness, the MCR 
instruction has been incorporated in the Cognitive Interview protocol, to 
which we turn next. 
 
2.2.4 Cognitive Interview 
The finding that eyewitness memory can be improved with certain mnemonic 
techniques has led to the development of comprehensive investigative 
interview protocols incorporating these techniques. Some of the protocols 
have been developed with a specific target group in mind. For instance, 
conversation management was designed to help overcome resistance in 
investigative interviews, for example from suspects or uncooperative 
witnesses (Shepherd, 1988). Another example is the National Institute of Child 
Health and Human Development (NICHD) protocol, which was developed for 
children who may have been victims of abuse (Orbach, Hershkowitz, Lamb, 
Sternberg, Esplin, et al., 2000). It has been shown that interviewers using the 
NICHD protocol elicit substantially more forensically relevant information 
from alleged victims of abuse than interviewers who do not use the protocol 
(see Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2007, for a review of the 
available evidence), and there are some indications that the additional 
information elicited is also more likely to be accurate (Lamb, Orbach, 
Hershkowitz, Horowitz, & Abbott, 2007). Furthermore, the additional 
information elicited has been found to increase the likelihood of charges being 
pressed and subsequent conviction of the suspect (Pipe, Orbach, Lamb, 
Abbott, & Stewart, 2008).  
  In the present review, I will focus on an interview protocol that was 
developed for a wider population and has undergone much empirical testing. 
Based on a number of psychological principles, Geiselman and Fisher 
developed a set of practical guidelines for investigative interviewers, termed 
the Cognitive Interview (CI; Geiselman et al., 1984; Geiselman et al., 1985; 
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Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1986). The CI is intended to help 
interviewers obtain more accurate information from victims, witnesses, 
suspects, and informants alike (cf. Milne & Bull, 2003b). In 1992, Fisher and 
Geiselman refined the CI, incorporating additional findings from the literature 
on interviewing, as well as feedback from the police. In this section, I will first 
explore the instructions used in the enhanced CI, followed by a review of the 
empirical evidence to support the protocol, concluding with a discussion of its 
practical implementation.  
 
2.2.4.1 Instructions 
The enhanced version of the Cognitive Interview includes a number of general 
interviewing principles to motivate the witness, as well as several specific 
techniques to provide mnemonic aids (see Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). In 
terms of general principles, the CI advocates that: (a) the eyewitness takes an 
active role, (b) the interviewer establishes a level of trust and rapport with the 
witness, and (c) the interviewer first obtains an uninterrupted free account, 
which is followed by (neutrally worded) questions. In terms of specific 
mnemonic techniques, the interviewer should instruct the witness: (a) to 
report everything, (b) to mentally reinstate the context of the witnessed event, 
and (c) to retrieve the event on multiple and varied occasions. For instance, 
the witness may be asked to recall the event in backward chronological order, 
from different perspectives, or in different sensory modalities. Furthermore, 
Fisher and Geiselman suggest that eye-closure on the part of the witness may 
improve memory retrieval (although this recommendation was not based on 
empirical research at the time). Many studies have sought to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the CI techniques, which will be reviewed in the next section.  
 
2.2.4.2 Effectiveness 
Since the development of the Cognitive Interview, approximately 65 studies 
have been published on the topic (Memon, Meissner, et al., 2010). Instead of 
discussing individual studies, I will report in some detail the findings of two 
meta-analyses conducted on the CI. About twelve years ago, Köhnken et al. 
(1999) conducted a highly influential and oft-cited meta-analysis on the 
effectiveness of the CI. They reviewed 42 experimental studies (29 of which 
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were published) including nearly 2,500 interviewees, containing 55 
comparisons between the CI and some form of control interview. Some 
studies compared the CI to a standard interview similar to procedures often 
used in practice (to provide an ecologically valid comparison, in line with the 
‘applied research view’). Other studies compared the CI to a structured 
interview, which involves an equal amount of interview training as the CI, but 
does not include the specific mnemonic techniques (to examine whether the 
CI is purely due to motivational or training effects, in line with the ‘theoretical 
research view’). 
Köhnken et al.’s (1999) main finding was that the CI (compared to a 
control interview) significantly increased the amount of correct information (d 
= .87), as well as the amount of incorrect information (d = .28) obtained from 
witnesses. Because the increase in errors was substantially smaller than the 
increase correct information, overall testimonial accuracy for both types of 
interviews was nearly identical (with 85% of reported details correct for the CI 
and 82% correct for the control interview). Thus, it seems that the CI does not 
simply shift participants’ response criterion; in that case, a decrease in 
testimonial accuracy would have been expected (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 
In addition, Köhnken and colleagues (1999) identified a number of 
moderators of the effectiveness of the CI. In terms of the type of to-be-
remembered event, the CI is significantly more effective for staged events than 
for videotaped events, and significantly more effective for recent events than 
for events that happened longer ago. In terms of the type of witness, the CI 
seems to elicit slightly more correct details and significantly more incorrect 
details from adults than from children, and elicits significantly more correct 
details from active witnesses than from passive witnesses. In terms of the type 
of interview, the enhanced version of the CI generates significantly more 
incorrect details than the original version. Finally, in terms of research 
laboratories, Fisher and Geiselman and colleagues found significantly larger 
increases in both correct and incorrect details with the CI than researchers in 
other laboratories. All in all, Köhnken et al. concluded that the benefits of the 
CI on correct recall are “remarkably stable and consistent” (p. 20), and that 
“the worst possible effect that may be obtained when a cognitive interview 
instead of a standard interview is applied is simply no effect at all.” (p. 20). 
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 More recently, Memon et al. (2010) published an updated meta-
analysis assessing the effectiveness of the CI, which may well become just as 
influential as its predecessor. Unlike Köhnken et al. (1999), they only included 
studies published in peer-reviewed outlets, to mirror legal standards for 
proffered scientific testimony (e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
1993). Their meta-analysis comprised of 46 published studies (including 17 
new studies), describing 59 comparisons between the CI and some form of 
control interview (standard, structured, or free-recall), representing the 
responses of almost 2,900 participants. They found even greater benefits of the 
CI overall, with an effect size of d = 1.20 for correct details and d = .24 for 
incorrect details, and no significant difference between the CI and the control 
interview in terms of testimonial accuracy. Thus, Memon et al. provided 
additional support for the effectiveness of the CI.  
Like Köhnken et al. (1999), Memon and colleagues (2010) identified a 
number of moderators in the effectiveness of the CI. They obtained similar 
findings with regard to the age of the witness and retention interval (see 
above). In addition, they found that the CI was less effective for events that 
likely generated emotional arousal than for neutral events, though the effect 
was still substantial even for emotionally arousing events. The difference 
between the original and the enhanced versions of the CI obtained by 
Köhnken et al. was not replicated, but they found that modified (typically 
shortened) versions of the CI produced significantly more incorrect details 
than the original and enhanced versions. Finally, they distinguished between 
the different forms of control interviews, and found that larger effect sizes for 
the CI were obtained when it was compared to a standard interview as 
opposed to a structured interview. In other words, structured interviews are 
more effective than standard interviews.  
Type of recall format (free versus cued) was not included as a 
moderator of the effectiveness of the CI in the meta-analyses, probably 
because most studies on the CI have collapsed findings across the different 
interview phases. Nevertheless, a few studies have analysed the phases 
separately, yielding mixed results. Some studies with adult and child witnesses 
(Davis, McMahon, & Greenwood, 2005; Holliday, 2003a) have replicated the 
findings obtained for MCR (Emmett et al., 2003; Ready et al., 1997; Wagstaff et 
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al., 2011); that is, the CI was more beneficial in free recall than in cued recall. 
Other studies with child witnesses, however (Memon, Wark, Bull, & Köhnken, 
1997; Milne & Bull, 2003a), have reported the opposite pattern; that is, the 
recall advantage of the CI was observed in the cued recall phase, but not the 
free recall phase. The apparent inconsistency of these findings will be further 
addressed in section 2.3.1.2. 
Besides the increase in the amount of information obtained, several 
additional benefits of the CI have been reported. For instance, unlike 
hypnosis, the CI does not inflate confidence in incorrect responses (Allwood, 
Ask, & Granhag, 2005; Granhag, Jonsson, & Allwood, 2004; Gwyer & Clifford, 
1997; McMahon, 2000; Mello & Fisher, 1996; see also Roberts & Higham, 2002). 
Moreover, the CI has been found to protect against the incorporation of 
misleading information into eyewitness testimony, provided that the 
interview is conducted prior to encountering the misinformation (Geiselman, 
Fisher, Cohen, et al., 1986; Memon, Zaragoza, et al., 2010). This may be 
because the CI enhances witnesses’ ability to notice discrepancies between 
their original memory and the misleading information (consistent with the 
discrepancy detection principle; Garry, Loftus, & Brown, 1994; Hall, Loftus, & 
Tousignant, 1984; Loftus, Levidow, & Duensing, 1992; Tousignant et al., 1986). 
In conclusion, the CI increases the amount of relevant information obtained 
from witnesses without inflating confidence or decreasing testimonial 
accuracy, and may even protect against the incorporation of misleading 
information encountered after the event.  
 
2.2.4.3 Practical Implementation 
Elements of the Cognitive Interview have been included in police interview 
training in a number of different countries, such as New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada (Fisher, Milne, & Bull, 2011), Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland 
(Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009), and The Netherlands (Clément et al., 2009). The CI 
has perhaps been most widely implemented in the United Kingdom. In 
response to growing criticism of police interviewing practices (e.g., Baldwin, 
1992), the PEACE interview model was developed, and all police officers in 
England and Wales were trained according to this model (Clarke & Milne, 
2001). PEACE is a mnemonic for five interview stages: Planning and 
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preparation, Engage and explain, Account, Closure, and Evaluation. In the 
Account stage, conversation management and the CI are recommended to 
facilitate the production of a detailed account of the witnessed event.  
Even though research findings suggest that the CI is effective, a number 
of problems with the practical implementation of the procedure have been 
reported. In a national evaluation of the PEACE approach, Clarke and Milne 
(2001) found that police interviewers in England and Wales had failed to use 
the CI in 83% of interviews. Police officers have provided a number of reasons 
why the CI is difficult to use in practice. First, there is the issue of training: the 
CI procedure takes a significant amount of training and even trained 
interviewers do not always adhere to the procedures (Kebbell & Wagstaff, 
1999). In addition, interviewer skills have been found to decline after initial 
training (Griffiths & Milne, 2006). Furthermore, it takes much longer to 
conduct a CI than it does to conduct a standard interview, and police officers 
report that they simply do not have the luxury of time for the bulk of criminal 
cases (Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2008; Kebbell, Milne, & Wagstaff, 1999). 
Certain elements of the CI, such as the instructions to report everything 
and reinstate mental context, are considered to be more useful than other 
elements, such as the “reverse order” and “change perspective” instructions 
(Clifford & George, 1996; Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009a; Kebbell et al., 1999; 
Memon, Holley, Milne, Köhnken, & Bull, 1994; Milne & Bull, 2002). The 
elements that are judged to be less useful are rarely used in practice, and when 
they are used, they are often poorly applied. In addition, when interviewers 
deem certain CI techniques to be inappropriate for a particular witness, they 
often abandon the CI approach altogether, rather than using it flexibly (Milne 
& Bull, 2003b). All in all, it seems that the CI is a good idea in theory, but is not 
feasible to implement in the majority of criminal cases, except perhaps in the 
most serious cases for which more time and resources are available (Clarke & 
Milne, 2001; Kebbell et al., 1999; Milne & Bull, 2003b).  
To combat some of the practical concerns, a number of researchers 
have developed modified versions of the CI, which shorten the time necessary 
to conduct a CI, while preserving its benefits. For instance, Boon and Noon 
(1994) found that the “change perspective” instruction did not have any 
additional benefits on top of an initial retrieval attempt (but see Milne & Bull, 
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2002), and Mello and Fisher (1996) found that a modified CI without the 
“change perspective” instruction was just as effective for older adults as the 
enhanced CI. Davis et al. (2005) found that both the “change perspective” and 
the “reverse order” technique could be omitted from the enhanced CI without 
any loss in the amount and accuracy of information obtained from witnesses. 
In another modified procedure developed by Dando and collaborators, the 
traditional MCR procedure was replaced by the instruction to provide a sketch 
of the witnessed event (Dando, Wilcock, Behnkle, & Milne, 2011; Dando, 
Wilcock, & Milne, 2009b; Dando, Wilcock, Milne, & Henry, 2009; see also 
Gabbert et al., 2009). The researchers found the sketch method to be just as 
effective as the traditional context reinstatement procedure, and proposed 
that the technique “may be a viable, less complex and less time consuming 
alternative” for less serious cases (Dando, Wilcock, et al., 2009b, p. 138).  
Although the development of shortened interview procedures seems 
promising from a practical perspective, Memon et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis 
showed that the modified CI procedures tend to increase the number of 
incorrect details reported by the witness. Since eyewitness accuracy is often of 
paramount importance in criminal proceedings, there still seems to be room 
for improvement. 
 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
A number of interview methods have been proposed to improve eyewitness 
memory, of which the Cognitive Interview seems to be the most effective. 
Nevertheless, due to time constraints and limited resources, the Cognitive 
Interview has turned out to be difficult to implement in practice. For this 
reason, it would be helpful to have an alternative interview procedure that 
does not require additional interview time or training. One such procedure 
could be closing the eyes during the interview, which will be discussed in the 
next section. 
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2.3 Eye-Closure 
 
When we are deeply engaged in thought, this may be reflected in our outward 
behaviour. For instance, we might start walking more slowly (Kundera, 1996), 
speaking more slowly (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992), look away, or close our eyes 
(Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972; Argyle & Cook, 1976; Brooks, 1967; Fisher 
& Geiselman, 1992). What is perhaps even more interesting is that such bodily 
manifestations may not only be side effects of cognitive processes; they may 
also facilitate such processes (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg, 1997; Niedenthal, 
2007). For example, in an interesting line of research, Miles and colleagues 
found not only that people tend to lean backward when thinking about the 
past and forward when thinking about the future (L. K. Miles, Nind, & Macrae, 
2010), but also that the sensation of backward movement can cause people to 
think about the past, and conversely, the sensation of forward movement can 
inspire future thought (L. K. Miles, Karpinska, Lumsden, & Macrae, 2010). This 
line of research illustrates the bidirectional relationship between mental time 
travel and bodily movement. In a similar vein, Glenberg, Schroeder, and 
Robertson (1998) conducted pioneering empirical research into the 
bidirectional relationship between memory performance and the tendency to 
look away or close the eyes. This section will review the research on the effect 
of eye-closure on semantic and episodic memory, discuss potential factors 
involved in the eye-closure effect, and conclude with the proposal of a new 
framework incorporating some of these factors.  
 
2.3.1 Memory Benefits 
2.3.1.1 Semantic Recall 
Having observed the human tendency to look away while trying to remember 
something, Glenberg et al. (1998) decided to study this behaviour in a series of 
controlled experiments. In their first two experiments, they found that the 
tendency to avert gaze was greater for difficult than for easy questions about 
autobiographical and general facts. In their third experiment, they showed 
that the tendency to avert gaze remained even when social factors were 
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eliminated, indicating that the phenomenon is not solely due to social 
embarrassment. Of most interest to the present thesis are Glenberg et al.’s 
(1998) last two experiments, in which they examined the functionality of the 
behaviour. In Experiment 4, they found that instructing people to close their 
eyes during the test increased the proportion of correct responses for 
questions of moderate difficulty by approximately 10%. Their final experiment 
tested the effects of not averting the gaze. Thus, participants were forced to 
look at a visual display that was either simple (a picture of a sunset) or 
complex (a silent movie) while trying to recall words. Participants in the 
simple condition recalled 20% more words than participants in the complex 
condition. The authors explain their findings in terms of the interplay between 
environmental and cognitive control over cognition (Glenberg, 1997), which 
will be explored in more depth in section 2.3.2.3. 
Doherty-Sneddon’s research group investigated whether the 
bidirectional relationship between gaze aversion and memory performance 
reported by Glenberg et al. (1998) would extend to children’s performance. 
First, they found that, like adults, 8-year old children look away more from the 
experimenter’s face when answering difficult as opposed to easy verbal-
reasoning and arithmetic questions (Doherty-Sneddon, Bruce, Bonner, 
Longbotham, & Doyle, 2002; Doherty-Sneddon, Phelps, & Clark, 2007). 
Second, they found that children’s gaze aversion, like adult’s gaze aversion, is 
functional (Doherty-Sneddon, Bonner, & Bruce, 2001; Phelps, Doherty-
Sneddon, & Warnock, 2006). Given that children’s gaze aversion improves 
their performance on cognitive tasks, Phelps et al. (2006) investigated whether 
5-year old children, who do not spontaneously avert their gaze when faced 
with a difficult task (Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2002), could be trained to use 
gaze aversion to their advantage. They found that children who were 
instructed to look away from the experimenter’s face while trying to think of 
the answer to arithmetic and verbal-reasoning questions spent significantly 
more time averting their gaze than children simply instructed to try to think of 
the answer. Crucially, the instructed group also gave significantly more correct 
answers than the uninstructed group. These findings are in need of 
replication, however, since Phelps et al. included only ten children in each 
condition. 
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In sum, looking away or closing the eyes while trying to remember the 
answer to a question has the potential to enhance retrieval from semantic 
memory for both adults and children. The next section will explore the effects 
of eye-closure on episodic recall. 
 
2.3.1.2 Episodic Recall 
Closing the eyes may not only help one to remember the answers to an exam, 
it may also improve recall of an experienced event. Wagstaff et al. (2004, 
Experiment 2) examined the effects of focused meditation and eye-closure on 
recall of Princess Diana’s funeral five years earlier. They found that eye-
closure was a memory aid in its own right, significantly increasing correct free 
recall (but not cued recall) of the event. Crucially, the gain in correct recall 
obtained with eye-closure was not accompanied by an increase in the recall of 
incorrect details (unlike hypnosis; Erdelyi, 1994). Wagstaff et al. (2004) found 
that focused meditation was somewhat more effective than eye-closure; 
however, the efficacy of their eye-closure instruction may have been limited 
by the fact that participants were required to open their eyes to read and 
answer the interview questions (cf. Wagstaff et al., 2010). In addition, Wagstaff 
and colleagues (2004; 2010) found that a focused meditation procedure was 
most effective when it was combined with eye-closure. In short, the Wagstaff 
et al. (2004) study shows that closing the eyes during an investigative interview 
can help witnesses to remember the details of a past public event. 
Perfect et al. (2008) extended this finding to recall of mundane events 
witnessed only once, under various conditions. Their first experiment 
investigated the effect of eye-closure on cued recall of a videotaped simulated 
robbery at a car-dealership, and their second experiment examined cued 
recall of a videotaped local news bulletin. Their third experiment tested free 
recall of a video clip from a little-known TV series. Their fourth and fifth 
experiment tested memory for a staged mundane event, in cued and free 
recall, respectively. Significant and considerable benefits of eye-closure on 
eyewitness memory were observed across all experiments. They concluded 
that the experiments “collectively demonstrate that eye-closure can benefit 
both cued-recall and free-recall, for both visual and auditory materials, for 
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events studied deliberately on video, and for incidentally encoded live 
interactions” (Perfect et al., 2008, p. 321).  
In follow-up research, Perfect, Andrade, and Eagan (2011) combined 
the eye-closure instruction with the presentation of auditory distraction. 
Neither eye-closure nor bursts of white noise during the interview had a 
significant effect on correct recall of visual or auditory information. However, 
noise significantly increased the number of errors reported by participants, 
and eye-closure significantly reduced these errors. Examining the theoretical 
underpinnings of the eye-closure effect further, Perfect, Andrade and Syrett 
(2011) manipulated the complexity and predictability of (meaningless) visual 
distraction in the interview environment. They found that complex (as 
opposed to simple) visual distraction significantly impaired the accuracy, but 
not the number, of responses provided about a news bulletin. They concluded 
that a reduction in visual distraction as a result of eye-closure improves the 
quality rather than the quantity of eyewitness testimony. The work by Perfect 
and colleagues will be considered in further detail in section 2.3.2.3.  
Mastroberardino, Natali, and Candel (2010) investigated whether eye-
closure also improves event recall for 6- and 11-year old children. They tested 
free and cued recall of a video extract from the movie Jurassic Park. The 
selected event was fairly emotional: in the video, a group of people was 
attacked by a Tyrannosaurus Rex, and one man was eaten by the dinosaur. 
Mastroberardino and colleagues found that, irrespective of age, children who 
closed their eyes performed better in cued recall. However, eye-closure had no 
significant effect on free recall performance. This finding adds to the 
conflicting findings concerning the effects of retrieval techniques on free 
versus cued recall. One moderator of the inconsistency seems to be the age of 
the witness. Thus, most studies with children have found that the Cognitive 
Interview (CI) and the eye-closure instruction are more beneficial in cued 
recall than in free recall (Mastroberardino et al., 2010; Memon et al., 1997; 
Milne & Bull, 2003a; but see Holliday, 2003). Most studies with adults, on the 
other hand, have found that the CI, mental context reinstatement (MCR), and 
eye-closure are all either equally beneficial in both types of recall (Hammond 
et al., 2006; Perfect et al., 2008), or more beneficial in free recall than in cued 
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recall (Davis et al., 2005; Emmett et al., 2003; Ready et al., 1997; Wagstaff et al., 
2004; Wagstaff et al., 2011).  
Perhaps, the retrieval techniques trigger different cognitive processes in 
children than in adults. It is likely that, in free recall, interview procedures 
such as the CI, MCR, and eye-closure facilitate accessibility to retrieval cues, 
for adults and children alike (S. M. Smith, 1988; Thomson & Tulving, 1970). 
However, it is possible that adults are better at using such cues to their 
advantage. It has been suggested that adults have richer memory 
representations than young children (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Holliday, 
2003a). Hence, for adults, the provided cues may trigger additional related 
aspects of the memory (J. R. Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; McKoon & 
Ratcliff, 1979), whereas it may do so to a lesser extent for children, whose 
associative connections in memory are perhaps less developed. For children, 
on the other hand, the greater benefits of interview techniques in cued recall 
may be observed because they facilitate an understanding of the interview 
questions; a function which is less relevant for adults, who already tend to 
have a better understanding of the questions (N. W. Perry et al., 1995). Of 
course, these explanations are purely speculative and, unfortunately, 
developmental differences in eyewitness memory are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, for adult witnesses, Experiments 3 and 6 will attempt to 
provide more insight into the role of recall format in the eye-closure effect.  
Wais, Rubens, Boccanfuso, and Gazzaley (2010) examined the neural 
basis of the eye-closure effect. They conducted a behavioural study and a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study. Cued recall of images 
seen an hour earlier was compared across three within-subjects conditions: 
participants had their eyes closed, looked at a gray screen, or looked at 
distraction images of complex scenes. The behavioural results indicated that 
recollection accuracy was significantly higher in the eyes-closed condition 
than in the visual-distraction condition, with participants in the gray-screen 
condition scoring in-between the two other conditions. The fMRI results 
showed that visual distraction during retrieval disrupted functional 
connectivity in a network involving the left inferior frontal gyrus, 
hippocampus, and visual association cortex. In other words, looking at 
irrelevant images reduced activity in brain regions associated with recollection 
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and visual imagery. The Wais et al. study provides interesting insights into 
neurocognitive functions involved in the eye-closure effect. Nevertheless, the 
to-be-remembered stimuli used in their study were quite simple (images of 
common objects). Neural representations of complex events, on the other 
hand, likely involve a wider range of brain regions. Future fMRI research could 
investigate the neural correlates of eye-closure during retrieval of complex 
events. 
To American singer Minnie Riperton, the findings that eye-closure 
improves episodic memory should come as no surprise. Many years ago, she 
already advised of the benefits associated with eye-closure in her song entitled 
“Close your eyes and remember” (Riperton, 1969). The idea is not novel to 
investigative interviewing either: the Cognitive Interview manual (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992, p. 133), the Self-Administered Interview (Hope et al., 2011), 
and the Dutch Police Academy manual (van Amelsvoort, Rispens, & Grolman, 
2006) all suggest encouraging the witness to close her eyes, and eye-closure is 
a crucial component of hypnotic interviewing (Barber, 1969; Hibbard & 
Worring, 1981; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962). Nevertheless, until recently, 
the instruction had received little research attention, and recommendations 
have solely been based on intuitions about the usefulness of eye-closure. The 
research discussed in this section provides some empirical support for these 
intuitions, yet many relevant questions still remain unanswered (see section 
2.4). The next section will explore possible explanations for the finding that 
eye-closure improves memory. 
 
2.3.2 Explaining the Eye-Closure Effect 
We have seen that closing the eyes may lead to people retrieving more 
information from memory. But why does eye-closure facilitate retrieval? 
Factors such as social demands and mental imagery are likely to play a role in 
the eye-closure effect. Eye-closure may have a general or modality-specific 
effect on recall, or a combination of both. At the end of this section, an 
integrative framework explaining the eye-closure effect will be proposed.  
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2.3.2.1 Social Factors 
Witnesses typically experience some social discomfort during police 
interviews (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Memon & Bull, 1991; Milne & Bull, 
2003b). Even in an experimental setting, Glenberg et al. (1998) noted that “the 
participant might become embarrassed by the awkward social situation and 
this embarrassment would be the cause of averting the gaze” (p.654). This type 
of social discomfort has been found to impair recall performance. For 
instance, Wagstaff et al. (2008) found that eyewitness recall was impaired by 
the mere presence of another person in the interview room. Similarly, 
Doherty-Sneddon and McAuley (2000) found that children who were 
interviewed face-to-face provided less accurate testimony than children who 
were interviewed via a live video link (see also Davies, 1999; Davies & Noon, 
1991). Thus, one reason why eye-closure may facilitate retrieval performance 
is that it reduces social discomfort. However, Doherty-Sneddon et al. (2001) 
reported that, in their study, closing the eyes actually seemed to increase 
participants’ social discomfort. In Experiment 3, this anecdotal observation 
will be investigated more systematically by asking all participants how 
comfortable they felt during the interview. 
 Even if eye-closure does not reduce social discomfort, it necessarily 
cuts out visually-based social cues. During an investigative interview, the 
witness needs to attend to various non-verbal social cues displayed by the 
interviewer, including visual cues such as facial expressions (Posamentier & 
Abdi, 2003) and eye gaze (Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000); and auditory cues 
such as pauses in speech (Goldman-Eisler, 1961) and tone of voice (Belin, 
Zatorre, Lafaille, Ahad, & Pike, 2000). Out of these types of social cues, visual 
cues tend to be more dominant than auditory cues (de Gelder, Böcker, 
Tuomainen, Hensen, & Vroomen, 1999; McGurk & MacDonald, 1976; 
Möttönen, Krause, Tiippana, & Sams, 2002; Saldaña & Rosenblum, 1993; Sams 
et al., 1991; but see Shams, Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2000). Furthermore, 
visuospatial imagery is more likely to be disrupted by looking at a face (a social 
stimulus) than by looking at complex visual patterns (a non-social stimulus; 
Markson & Paterson, 2009). Thus, eliminating the need to attend to visual 
social cues is likely to reduce the strain on a witness’s cognitive resources, 
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which facilitates recall (in line with the embodied cognition account proposed 
by Glenberg, 1997, which will be explained in section 2.3.2.3). 
In their research on the mechanisms involved in children’s gaze 
aversion, Doherty-Sneddon and Phelps (2005) independently manipulated 
both the social demands of the interview environment and the cognitive 
demands of the questions posed to participants, which involved arithmetic, 
verbal-reasoning, autobiographical, and episodic tasks. Consistent with 
previous findings (Doherty-Sneddon & McAuley, 2000), they found that 
children looked away from the interviewer more often when interviewed face-
to-face than when interviewed via a live video link. However, question 
difficulty had a considerably larger impact on children’s tendency to look 
away than communication mode. Hence, Doherty-Sneddon and Phelps 
conclude that “although social factors play a role in children's gaze aversion 
..., the primary function of averting gaze is to manage the cognitive load 
involved in the processing of environmental information” (p. 727). In 
conclusion, social factors probably play a role in the eye-closure effect, 
although they seem unlikely to provide a full explanation. 
 
2.3.2.2 Mental Imagery 
Another potential reason for the finding that eye-closure enhances recall is 
that it facilitates the use of mental imagery. Mental imagery refers to the idea 
that people can form mental images of stimuli and events, for instance in their 
“mind’s eye” (i.e., visual imagery; see Finke & Shepard, 1986; Kosslyn, 
Behrmann, & Jeannerod, 1995) or in their “mind’s ear” (i.e., auditory imagery; 
see Crowder, 1993; Reisberg, 1992). In the Cognitive Interview manual, Fisher 
and Geiselman (1992) suggest that witnesses should be encouraged to close 
their eyes, in order to “probe mental images most effectively” (p.133). 
Supporting this recommendation, Caruso and Gino (2011) found that 
participants who closed their eyes were significantly more likely to report 
having mentally simulated a hypothetical scenario while considering its 
morality than participants who kept their eyes open. In addition, Rode, Revol, 
Rossetti, Boisson, and Bartolomeo (2007) asked participants to conjure up a 
mental image of the map of France, and found that participants who were 
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blindfolded reported significantly more cities than participants who kept their 
eyes open. Finally, Wais et al. (2010) found that, despite the lack of visual input 
for participants with their eyes closed, visual areas in the brain were activated 
when they were remembering previously seen visual objects. The authors 
interpreted this finding as strong evidence that participants who closed their 
eyes were using visual imagery (see also Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004; 
Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003; O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000).  
 The idea that mental imagery improves memory retrieval is not only 
supported by ancient wisdom (e.g., the poet Simonides invented the method 
of loci around 500 B.C.; Yates, 1966), but also by an overwhelming body of 
empirical research (J. M. Clark & Paivio, 1991; Fletcher et al., 1995; Ishai, 
Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; Jonides, Kahn, & Rozin, 1975; Mechelli, Price, 
Friston, & Ishai, 2004; Paivio, 1969, 1971; J. Ross & Lawrence, 1968). For 
instance, Paivio (1969) found that participants who were instructed to use 
mental imagery recalled more words that could easily be visualised (e.g., 
“house”), than words that could not readily be visualised (e.g., “truth”). 
Furthermore, Brooks (1967) found that recall of verbal material was better if 
the material could be mentally organised in a spatial manner, whereas this 
advantage was eliminated when visuospatial imagery was disrupted by 
concurrent reading. In follow-up work, Baddeley and Lieberman (1980) 
showed that a non-visual spatial tracking task also interfered with the recall of 
spatially organised verbal material.  
 In sum, eye-closure seems to facilitate the use of mental imagery, and 
mental imagery has consistently been found to improve recall. One question 
to be answered is whether eye-closure only facilitates visual imagery, or 
whether it also encourages other forms of mental imagery (e.g., auditory 
imagery). If eye-closure only facilitates visual imagery, it is likely to have a 
modality-specific effect on recall performance, predominantly improving 
recall of aspects of the witnessed event that can be visualised. If eye-closure 
also inspires different forms of mental imagery, however, it is likely to have a 
general effect on recall performance, improving recall of various aspects of the 
witnessed event. In previous work, the former possibility has been referred to 
as the modality-specific interference hypothesis of the eye-closure effect, 
whereas the latter has been referred to as the dual-task or cognitive load 
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hypothesis (e.g., Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2001; Mastroberardino et al., 2010; 
Perfect, Andrade, & Eagan, 2011; Perfect et al., 2008). The next section will 
explore the background of each of these hypotheses, followed by a discussion 
of the evidence to date. 
 
2.3.2.3 General and Modality-Specific Processes 
It is possible that eye-closure improves recall performance in general, 
irrespective of the modality of the to-be-remembered information. This 
hypothesis is based on Glenberg’s (1997) embodied cognition account of 
memory. Glenberg emphasises that cognition has developed in the service of 
action. Typically, a considerable amount of our cognitive resources is devoted 
to monitoring the environment, since keeping an eye out for potential dangers 
in the environment improves our chances of survival. However, we only have 
a limited pool of cognitive resources, and tasks such as memory retrieval may 
compete for those resources. Disengaging from the environment, for instance 
by closing the eyes or looking at the sky (see also Glenberg et al., 1998), helps 
us to reallocate cognitive resources to the memory retrieval task, thereby 
improving our performance on that task. In sum, because environmental 
monitoring and memory retrieval are two competing tasks, the cognitive load 
hypothesis holds that disengaging from the environment through eye-closure 
will improve overall retrieval performance. 
An alternative possibility is that eye-closure improves recall of visual 
information more than recall of auditory information. This hypothesis is 
based on the modality-specific interference effect, studied predominantly in 
the context of short-term memory (for reviews, see Baddeley, 1986, 2007; 
Logie, 1986). Across many studies, it has been found that two concurrent tasks 
that rely on the same modality interfere more with each other than two 
concurrent tasks that rely on different modalities. In this context, the word 
‘modality’ can pertain to various types of information, including verbal, 
acoustic, visual, spatial, and kinaesthetic information. Of particular interest to 
the present study, Baddeley and Andrade (2000) found that a concurrent 
verbal task (counting) interfered more with the vividness of auditory imagery 
(e.g., “imagine the sound of a cat meowing”) than with the vividness of visual 
imagery (e.g., “imagine the appearance of cows grazing”), whereas a 
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concurrent visuospatial task (spatial tapping) interfered more with the 
vividness of visual imagery than with the vividness of auditory imagery. 
Applying these findings to the eye-closure effect, the modality-specific 
interference hypothesis holds that eliminating visual distractions through eye-
closure will have greater benefits for recall of visual information than for recall 
of auditory information. 
 Only a limited number of studies to date have examined the theoretical 
underpinnings of the eye-closure effect, and they have all concluded that 
there is more evidence for the cognitive load hypothesis than for the modality-
specific interference hypothesis (Perfect, Andrade, & Eagan, 2011; Perfect, 
Andrade, & Syrett, 2011; Perfect et al., 2008). Perfect et al. (2008) based this 
conclusion on their assertion that eye-closure improved recall of both visual 
and auditory information. However, a closer look at their data suggests that 
their findings provide some support for a general effect, but also some support 
for a modality-specific effect.4 In a similar vein, Perfect, Andrade and Syrett 
(2011) concluded that complex visual distraction impaired the accuracy of 
responses about both visual and auditory aspects of a news bulletin (but see 
Chapter 5). Finally, Perfect, Andrade, and Eagan (2011) concluded that the 
eye-closure effect is not modality-specific because eye-closure helped 
participants to overcome the cross-modal memory impairment caused by 
auditory distraction. Perhaps, however, the focus of the work by Perfect and 
colleagues was somewhat too narrow. Their aim was to find the ‘correct’ 
explanation of the eye-closure effect, rather than examining to what extent 
general and modality-specific processes play a role.  
To provide a more comprehensive account of the eye-closure effect, it 
may be useful to adopt an approach similar to the one taken by Baddeley and 
Hitch  (1974) in their development of the Working Memory model (see Figure 
2.2a). The model holds that we have two modality-specific subsystems, the 
                                                      
4 Perfect et al. (2008) concluded that eye-closure helped recall of both visual and auditory 
information—except in Experiment 2, which was “clearly out of line with the subsequent 
studies” (p. 322). However, if we take the accuracy of the recalled information into account, 
only Experiment 4 and 5 supported the conclusion that eye-closure improved recall of both 
visual and auditory aspects. Experiment 1 did not bear on the modality issue, and Experiment 
2, as mentioned by the authors, showed that eye-closure impaired both the amount and the 
accuracy of auditory recall. Finally, Experiment 3 found that eye-closure increased the 
number of auditory details recalled, but significantly decreased the accuracy of the recalled 
auditory information. All in all, Perfect et al.’s experiments showed consistent eye-closure 
benefits for recall of visual details, but inconsistent effects on recall of auditory details.  
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phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad, which are governed by a 
general attentional system, the central executive. The phonological loop is 
thought to be involved in the storage and processing of information held in a 
verbal or acoustic code, whereas the visuospatial sketchpad is thought to be 
involved in the storage and processing of information held in a visual or 
spatial code (and perhaps kinaesthetic, see Baddeley, 2007). The central 
executive is responsible for the allocation of attentional resources. To account 
for a number of inconsistent findings after publication of the original model, 
Baddeley (2000) proposed an additional subsystem capable of integrating and 
storing information in distinct codes: the episodic buffer (see Figure 2.2b). The 
Working Memory model has been successful in providing an integrated 
account of research findings from many areas of cognitive science (see 
Baddeley, 2007, for a review). In a similar vein, the eye-closure effect might be 
best explained by a combination of general and modality-specific processes. 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Working Memory model. The figure, adapted from Baddeley 
(2000, p. 418 and p. 421), shows (a) the original version and (b) the current 
version of the Working Memory model. 
 
2.3.2.4 The Cognitive Resources Framework 
In an attempt to integrate the general and modality-specific explanations of 
the eye-closure effect, I propose the Cognitive Resources framework, depicted 
in Figure 2.3. In line with Glenberg’s (1997) embodied cognition account, 
environmental distractions and memory retrieval are construed as two 
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concurrent tasks competing for cognitive resources. Moreover, the framework 
specifies modality-specific sources of distraction. For instance, a witness may 
be distracted by a flickering clock on the wall (visual), or by a phone ringing in 
the background (auditory). Of course, a witness may also experience 
distractions that are based in other sensory domains (e.g., smell; cf. A. J. 
Johnson & Miles, 2009) or do not reside in a particular sensory domain at all 
(e.g., nerves), but for the sake of simplicity, the framework focuses on 
distractions in the visual and auditory domains only. 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Cognitive Resources framework. Schematic representation of (a) 
the basic framework, (b) the allocation of resources when a witness is exposed 
to visual distractions in the interview environment, and (c) the allocation of 
resources when a witness is exposed to auditory distractions. 
 
Following from Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) Working Memory model, 
the framework specifies three “pools” of cognitive resources involved in both 
environmental monitoring and memory retrieval. The visual pool is thought 
Visual
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to be involved in visual and spatial processes, such as visual imagery. The 
auditory pool is thought to be involved in acoustic and verbal processes, such 
as auditory imagery. Finally, the general pool reflects general attentional 
resources or overall concentration. As shown in Figure 2.3b, visual distractions 
in the environment may occupy the general pool of resources, leaving fewer 
resources available for the retrieval task. In addition, visual distractions may 
occupy the visual pool of resources, leaving fewer resources available for the 
retrieval of specifically visual information (e.g., what the perpetrator looked 
like). In a similar vein, as depicted in Figure 2.3c, auditory distractions in the 
environment may occupy the general pool of resources, but may also engage 
the auditory pool, thereby impairing recall of auditory aspects of the 
witnessed event (e.g., what the perpetrator said). In Experiment 5, visual and 
auditory distractions in the interview environment will be manipulated 
independently, and the data will be fitted to the Cognitive Resources 
framework, to provide an estimate of the relative importance of general and 
modality-specific impairments (see section 5.3.4.1). 
 
2.3.3 Conclusion 
Recent research has shown that closing the eyes during the investigative 
interview may help eyewitnesses to remember more information about 
witnessed events, without harming the accuracy of their testimony. These 
findings suggest that the eye-closure instruction may be an effective yet very 
simple interview procedure that could potentially serve as an alternative to the 
time-consuming Cognitive Interview procedure in some cases. However, 
before the instruction can be recommended to police interviewers, it needs to 
be investigated in more realistic settings. In addition, the theoretical 
underpinnings of the eye-closure effect are as of yet unclear. 
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2.4 Research Aims 
 
This section will provide a brief overview of what has been learned from 
previous research, followed by an outline of research questions that have not 
yet been answered. 
 
2.4.1 What We Know 
An overwhelming body of evidence has shown that eyewitness memory suffers 
from many limitations. Memory traces may deteriorate over time, and may be 
influenced by external influences and our own stereotypes. Various 
interviewing procedures have been developed to overcome these limitations 
of eyewitness memory. For instance, mental context reinstatement and the 
Cognitive Interview have proven to be effective in helping witnesses to 
remember more, without harming the accuracy of their testimony. 
Nevertheless, these procedures are rather cumbersome, and cannot always be 
implemented in practice. Relatively recent research suggests that a method as 
simple as instructing witnesses to close their eyes may substantially improve 
recall of events. A comprehensive explanation of the eye-closure effect 
probably involves various factors, such as reductions in social demands and 
facilitation of mental imagery. The Cognitive Resources framework was 
proposed to reflect the potential for both general and modality-specific 
impairments as a result of distractions in the interview environment. The 
experiments in the present thesis were designed to investigate the robustness 
of the eye-closure effect in more realistic contexts, and to provide more insight 
into the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effect.  
 
2.4.2 The Present Research 
Based on the literature described in this chapter, a number of research 
questions were formulated concerning the effects of eye-closure on 
eyewitness memory. This section will outline these questions, accompanied 
by a brief rationale relating each question to the relevant portion of the 
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literature review. The first four research questions (pertaining to modality, 
content, accuracy, and confidence) were assessed across nearly all 
experiments, whereas the last six were targeted by specific experiments.  
 
2.4.2.1 Modality 
The findings on the role of modality in the eye-closure effect have been 
equivocal (see section 2.3.2.3). For this reason, the research presented in the 
thesis will examine whether eye-closure facilitates recall of both visual and 
auditory information, or recall of visual information only. 
 
2.4.2.2 Content 
It has been found that witnesses can strategically control the specificity and 
centrality of the information they choose to report (see section 2.1.2.2). 
Therefore, the research presented in the thesis will examine whether the eye-
closure instruction is equally effective for retrieval of fine-grain and coarse-
grain information, and of central and peripheral information. 
 
2.4.2.3 Accuracy 
Some interview procedures, notably hypnosis, have been found to impair the 
accuracy of eyewitness testimony (see section 2.2). In light of this finding, the 
research presented in the thesis will examine whether the eye-closure 
instruction affects testimonial accuracy. 
 
2.4.2.4 Confidence 
Certain interview instructions, such as hypnosis and mental context 
reinstatement, have been found to inflate confidence in incorrect responses 
(see section 2.2). Therefore, the research presented in the thesis will examine 
whether eye-closure affects eyewitness confidence. 
 
2.4.2.5 Event Violence 
Memory for events is affected by the level of emotional arousal experienced 
during the event (see section 2.1.3). For this reason, Experiments 1 and 2 will 
examine whether the eye-closure effect extends to recall of emotionally 
arousing violent events. 
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2.4.2.6 Recall Format 
The benefits of interview procedures may depend on whether memory is 
tested in free or cued recall (see section 2.3.1.2). Therefore, Experiments 3 and 
6 will examine whether eye-closure improves performance in both free and 
cued recall. 
 
2.4.2.7 Delay and Repeated Recall 
Memory for events is influenced by the passage of time and intervening events 
(see sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.4). In light of this finding, Experiment 3 will 
examine whether the benefits of eye-closure are still observed when memory 
is tested after a delay of a week and repeated retrieval attempts.  
 
2.4.2.8 Ear-Closure 
Eye-closure might predominantly improve recall of visual information (see 
section 2.3.2). Following from this observation, Experiment 4 will examine 
whether “ear-closure” predominantly improves recall of auditory information. 
 
2.4.2.9 General and Modality-Specific Interference 
Eye-closure is likely to have both general and modality-specific influences on 
recall performance (see section 2.3.2). To test the relative impact of each type 
of process, Experiment 5 will examine the extent to which sensory distractions 
have general or modality-specific effects on recall. 
 
2.4.2.10 Ecological Validity 
Eye-closure improves recall of mundane live events, when witnesses are 
interviewed in quiet interview rooms (see section 2.3.1). To enhance the 
ecological validity of the research, Experiment 6 will examine whether eye-
closure improves recall of a forensically relevant live event on the street, with 
the interview taking place either in a quiet interview room or on the street. 
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2.4.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, we know that closing the eyes may help us remember, but we 
do not know whether the effect extends to realistic settings, nor do we have a 
complete understanding of why closing the eyes helps memory. The present 
thesis was designed to shed more light on applied and theoretical questions 
concerning the effects of eye-closure on eyewitness memory. 
 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary  
 Eyewitness memory is affected by factors such as the passage of time, 
the emotional response elicited by the witnessed event, and intervening 
events such as repeated retrieval and misleading suggestions. 
 Various methods have been proposed to help witnesses remember 
more, most notably the Cognitive Interview. The CI significantly 
increases the amount of information obtained from witnesses, but 
police interviewers struggle to implement the procedure in practice. 
 A feasible alternative to complex interview procedures could be 
instructing witnesses to close their eyes. Eye-closure has been found to 
improve semantic recall, as well as episodic recall of mundane events. 
The experiments presented in the thesis investigate the eye-closure 
effect under more realistic conditions.  
 The Cognitive Resources framework is proposed to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the eye-closure effect, incorporating 
general and modality-specific impairments in recall performance 
caused by environmental distractions. 
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Chapter 3 
Memory for Violent Events 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents two experiments examining the effect of eye-closure on 
recall of violent events. Experiment 1 investigated whether the eye-closure 
effect extends to recall of a violent event. Experiment 2 directly compared the 
eye-closure effect for violent and non-violent events, and incorporated 
subjective and physiological measures of emotional arousal, and self-report 
measures of confidence and retrieval strategies.  
 
 
3.2 Experiment 1: Violent Event 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The first experiment intended to replicate and extend the findings reported by 
Perfect et al. (2008). The eye-closure effect was explored in the context of a 
violent event, and the modality and grain size of the recalled information was 
examined in more detail. 
 
3.2.1.1 Extension of the Eye-Closure Effect 
Perfect et al. (2008) provided evidence that closing the eyes during an 
investigative interview improves recall of “mundane events about which the 
police may interview witnesses” (p. 315), such as a commonplace social 
interaction. However, the police may also interview witnesses about less 
mundane events, and obtaining information about such events (e.g., violent 
crime) is often even more important than obtaining information about 
relatively mundane events. Although Mastroberardino et al. (2010) examined 
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the effect of eye-closure on children’s recall of a fairly emotional event, this 
event was highly unrealistic (a person was eaten by a dinosaur). Hence, the 
video was probably more entertaining than upsetting, which was reflected in 
the enthusiastic reactions from the children (S. Mastroberardino, personal 
communication, September 5, 2009) and in the fact that the clip was rated as 
suitable for all ages. Thus, research to date has not yet examined the effect of 
eye-closure on adults’ recall of a violent event. Given that recall of violent 
versus non-violent events seem to involve distinct memorial processes (e.g., 
Christianson, 1992; Deffenbacher et al., 2004), it is possible that eye-closure 
has a different impact on recall of violent events than on recall of mundane 
events. To examine this possibility, the present experiment assessed the effect 
of eye-closure on recall of a violent event. 
 
3.2.1.2 Modality and Grain Size 
An additional aim of the present experiment was to provide more insight into 
the type of information that is most affected by eye-closure. First, as explained 
in detail in section 2.3.2.3, the findings obtained by Perfect et al. (2008) were 
ambivalent concerning the role of information modality in the eye-closure 
effect. Even though two of their experiments showed eye-closure benefits for 
recall of visual as well as auditory details (Experiment 4 in terms of both 
amount and accuracy, and Experiment 5 in terms of amount only); two other 
experiments showed that eye-closure improved recall of visual details but 
impaired recall of auditory details (Experiment 2 in terms of both amount and 
accuracy, and Experiment 3 in terms of accuracy only). Therefore, the 
interview questions in the present experiment distinguished between 
uniquely visual and uniquely auditory aspects of the event, to investigate to 
what extent the benefits of eye-closure are general or modality-specific in 
nature.  
To obtain additional insight into the type of information affected by 
eye-closure, participants’ responses were scored in terms of grain size (e.g., 
Goldsmith et al., 2002). As explained in section 2.1.2.2, participants 
strategically control the level of generality at which they choose to answer a 
question (Goldsmith & Koriat, 1999; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Neisser, 1988). 
Previous research has shown that eye-closure helps participants to provide 
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more correct responses, but it is unclear whether these responses were correct 
but vague (coarse-grain; e.g., “between 30 and 40 pounds”) or correct and 
specific (fine-grain; e.g., “£34.78”). Intuitively, it seems likely that the retrieval 
of fine-grain information requires some form of mental imagery, for instance, 
mentally picturing the amount displayed on the bottom of the receipt. 
Retrieval of coarse-grain information, on the other hand, might be less 
dependent on mental imagery, for instance, remembering roughly how much 
one paid for the groceries. Previous research has shown that eye-closure 
facilitates the use of mental imagery (Caruso & Gino, 2011; Rode et al., 2007; 
Wais et al., 2010). Therefore, if one assumes that recall of fine-grain 
information involves a greater degree of mental imagery than recall of coarse-
grain information does, then one might expect eye-closure to be more 
effective for fine-grain recall than for coarse-grain recall.  
 
3.2.1.3 Aims and Hypotheses 
The primary goal of the present experiment was to test the effect of eye-
closure on recall of a violent event. In addition, it was hypothesised that eye-
closure would have the greatest impact on recall of visual (as opposed to 
auditory) details, and on retrieval of fine-grain (as opposed to coarse-grain) 
information.  
 
3.2.2 Method 
3.2.2.1 Participants 
Fifty-seven undergraduate psychology students from the University of York 
participated for course credit or a small monetary reward. One participant 
who had seen the video before was excluded from the analysis, leaving 56 
participants. The sample consisted of 10 males and 46 females, with ages 
ranging from 18 to 26 (M = 19.75 years, SD = 1.60). All participants were native 
English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing. 
All experiments presented in this thesis were approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the Department of Psychology at the University of York, and 
participants provided informed consent in line with Committee guidelines. 
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3.2.2.2 Materials 
A two-and-a-half-minute video clip was extracted from an episode of the 
commercial TV series “Six Feet Under” (season 1, episode 12, aired August 
2001). The British Board of Film Classification rated this episode as ‘15’ 
(suitable only for 15 years and over). A crime scene containing moderate 
violence, blood, and injuries was selected, depicting a man who breaks into a 
woman’s house and tries to cut her with a knife. The interview about the event 
consisted of 16 questions; half addressing uniquely visual aspects and half 
addressing uniquely auditory aspects of the event (see Appendix A.1). The 
questions were asked in the order in which the corresponding information 
appeared in the video clip; hence the different types of questions were mixed, 
and in a fixed order throughout. 
 
3.2.2.3 Pilot 
Eight pilot participants watched the video and attempted to answer the 
original set of 22 questions; 11 about visual details and 11 about auditory 
details. Based on their performance, 8 questions per category of roughly 
equivalent difficulty were selected for the main experiment. None of the pilot 
participants took part in the main experiment.  
 
3.2.2.4 Design 
The experiment manipulated two independent variables. The first, interview 
condition, was a between-subjects variable with two levels: eyes open and 
eyes closed. The second, question modality, was a within-subjects variable 
with two levels: visual and auditory. Thus, the study employed a 2 (Interview 
Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) 
mixed design with repeated measures on the second factor. There were four 
dependent variables: the total number of correct responses, the number of 
fine-grain correct responses, the number of coarse-grain correct responses, 
and the proportion of responses that were correct (i.e., testimonial accuracy).  
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3.2.2.5 Procedure 
All participants were tested individually in a small laboratory. After providing 
informed consent, participants watched the video and engaged in a two-
minute distracter task involving the backwards spelling of animal names (cf. 
Perfect et al., 2008). Subsequently, they were interviewed about the video. 
Participants were randomly assigned to interview condition. Those in the 
eyes-closed condition were instructed to keep their eyes closed throughout 
the interview, whereas those in the eyes-open condition received no 
instructions. If participants in the eyes-closed condition inadvertently opened 
their eyes (which happened infrequently), they were reminded to keep them 
closed. None of the participants in the eyes-open condition spontaneously 
closed their eyes; all of them were facing the interviewer throughout the 
interview. Participants were encouraged to ask the interviewer to repeat the 
question if they did not hear it properly (which happened occasionally in both 
interview conditions). They were asked to remember as much as possible, but 
not to guess; a “do not remember” response was allowed.5 All interviews were 
audio-taped for subsequent analysis. After completing a demographic 
information sheet, participants were asked whether they had seen the TV 
series before, debriefed, and thanked for their participation.  
 
3.2.2.6 Data Coding 
The audio-taped interviews were coded blind to interview condition. 
Responses were coded as correct, incorrect, or omitted (“don’t know”), and all 
correct responses were coded for grain size. Thus, a correct response could be 
classified as coarse-grain (e.g., “the shirt was grey”) or fine-grain (e.g., “the 
shirt had a grey body with dark-blue sleeves”). Examples of each type of 
response can be found in Appendix A.1. Incorrect responses were not coded 
for grain size, due to insufficient data. Ten interviews (160 responses; 18% of 
the total sample) were randomly selected and coded independently by a 
second blind coder. Inter-rater reliability (for the decision to score a response 
as fine-grain correct, coarse-grain correct, incorrect, or omitted) was high, κ = 
.92, p < .001. The scores of the first coder were retained for the main analysis. 
                                                      
5 Participants tended to provide more “do not remember” responses for questions about 
auditory details (M = 1.86, SD = .96) than for questions about visual details (M = .14, SD = .35). 
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3.2.3 Results 
The aim of this experiment was to assess the effects of eye-closure on recall of 
visual and auditory aspects of a violent event. This section will first outline the 
results in terms of the total number of correct responses, followed by a 
separate analysis of the number of fine- and coarse-grain correct responses. 
Finally, it will assess the proportion of provided responses that were correct. 
 
3.2.3.1 Total Number Correct 
The total number of correct responses provided by participants (fine- plus 
coarse-grain) is displayed in Figure 3.1. Exploratory analyses showed that all 
assumptions of parametric tests (normality, homogeneity of variance, interval 
data, and independence) were met6. 
 
Figure 3.1  Experiment 1: Total number correct. Mean total number of 
correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the video. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Question 
Modality: visual, auditory) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted 
on the total number of correct responses. There was a significant main effect 
                                                      
6 From this point forward, the reader may assume that parametric assumptions were met, 
unless mentioned otherwise.  
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of modality, F (1, 54) = 45.46, p < .001, η2 = .43; despite efforts to match 
questions about visual and auditory aspects for difficulty, participants gave 
significantly more correct responses to questions about visual aspects than to 
questions about auditory aspects (see section 3.4.4 for a discussion of this 
finding). There was no main effect of eye-closure, F (1, 54) = 2.57, p = .12, but 
there was a significant interaction between eye-closure and modality, F (1, 54) 
= 7.00, p < .05, η2 = .07. Simple effects analyses showed that participants who 
closed their eyes remembered significantly more correct visual aspects than 
participants who kept their eyes open, F (1, 54) = 8.79, p < .01, η2 = .14, d = .79, 
whereas the difference was not significant for auditory aspects (F < 1). 7 
 
3.2.3.2 Fine-Grain Correct 
Next, the number of correct responses was separated into fine-grain and 
coarse-grain correct responses. Figure 3.2 shows the number of fine-grain 
correct responses provided by participants.  
 
 
Figure 3.2  Experiment 1: Fine-grain correct. Mean number of fine-grain 
correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the video. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
                                                      
7 Although η2 will be the preferred estimate of effect size for significant effects throughout this 
thesis (cf. Levine & Hullett, 2002), I will also provide Cohen’s d for the eye-closure effects only, 
to allow for comparisons with previous research reporting this statistic. 
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The fine-grain correct recall data violated the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance (Levene, 1960), and data transformations did not 
solve the problem. Therefore, non-parametric tests were also performed, with 
results confirming the findings reported below (see Appendix B.2). A 2 
(Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, 
auditory) mixed ANOVA on fine-grain correct responses revealed a significant 
main effect of question modality, F (1, 54) = 12.65, p < .001, η2 = .17, in the same 
direction as described for the total number of correct responses. There was 
again no significant main effect of eye-closure (F < 1), but a significant 
interaction between eye-closure and modality, F (1, 54) = 6.46, p < .05, η2 = .09. 
Figure 3.2 suggests that eye-closure tended to increase the number of fine-
grain correct responses to questions about visual aspects and decrease the 
number of fine-grain correct responses to questions about auditory aspects, 
but simple effects analyses showed that neither of these contrasts was 
significant (both ps > .08).  
 
3.2.3.3 Coarse-Grain Correct 
The number of coarse-grain correct responses is shown in Figure 3.3.  
 
 
Figure 3.3  Experiment 1: Coarse-grain correct. Mean number of coarse-
grain correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the 
video. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Question 
Modality: visual, auditory) mixed ANOVA on coarse-grain correct responses 
showed a main effect of modality in the same direction as described above, F 
(1, 54) = 13.68, p < .001, η2 = .20. Furthermore, there was a significant main 
effect of eye-closure, F (1, 54) = 8.28, p < .01, η2 = .15, d = .77, and no significant 
interaction between eye-closure and modality (F < 1). Thus, participants who 
closed their eyes volunteered significantly more correct coarse-grain 
responses than participants with their eyes open, pertaining to both visual and 
auditory aspects of the witnessed event.  
 
3.2.3.4 Proportion Correct 
On average, participants answered 3.41 out of 16 questions incorrectly (SD = 
1.87). Examples of inaccurate responses are provided in Appendix A.1, and the 
nature of these errors will be addressed in the Discussion. Testimonial 
accuracy was calculated by dividing the total number of correct responses 
(fine-grain plus coarse-grain) by the total number of answered questions 
(correct plus incorrect responses). Proportion correct in all conditions is 
shown in Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4  Experiment 1: Proportion correct. Mean proportion of responses 
that were correct for questions about visual and auditory aspects of the video. 
Error bars represent standard errors.  
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A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Question 
Modality: visual, auditory) mixed ANOVA on the proportion of correct answers 
revealed no main effects of modality (F < 1) or eye-closure, F (1, 54) = 1.74, p = 
.19. There was, however, a significant interaction between eye-closure and 
modality, F (1, 54) = 8.54, p < .01, η2 = .14. Simple effects analyses showed that 
eye-closure significantly increased proportion correct for questions about 
visual aspects, F (1, 54) = 9.15, p < .01, η2 = .14, d = .81, but did not significantly 
affect proportion correct for questions about auditory aspects (F < 1). 
 
3.2.4 Discussion 
The primary goal of the present experiment was to extend the eye-closure 
effect to recall of a violent event. This goal was partially achieved. In terms of 
the total number of correct responses, eye-closure had no significant effect 
overall, but significantly increased correct recall of the visual aspects of the 
violent event. In terms of grain size, eye-closure increased fine-grain correct 
recall only for visual details, but increased coarse-grain correct recall for both 
visual and auditory details. Finally, in terms of testimonial accuracy, eye-
closure had no significant main effect, but significantly increased proportion 
correct for questions about visual details only. This section will first address 
the role of grain size and modality, after which limitations of the experiment 
will be discussed. 
 
3.2.4.1 Modality and Grain Size  
The finding that eye-closure increased fine-grain correct recall of visual, but 
not auditory, aspects of the event is consistent with the idea that eye-closure 
facilitates visual imagery (Rode et al., 2007; Wais et al., 2010). Thus, it seems 
that eye-closure helped participants in the present study to retrieve a mental 
image of detailed aspects of the event (e.g., the exact appearance of the 
perpetrator’s shirt), thereby enhancing retrieval of correct fine-grain visual 
information. This speculative interpretation of the findings will be examined 
with self-report measures in the next experiment.  
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Unexpectedly, eye-closure also increased the number of correct coarse-
grain responses reported by participants, and this effect was observed 
irrespective of the modality of the to-be-remembered information. This 
finding is compatible with the idea that eye-closure reduces general cognitive 
load, thereby improving overall concentration (e.g., Glenberg et al., 1998; 
Perfect, Andrade, & Eagan, 2011; Perfect et al., 2008). Thus, the present 
findings seem to suggest that both modality-specific and general processes 
play a role in the eye-closure effect, as described in the Cognitive Resources 
framework in section 2.3.2.4. This topic will be addressed in more detail in 
Chapter 5. In addition, the present findings suggest that it is useful to 
distinguish between fine-grain and coarse-grain responses (cf. Goldsmith et 
al., 2002), since eye-closure had a different impact on each type of recall. 
 
3.2.4.2 Nature of False Memories 
Although participants generally did not volunteer many incorrect responses, 
the nature of some of these responses was surprisingly consistent across 
participants. For instance, a substantial number of participants reported that 
the man cut the woman’s dress with his knife (whereas he actually ripped it 
with his hands), and that he told her that he was going to kill her (whereas he 
actually said that it would hurt; see Appendix A.1). Thus, certain false 
memories were shared among many participants, potentially pointing to the 
existence of common event scripts (see section 2.1.2.3), and this tendency was 
predominantly observed for violent actions. This issue will be addressed in 
more detail in section 3.4.2. 
 
3.2.4.3 Limitations 
As explained in section 2.1.3, the quality of one’s memory for an event likely 
depends on the emotional response elicited by that event. Although the to-be-
remembered event used in the present experiment was selected to be more 
violent than the events used by Perfect et al., (2008) it is not clear whether the 
video elicited an orienting response or a defensive response in the 
participants. To be more confident that the present findings will generalise to 
real-world eyewitness contexts, it is imperative to establish whether the 
violent event succeeded in eliciting an emotional response that approximates 
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the emotional response experienced by real eyewitnesses of violent crime 
(although laboratory studies are unlikely to elicit an emotional response as 
strong as the response elicited by violent events in real life). To provide more 
insight into the emotional response generated by violent videos, the next 
experiment included subjective and physiological measures of emotional 
arousal. In addition, given that the effect of arousal on memory may depend 
on the centrality of the to-be-remembered information (cf. Christianson, 
1992), the next experiment distinguished between questions addressing 
central aspects of the event and questions addressing peripheral aspects. 
 
3.2.4.4 Conclusion 
The present findings suggest that instructed eye-closure may be a useful tool 
for interviewing witnesses about a violent event. Eye-closure increased the 
number of correct coarse-grain responses about both visual and auditory 
aspects of the event, and increased the number of correct fine-grain responses 
and testimonial accuracy for visual aspects of the event. The broader 
implications of these findings will be discussed in the General Discussion of 
this chapter. We now turn to the second experiment, in which the effect of 
eye-closure on recall of violent and non-violent events was compared. 
 
 
3.3 Experiment 2: Emotional Arousal 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In the first experiment, the eye-closure effect was successfully extended to 
recall of a violent event. However, Experiment 1 did not confirm whether the 
violent event elicited emotional arousal in the participants. Furthermore, it 
was unclear whether the eye-closure effect would generalise to different 
violent and non-violent events. The present experiment investigated these 
questions, and included additional measures of interest, such as confidence 
and self-reported retrieval strategies. Each of these issues will be discussed in 
turn below. 
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3.3.1.1 Emotional Arousal 
As explained in section 2.1.3, real-world events have the potential to elicit two 
different physiological responses in the viewer. If the viewer’s reaction is 
predominantly one of interest, this will likely be reflected in an orienting 
response, which is associated with increased electrodermal activity (EDA) and 
decreased heart rate. If the event is perceived to be threatening, however, this 
will likely be reflected in a defensive response, which is associated with 
increased EDA and increased heart rate. In previous research, some studies 
have found that videos or slides depicting violence or injuries evoked an 
orienting response (e.g., Burke et al., 1992; Christianson, 1984; Heuer & 
Reisberg, 1992; Palomba, Angrilli, & Mini, 1997; van Stegeren, Everaerd, Cahill, 
McGaugh, & Gooren, 1998), whereas other studies have found that similar 
stimuli elicited a defensive response (e.g., Christianson, 1987; Christianson & 
Nilsson, 1984; Mordkoff, 1964; Steptoe & Vögele, 1986).  
 To assess what type of emotional response was elicited by the violent 
and non-violent events in the present study, a number of subjective and 
physiological measures were included. First, a self-report measure of 
emotional arousal was included, asking participants to indicate how violent, 
upsetting, emotional, and interesting they had found each video (cf. Clifford & 
Scott, 1978; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Loftus & Burns, 1982; Read, Yuille, & 
Tollestrup, 1992). Second, skin conductance response (SCR; also known as 
galvanic skin response), was recorded to measure participants’ EDA before 
and during the videos (cf. Dawson et al., 2000). EDA has been described as a 
method that “may unambiguously reflect primary arousal” (Hubert & De 
Jong-Meyer, 1990, p. 88). It was hypothesised that EDA would be higher while 
watching the videos than during the baseline period, and that it would be 
higher while watching the violent videos compared to the non-violent videos. 
Although EDA provides an indication of the level of physiological arousal 
experienced by participants, it does not distinguish between the defensive and 
the orienting response, since both are associated with increased EDA 
(Christianson, 1992; Deffenbacher et al., 2004; Lacey & Lacey, 1970, 1974).  
Therefore, heart rate variability (HRV) measures were taken to assess 
participants’ cardiovascular response to the videos. HRV assesses the interplay 
between sympathetic and parasympathetic influences described in section 
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2.1.3, which “yields information about autonomic flexibility and thereby 
represents the capacity for regulated emotional responding” (Appelhans & 
Luecken, 2006, p. 230). In the current study, HRV analysis was conducted on 
blood volume measurement obtained with photoplethysmography (PPG), 
which measures changes in blood volume in the blood vessels close to the 
surface of the skin (Murthy, Ramamoorthy, Srinivasan, Rajagopal, & Rao, 
2001). Selvaraj, Jaryal, Santhish, Deepak and Anand (2008) have shown that 
the peak-to-peak intervals derived from PPG can be used to reliably estimate 
heart rate. It was expected that participants would exhibit an increase in heart 
rate while watching the videos compared to the baseline period before 
watching the videos. However, in light of the inconsistent findings in previous 
research, it was unclear whether the violent videos in the present study would 
increase or decrease heart rate compared to the non-violent videos.  
 
3.3.1.2 Comparison of Violent and Non-Violent Events 
If the violent videos in the present study elicit a defensive response, overall 
recall is expected to be impaired for violent events compared to non-violent 
events (Deffenbacher et al., 2004). If, on the other hand, the violent videos 
elicit an orienting response, recall of peripheral details is expected to be 
impaired, whereas recall of central details is expected to be improved 
compared to the non-violent videos (Christianson, 1992). To distinguish 
between these potential effects, interview questions in the present study 
addressed either central or peripheral aspects of the event. Centrality was 
determined based on plot relevance, defined by Heuer and Reisberg (1990) as 
“any fact or element pertaining to the basic story that could not be changed or 
excluded without changing the basic story line” (p. 499; see also Rosch, 1978). 
Appendix A.2 provides an overview of all questions used in the present 
experiment, categorised based on centrality and modality. 
Although eye-closure has been found to be effective for recall of 
mundane events (Perfect et al., 2008) as well as for recall of a violent event 
(Experiment 1), it is unclear whether it is more effective for recall of non-
violent or violent events. The mundane events used by Perfect et al. could not 
be directly compared to the violent event used in Experiment 1, because the 
nature of the events was not comparable. The present study was designed to 
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compare violent and non-violent events that were similar in nearly all respects 
(e.g., plot, setting, characters), except the level of violence. Knowing which 
type of event benefits most from the eye-closure instruction will allow us to 
provide more specific recommendations to investigative interviewers 
regarding the use of the eye-closure instruction in interviews about violent 
and non-violent crime. 
Based on the literature on mood congruency (see section 2.2.3.1), it 
might be hypothesised that eye-closure will be more effective for recall of 
violent events than for recall of non-violent events. First, it has consistently 
been shown that memories about negative emotional events, such as violent 
crime, are most likely to be retrieved if the rememberer is in a negative 
emotional mood during retrieval (e.g., Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981; Madigan & 
Bollenbach, 1982; Snyder & White, 1982). Second, there are some indications 
that eye-closure intensifies negative emotional mood.8 Caruso and Gino (2011) 
found that unethical scenarios were judged as more unethical when 
participants had their eyes closed. They showed that eye-closure facilitated 
vivid mental simulation of the scenarios, resulting in more intense negative 
emotions (measured by self-report). In a similar vein, Lerner, Papo, Zhdanov, 
Belozersky, and Hendler (2009) found that eye-closure increased the intensity 
of emotions experienced while listening to negative emotional music. These 
findings provide an interesting parallel to previous research showing that eye 
movements and visually-based tasks can potentially reduce the vividness of 
emotionally-laden mental images, for instance in PTSD patients (Andrade, 
Kavanagh, & Baddeley, 1997; van den Hout, Muris, Salemink, & Kindt, 2001) or 
during cravings of cigarettes and food (Kemps, Tiggemann, Woods, & Soekov, 
2004; Panabokke, May, Eade, Andrade, & Kavanagh, 2004). In sum, closing the 
eyes has the potential to intensify (negative) emotional moods experienced 
during the interview, and this enhanced emotionality is likely to benefit recall 
of emotionally-laden events (e.g., violent events), as opposed to emotionally-
neutral events (e.g., non-violent events; see Ginet & Verkampt, 2007, for a 
similar argument pertaining to the Cognitive Interview). 
  
                                                      
8 Eye-closure might also intensify positive emotions, but research to date has primarily 
focussed on negative emotions.  
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3.3.1.3 Modality and Grain Size 
The interview questions used in the present study again addressed either 
uniquely visual or uniquely auditory aspects of the event, and all correct 
responses were scored for grain size. In line with the findings from Experiment 
1, it was expected that eye-closure would enhance fine-grain recall of visual 
but not auditory details, and that it would increase coarse-grain recall 
irrespective of question modality.  
 
3.3.1.4 Confidence 
In Experiment 1, participants’ confidence in their responses was not assessed. 
However, eyewitness confidence may play an important role in legal cases, 
because jurors and judges tend to rely heavily on expressed levels of 
confidence to determine whether a witness’s testimony is accurate (Cutler et 
al., 1990; Wells et al., 1979; Wheatcroft et al., 2004). For instance, Cutler et al. 
found that jurors were considerably more likely to judge an identification 
decision as reliable and the suspect as guilty if the witness said she was 100% 
(as opposed to 80%) confident that she had correctly identified the robber. In 
reality, however, correlations between eyewitness confidence and 
identification accuracy tend to be weak (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 
1987; Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987b; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). 
To assess the correlation between confidence and accuracy of responses 
about the witnessed event in the present experiment, participants were asked 
to rate the level of confidence in each of their responses on a scale from 1 (not 
confident at all) to 5 (extremely confident). 
Given that the witness’s expressed level of confidence may influence 
how jurors perceive the reliability of her testimony, it is important that 
investigative interview techniques do not impair the correlation between 
confidence and accuracy. As we have seen in section 2.2.2, hypnosis tends to 
inflate witness confidence in incorrect responses (Dywan & Bowers, 1983; 
Sheehan et al., 1984; Zelig & Beidleman, 1981). Research to date on the effect 
of mental context reinstatement on the confidence-accuracy (CA) correlation 
has been inconclusive (Hammond et al., 2006; Krafka & Penrod, 1985). Finally, 
evidence suggests that the Cognitive Interview does not inflate confidence 
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(Allwood et al., 2005; Granhag et al., 2004; Gwyer & Clifford, 1997; McMahon, 
2000; Mello & Fisher, 1996).  
With respect to the eye-closure instruction, the only previous studies 
that included a measure of witness confidence were those conducted by 
Wagstaff and colleagues. Wagstaff et al. (2004) analysed three sets of CA 
correlations, one per type of question (free-recall, names, and closed 
questions). They examined the correlation between the average confidence 
rating per question category provided by each participant, and his or her total 
correct score for that question category. The CA correlation was only 
significant for the closed-question category, and eye-closure tended to 
increase the correlation (the CA correlation was .57 for the eyes-open group 
and .74 for the eyes-closed group)9. This finding suggests that participants who 
generally gave high confidence ratings in the closed-question category were 
generally accurate in that category. Wagstaff et al. (2010) opted for a different 
approach to analysing the effect of eye-closure on eyewitness confidence: 
instead of assessing CA correlations, they computed the mean confidence 
rating in correct responses and incorrect responses, respectively. They found 
that mean confidence was significantly higher for correct responses than for 
incorrect responses, and that eye-closure did not affect either type of 
confidence rating.  
The relationship between confidence and accuracy in the present study 
will be examined in four different ways. First, like Wagstaff et al. (2010), I will 
examine average confidence in correct and incorrect responses. Second, like 
Wagstaff et al. (2004), I will examine whether a generally confident 
rememberer is also a generally accurate rememberer. Third, I will examine 
whether a particular response given with high confidence is also likely to be 
accurate. Fourth, to assess potential effects that may not be revealed in CA 
correlations, a calibration technique will be used (cf. Brewer & Day, 2005; 
Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Olsson, 2000). This technique involves 
plotting the subjective probability that a response is correct (i.e., the 
confidence rating) against the objective probability that the response is 
                                                      
9 Wagstaff et al. (2004) do not report whether the difference between these correlation 
coefficients is significant, although in stating that “C-A relationships were more or less 
unaffected by the FM and eye-closure manipulations” (p. 444), they imply that the difference 
was non-significant. 
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correct (i.e., the accuracy of the response). In light of Wagstaff et al.’s findings, 
eye-closure was not expected to significantly affect any of the confidence 
measures. 
 
3.3.1.5 Retrieval Strategies 
In Experiment 1, eye-closure increased fine-grain correct recall of visual 
details. To explain this finding, it was speculated that eye-closure may have 
facilitated visual imagery, allowing for the retrieval of detailed visual 
information. To test this interpretation of the findings more directly, self-
report measures of retrieval strategies were included in the present 
experiment (see Appendix C).10 In line with previous findings (Rode et al., 
2007; Wais et al., 2010), it was hypothesised that participants in the eyes-
closed condition would be more likely to report using visual imagery than 
participants in the eyes-open condition. Furthermore, it was expected that 
participants who reported using visual or auditory imagery would exhibit 
superior recall performance compared to participants who did not report 
using mental imagery (cf. Carlson, Kincaid, Lance, & Hodgson, 1976; Wang & 
Thomas, 2000). 
 
3.3.1.6 Aims and Hypotheses 
The primary aims of the present study were to assess the emotional response 
generated by the violent events, and to examine whether eye-closure was 
more or less effective for violent compared to non-violent events. In line with 
previous research, the violent videos were expected to increase electrodermal 
activity in the participants, but it was not clear how they would affect heart 
rate. In light of the findings that eye-closure has the potential to induce 
negative emotional mood (e.g., Lerner et al., 2009), it was hypothesised that 
eye-closure would be more effective for recall of violent events than for recall 
of non-violent events. Secondary aims were to assess eyewitness confidence 
and self-reported retrieval strategies. It was hypothesised that eye-closure 
would not affect confidence ratings, but that it would increase the self-
reported use of visual imagery. 
 
                                                      
10 I am grateful to Graham Davies for this idea. 
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3.3.2 Method 
3.3.2.1 Participants 
Fifty-six students from the University of York participated in the study for 
course credit or a small monetary reward. The sample consisted of 11 males 
and 45 females, with ages ranging from 18 to 29 (M = 19.91, SD = 2.47). All 
participants were native English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and hearing.   
 
3.3.2.2 Materials 
One violent and one non-violent version were created for two episodes of 
different TV series (“Lost”, season 3, episode 11; and “Survivors”, season 1, 
episode 4). The British Board of Film Classification rated the “Lost” episode as 
suitable for 12 years and over and the “Survivors” episode as suitable for 15 
years and over. Each of the video clips was eight minutes in duration. Figure 
3.5 illustrates the video editing process for the “Lost” episode.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Video editing process. Schematic representation of the 
transformation from the original version of the “Lost” episode to the non-
violent and violent versions. The scenes depicted in blue and green were non-
violent, whereas the scenes depicted in red involved violence or injury. 
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The “Lost” video involved four survivors of a plane crash on a deserted 
island, who discover a house. In both versions of the video, they go into the 
house, explore the rooms and interact with the resident. In the violent version, 
one man gets shot by a rifle, the wound is stitched up, and a physical fight 
breaks out. In the non-violent version, the scenes containing violence and 
injury were replaced with other scenes of the survivors exploring the house 
and interacting with the resident. The “Survivors” video involved a woman 
who is looking for her missing son and thinks he might be among a group of 
boys living in a house in the forest. Both versions of the video contained 
scenes in the forest and in the house, and showed interactions between the 
woman, the boys, and a man who is helping the woman. In the violent version, 
the man gets shot by an arrow, the wound is stitched up, and a physical fight 
breaks out. In the non-violent version, the scenes containing violence and 
injury were replaced with other scenes of the woman and the man exploring 
the forest, and interactions with the boys. In editing the video clips, every 
effort was made to maintain the story line of the event. 
There were four question categories: visual-central, visual-peripheral, 
auditory-central, and auditory-peripheral (see Appendix A.2 for all questions 
listed per category for each video). Centrality was established based on plot 
relevance (Heuer & Reisberg, 1990)11. The questions were asked in the order in 
which the corresponding information appeared in the video clip; hence the 
different types of questions were mixed, and in a fixed order throughout. 
 
3.3.2.3 Pilot 
A pilot study was conducted to select interview questions of equivalent 
difficulty within each question category for the violent and non-violent 
versions of the videos. Eight pilot participants watched the videos and 
attempted to answer the original set of 24 questions. In addition, they were 
asked to tell the experimenter about the strategies they had used to retrieve 
the information. Based on their performance, five questions were selected for 
                                                      
11 An alternative distinction was also assessed, in which central details for the violent videos 
were defined as those central to the violence itself (i.e., the likely source of the emotional 
arousal; cf. Christianson & Safer, 1996; Safer, Christianson, Autry, & Österlund, 1998). 
However, this alternative distinction revealed the same data pattern as the plot relevance 
distinction. Therefore, only the latter findings are reported here. 
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each of the four question categories, and a list of potential retrieval strategies 
was constructed for the main experiment (see Appendix C). None of the pilot 
participants took part in the main experiment. 
 
3.3.2.4 Physiological Measures 
Electrodermal activity (EDA) and photoplethysmography (PPG) 
measurements were used as physiological correlates of the level of emotional 
arousal experienced by participants. The physiological responses were 
monitored using a MP36 system (BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Goleta, CA) and 
analysed with BIOPAC software AcqKnowledge 3.9.2 for Mac OS X. EDA was 
sampled at 1000 Hz using disposable electrodermal gel electrodes (BIOPAC 
model EL507) attached to the distal phalanx of the index and middle fingers of 
the participant’s non-dominant hand. Participants were asked to wash their 
hands with water and dry them gently before the electrodes were attached. A 
constant voltage (.5 V) was used to measure skin conductance (cf. Fowles et 
al., 1981). EDA was digitized at the electrodes and a 1 Hz filter applied (Gain 2 
µmho/V). Skin conductance responses were located using a threshold level of 
.15 µmho (with the exception of two recordings that contained a lot of noise, 
for which threshold levels of .20 µmho and .25 µmho were applied). The PPG 
was sampled at 1000 Hz using a BIOPAC SS4L PPG finger transducer attached 
to the distal phalanx of the thumb of the participant’s non-dominant hand. 
PPG signals were high-pass filtered at .5 Hz to obtain a stable baseline with 
level peaks and no drift. Peaks were detected automatically using a threshold 
level fixed at zero. The automatic detections were verified visually and 
corrected in case of misdetection.  
 
3.3.2.5 Design 
The experiment manipulated one between-subjects independent variable 
(eye-closure) and three within-subjects independent variables (the type of 
video, question modality, and question centrality). The experiment comprised 
a 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Type of Video: non-
violent, violent) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) x 2 (Question 
Centrality: central, peripheral) mixed design with repeated measures on the 
last three factors. The dependent variables were identical to Experiment 1. 
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3.3.2.6 Procedure 
In the announcement calling for participants, it was stated that the aim of the 
experiment was “to investigate people’s physiological patterns while they are 
watching violent TV”. Participants were informed that physiological 
measurements would be taken throughout the session. All participants were 
tested individually in a dimly lit room. A curtain separated them from the 
experimenter during the experimental stages in which no interaction was 
required. Participants signed an informed consent form and were asked to 
wash their hands, after which the EDA electrodes and the PPG transducer 
were attached. Participants were first asked to engage in a word finder filler 
task for five minutes in order to allow stabilisation of hydration under the 
electrodes. After the task, participants were instructed to just sit and relax for 
two minutes while a baseline measure was taken.  
During the session, participants watched two videos, one violent and 
one non-violent version. Videos were counterbalanced as shown in Figure 3.6. 
After the first baseline, participants were informed that they would watch a 
video about which they would be asked questions afterwards.12 After watching 
the video, they engaged in another word finder task for two minutes. 
Subsequently, the interviewer asked them 20 questions about the first video. 
Participants were randomly assigned to receive either an instruction to keep 
their eyes closed throughout the interview, or no instruction. They were asked 
to remember as much as possible, but not to guess: a “don’t know” response 
was allowed. They responded orally to the questions, and indicated their level 
of confidence in their responses on a five-point scale, ranging from 1 (not 
confident at all) to 5 (extremely confident). After the interview questions, 
participants were asked to rate on a five-point scale how emotional, 
interesting, violent, and upsetting they had found the first video.  
 
                                                      
12The reason for informing participants that they would be asked questions about the video 
was to prevent any differences between the first and the second video relating to expectations 
of being tested (i.e., incidental versus intentional learning, see McLaughlin, 1965; Neill, Beck, 
Bottalico, & Molloy, 1990; but also see Postman, 1964). 
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Figure 3.6 Video counter-balancing. Violence level of videos was a within-
subjects variable. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
counterbalancing conditions. 
 
The procedure was then repeated for the second video (i.e., a second 
baseline was taken, participants watched the second video, engaged in 
another two-minute filler task, and were interviewed about the second video). 
All interviews were audio-taped for subsequent analysis. At the end of the 
interview about the second video, participants completed a demographic 
information sheet and a retrieval strategies form (see Appendix C). The form 
provided a list of possible strategies that had been mentioned by the eight 
pilot participants. It also included the option to list other strategies that were 
not on the list. Finally, it asked the participant’s opinion on whether eye-
closure had helped (eyes-closed condition) or would have helped (eyes-open 
condition) in remembering the visual and auditory information, respectively. 
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked whether they had seen 
either of the TV episodes before (none of them indicated that they had), and 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
 
3.3.2.7 Data Coding 
The audio-taped interviews were coded blind to interview condition. 
Responses could be coded as correct, incorrect, or omitted, and all correct 
responses were coded for grain size as in Experiment 1 (see section 3.2.2.6). 
Examples of each type of response for the violent version of the “Lost” episode 
Lost - Neutral Survivors - Violent1
Survivors - Violent Lost - Neutral
Survivors - Neutral Lost- Violent
Lost - Violent Survivors - Neutral
2
3
4
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are provided in Appendix A.2. For each of the four video clips, the responses of 
5 randomly selected participants were double-coded by an independent coder 
(i.e., 100 responses per video; 400 responses in total; 18% of the total sample). 
Inter-rater reliability (for the decision to score a response as fine-grain correct, 
coarse-grain correct, incorrect, or omitted) was high, κ = .95, p < .001. The 
scores of the first coder were retained for the main analysis. 
 
3.3.3 Results 
This section will first report the findings of the subjective and physiological 
measures of emotional arousal. It will then outline the findings with respect to 
number correct, fine-grain correct, coarse-grain correct, and proportion 
correct. Subsequently, it will examine correlations between the measures of 
emotional arousal and recall performance. Finally, it will discuss the findings 
pertaining to confidence ratings and self-reported retrieval strategies. 
 
3.3.3.1 Subjective Ratings of Arousal 
The average self-report ratings of emotional arousal for the violent and non-
violent videos are displayed in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Experiment 2: Self-reported emotional arousal. Mean ratings of 
the videos on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). 
Rating 
Type of Video 
Non-violent (N = 56) Violent (N = 56) 
How violent? 1.77 (.10) 3.63 (.11) 
How upsetting? 1.61 (.11) 2.14 (.11) 
How emotional? 3.00 (.13) 3.29 (.11) 
How interesting? 3.61 (.12) 4.09 (.09) 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Type of Video: 
non-violent, violent) x 2 (Type of Rating: violent, upsetting, emotional, 
interesting) mixed ANOVA revealed significant main effects of type of video, F 
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(1, 54) = 88.05, p < .001, η2 = .13, and type of rating, F (3, 162) = 133.37, p < .001, 
η
2
 = .42, but no significant effect of eye-closure (F < 1). There was a significant 
interaction between type of video and type of rating13, F (2.67, 144.33) = 33.92, 
p < .001, η2 = .08, but no other significant interactions (all ps > .27). Simple 
effects analyses showed that the violent videos were rated as significantly 
more violent, F (1, 54) = 214.73, p < .001, η2 = .80, more upsetting, F (1, 54) = 
16.11, p < .001, η2 = .23, and more interesting, F (1, 54) = 13.27, p < .001, η2 = .20, 
and as marginally more emotional, F (1, 54) = 3.59, p = .06, η2 = .06, than the 
non-violent videos. Taken together, the self-report ratings suggest that the 
violence manipulation was successful: participants rated the violent videos as 
more violent and more upsetting than the non-violent videos.  
 
3.3.3.2 Skin Conductance Responses 
Due to difficulties with initially defective equipment, physiological responses 
were recorded for only 29 of the 56 participants. In line with Prokasy and 
Kumpfer’s (1973) recommendations, frequency and amplitude of skin 
conductance responses (SCRs) were assessed separately. A preliminary 2 
(Presentation Order: first, second) x 2 (Phase Type: baseline, video) x 2 (Video 
Condition: neutral-violent, violent-neutral) mixed ANOVA revealed no 
significant order effects for SCR frequency. The same analysis for SCR 
amplitude revealed that mean amplitude was significantly higher during the 
first half of the experiment than during the second half, F (1, 21) = 18.67, p < 
.001, η2 = .47, but presentation order did not interact with phase type or video 
condition. Therefore, the data were collapsed over video condition to increase 
statistical power. Thus, skin conductance responses were compared in four 
experimental phases: the baseline preceding the non-violent video (NV base), 
the non-violent video (NV video), the baseline preceding the violent video (V 
base), and the violent video (V video). Figure 3.7 shows the average frequency 
and amplitude of evoked SCRs during each of the experimental phases. 
                                                      
13 Because Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the 
interaction between type of video and type of rating (χ2(5) = 12.35, p = .03), degrees of freedom 
were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (ε = .79). 
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Figure 3.7 Experiment 2: Skin conductance responses. The average a) 
frequency (in Hz) and b) amplitude (in µmho) of SCRs, during the four 
different experimental phases: baseline preceding non-violent video (NV 
base), non-violent video (NV video), baseline preceding violent video (V base), 
and violent video (V video). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
A 4 (Experimental Phase: NV base, NV video, V base, V video) repeated 
measures ANOVA on the frequency of SCRs revealed a significant main effect 
of experimental phase, F (3, 84) = 6.15, p < .001, η2 = .07. Planned contrasts 
showed that SCRs were marginally more frequent during the non-violent 
video than during the baseline preceding the non-violent video, F (1, 28) = 
3.79, p = .06, η2 = .13, and significantly more frequent during the violent video 
than during the baseline preceding the violent video, F (1, 28) = 7.60, p < .05, η2 
= .21. The two baseline periods did not differ significantly, F (1, 28) = 3.19, p = 
.09, but SCRs were significantly more frequent during the violent video than 
during the non-violent video, F (1, 28) = 5.31, p < .05, η2 = .17.  
The same ANOVA on the square-root transformed amplitude of SCRs 
also revealed a significant main effect of experimental phase14, F (1.82, 40.06) = 
                                                      
14 A square root transformation was used to normalise the distribution of the amplitude data 
(Dawson et al., 2000). After transformation, there was still one significant outlier on all of the 
amplitude measures, therefore the original values of this participant were replaced by the 
mean plus two standard deviations (cf. Field, 2004). For the ANOVA, Mauchly’s test indicated 
that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(5) = 23.87, p < .001), therefore degrees 
of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (ε = .61). 
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8.14, p = .001, η2 = .27. Planned contrasts showed that the average amplitude 
was significantly higher during the non-violent video than during the baseline 
period preceding the non-violent video, F (1, 22) = 18.14, p < .001, η2 = .45, and 
also significantly higher during the violent video than during the baseline 
period preceding the violent video, F (1, 22) = 30.29, p < .001, η2 = .58. There 
were no significant differences between the two baseline periods (F < 1) or 
between the two videos (F < 1).  
In sum, both types of video increased electrodermal activity compared 
to the baseline periods. Furthermore, skin conductance responses were 
significantly more frequent (but not higher in amplitude) during the violent 
video than during the non-violent video. It was also examined whether the 
electrodermal measures of emotional arousal correlated with subjective 
ratings of emotional arousal and interest. To increase power, the three ratings 
assessing emotional arousal (violent, upsetting, and emotional) were 
collapsed into one emotional-arousal score (ranging from 3 to 15). Bonferroni 
corrections were applied to control for Type I error for the two comparisons 
(i.e., emotional-arousal and interest ratings; α = .025). However, neither 
frequency nor amplitude of SCRs was significantly correlated with the 
emotional-arousal score or with interest rating (all ps > .22). Thus, subjective 
ratings of emotional arousal did not reflect electrodermal-activity indicators of 
physiological arousal. 
 
3.3.3.3 Heart Rate Variability 
Peak-to-peak intervals obtained with HRV analysis were converted into heart 
rate in beats per minute (BPM) to allow for comparisons with previous 
research on emotion and memory (e.g., Burke et al., 1992; Christianson, 1984, 
1987; Read et al., 1992). Heart rate was 58 BPM on average during the baseline 
preceding the non-violent video, 61 BPM during the non-violent video, 60 
BPM during the baseline preceding the violent video, and 61 BPM during the 
violent video. A 4 (Experimental Phase: NV base, NV video, V base, V video) 
repeated measures ANOVA on heart rate did not reveal a significant effect of 
experimental phase (F < 1). In addition, heart rate during the videos did not 
correlate significantly with self-report ratings of emotional arousal or interest 
(all ps > .29). 
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The HRV analysis also provided estimates of sympathetic activity, 
parasympathetic (vagal) activity, “sympathovagal balance” (Eckberg, 1997; 
Pagani et al., 1986), and power in the very low frequency (VLF; .00 Hz to .04 
Hz), low frequency (LF; .04 Hz to .15 Hz), high frequency (HF; .15 Hz to .4 Hz), 
and very high frequency (VHF; .40 Hz to 3.00 Hz) domains. Briefly, power in 
the high frequency bands reflects parasympathetic activity, whereas power in 
the low frequency bands is thought to correspond mainly to sympathetic 
activity (Murthy et al., 2001; Selvaraj et al., 2008); although the latter may 
reflect both sympathetic and parasympathetic influences (Appelhans & 
Luecken, 2006; Pumprla, Howorka, Groves, Chester, & Nolan, 2002; Task 
Force, 1996). Out of these measures, only VLF band power revealed significant 
effects; this measure will therefore be explored in further detail below. 
A 4 (Experimental Phase: NV base, NV video, V base, V video) repeated 
measures ANOVA on the square-root transformed power in the VLF band 
revealed a significant main effect15, F (2.37, 66.55) = 399.15, p < .001, η2 = .93. 
Planned contrasts showed that average VLF band power during the non-
violent video (M = 8.57, SD = 2.23) was substantially higher than during the 
baseline preceding the non-violent video (M = 1.08, SD = .71), F (1, 28) = 
484.25, p < .001, η2 = .95. Similarly, average VLF band power during the violent 
video (M = 8.94, SD = 2.47) was substantially higher than during the baseline 
preceding the violent video (M = .82, SD = .42), F (1, 28) = 752.93, p < .001, η2 = 
.96. However, there were no significant differences in VLF band power 
between the two baseline periods (F < 1) or between the violent and non-
violent video (F < 1). Power in the VLF domain did not correlate significantly 
with self-report ratings of emotional arousal or interest (all ps > .50). The 
implications of the HRV findings will be addressed in the discussion.  
 
In sum, electrodermal and cardiovascular measures showed that participants 
were more aroused during the videos than during the baseline periods, and 
self-report and electrodermal measures showed that participants were more 
aroused during the violent video than during the non-violent video. 
                                                      
15 Prior to analysis, three significant outliers in VLF band power were replaced by the mean 
plus two standard deviations (Field, 2004) and the distribution was normalised by square-root 
transformation. Because the assumption of sphericity was violated (χ2(5) = 16.29, p = .006), 
degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate (ε = .79). 
Chapter 3  Memory for Violent Events 
89 
 
3.3.3.4 Total Number Correct 
Figure 3.8 depicts the total number of correct responses per type of video.  
 
Figure 3.8  Experiment 2: Total number correct. Mean total number of 
correct responses to different types of questions about (a) non-violent and (b) 
violent videos. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Because the distribution for visual-central responses about the non-
violent videos could not be normalised, non-parametric tests were also 
performed, with results confirming the findings reported below (see Appendix 
B.3). A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Type of Video: non-
violent, violent) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) x 2 (Question 
Centrality: central, peripheral) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the total 
number of correct responses. Overall, participants who closed their eyes gave 
significantly more correct responses than participants who kept their eyes 
open, F (1, 54) = 7.12, p < .05, η2 = .12, d = .71. There was no significant main 
effect of type of video (F < 1). Participants gave significantly more correct 
responses about visual than about auditory aspects, F (1, 54) = 68.17, p < .001, 
η
2
 = .11, and significantly more correct responses about central than about 
peripheral details, F (1, 54) = 7.56, p < .01, η2 = .02.  
Unlike in Experiment 1, there was no significant interaction between 
eye-closure and question modality, F (1, 54) = 1.48, p = .23, and there were also 
no other significant interactions involving eye-closure (all ps > .14). However, 
there was a significant interaction between type of video and question 
centrality, F (1, 54) = 10.50, p < .01, η2 = .02. Simple effects analyses showed 
that central details from the non-violent videos were significantly better 
remembered than peripheral details, F (1, 54) = 18.63, p < .001, η2 = .26, 
whereas there was no significant difference between central and peripheral 
details for the violent videos (F < 1). Finally, there was a significant three-way 
interaction between type of video, question modality, and question centrality, 
F (1, 54) = 14.08, p < .001, η2 = .04. As shown in Figure 3.8, the interaction 
between type of video and question centrality was observed for recall of visual, 
but not auditory, aspects of the videos. There were no other significant 
interactions (all ps > .14). 
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3.3.3.5 Fine-Grain Correct 
Figure 3.9 depicts the number of fine-grain correct responses per video.  
 
Figure 3.9  Experiment 2: Fine-grain correct. Mean number of fine-grain 
correct responses to different types of questions about (a) non-violent and (b) 
violent videos. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Type of Video: 
non-violent, violent) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) x 2 (Question 
Centrality: central, peripheral) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the number 
of fine-grain correct responses. Participants who closed their eyes provided 
significantly more fine-grain correct responses than participants who kept 
their eyes open, F (1, 54) = 8.85, p < .01, η2 = .14, d = .80, but there was no 
significant main effect of type of video, F (1, 54) = 2.92, p = .09, η2 = .01. 
Participants gave significantly more fine-grain correct responses about central 
details than about peripheral details, F (1, 54) = 22.72, p < .001, η2 = .05, but 
unlike the pattern observed for total correct, they gave significantly more fine-
grain correct responses about auditory aspects than about visual aspects, F (1, 
54) = 24.04, p < .001, η2 = .04.  
There was a marginally significant interaction between eye-closure and 
question modality, F (1, 54) = 3.77, p = .06, η2 = .01, indicating a significant eye-
closure effect for visual aspects, F (1, 54) = 12.02, p < .01, η2 = .18, d = .93, but 
not for auditory aspects, F (1, 54) = 3.01, p = .09, η2 = .05. There were no other 
significant interactions involving eye-closure (all ps > .09). There was a 
significant interaction between type of video and question centrality, F (1, 54) 
= 13.08, p < .001, η2 = .03, but the pattern was opposite from that observed for 
the total number of correct responses. Thus, central details from the violent 
videos were reported in significantly more fine-grain detail than peripheral 
details, F (1, 54) = 30.05, p < .001, η2 = .36, whereas there was no significant 
difference between central and peripheral details for the non-violent videos (F 
< 1). Finally, there was a significant interaction between question modality 
and question centrality, F (1, 54) = 12.84, p < .001, η2 = .03, suggesting that 
participants were more likely to provide a fine-grain correct answer for visual-
central questions than for visual-peripheral questions, F (1, 54) = 32.36, p < 
.001, η2 = .37, whereas there was no difference between auditory-central and 
auditory-peripheral questions (F < 1). There were no other significant 
interactions (all ps > .06).  
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3.3.3.6 Coarse-Grain Correct 
Figure 3.10 depicts the number of coarse-grain correct responses per video.  
 
Figure 3.10  Experiment 2: Coarse-grain correct. Mean number of coarse-
grain correct responses to different types of questions about (a) non-violent 
and (b) violent videos. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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The distribution of coarse-grain correct recall was normalised by log-
transformation. A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Type of 
Video: non-violent, violent) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) x 2 
(Question Centrality: central, peripheral) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the 
log-transformed number of coarse-grain correct responses. However, it was 
difficult to interpret the findings of this ANOVA, due to serious floor effects in 
the number of coarse-grain correct responses provided (particularly 
pertaining to auditory details; see Figure 3.10). For the present purposes, 
however, the most relevant finding was that eye-closure did not significantly 
affect the number of coarse-grain responses provided, and did not interact 
with any of the other variables (all ps > .14). 
 
3.3.3.7 Proportion Correct 
Figure 3.11 depicts the proportion of responses that were correct. On average, 
participants gave 2.04 incorrect responses for the non-violent videos (SD = 
1.35), and 2.96 for the violent videos (SD = 1.76; for examples, see Appendix 
A.2). Proportion correct was calculated by dividing the number of correct 
responses by the total number of correct and incorrect responses. Because the 
distributions of proportion correct for several question categories about the 
non-violent video were skewed, all variables were inverted and square-root 
transformed, which solved all problems with normality.  
A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Type of Video: 
non-violent, violent) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) x 2 (Question 
Centrality: central, peripheral) mixed ANOVA on the transformed proportions 
showed that participants who closed their eyes were significantly more 
accurate than participants who kept their eyes open, F (1, 54) = 11.26, p < .01, 
η
2
 = .17, d = .93. Proportion correct was significantly higher for non-violent 
videos than for violent videos, F (1, 54) = 12.75, p < .001, η2 = .03. Finally, 
proportion correct was significantly higher for visual questions than for 
auditory questions, F (1, 54) = 12.44, p < .001, η2 = .02, and significantly higher 
for central questions than for peripheral questions, F (1, 54) = 8.75, p < .01, η2 = 
.03. Interactions will be explored in the next paragraph. 
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Figure 3.11  Experiment 2: Proportion correct. Mean proportion of responses 
that were correct for different types of questions about (a) non-violent and (b) 
violent videos. Error bars represent standard errors.   
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In terms of proportion correct, there was no significant interaction 
between eye-closure and question modality, F (1, 54) = 1.39, p = .24, and there 
were no other significant interactions involving eye-closure (all ps > .09). 
There was a marginally significant interaction between type of video and 
question centrality, F (1, 54) = 3.90, p = .05, η2 = .01, suggesting that 
participants were more accurate about central than about peripheral details 
for the non-violent videos, F (1, 54) = 20.84, p < .05, η2 = .28, but not for the 
violent videos (F < 1). A significant three-way interaction between type of 
video, question modality, and centrality, F (1, 54) = 5.18, p < .05, η2 = .01, 
indicated that the interaction between type of video and centrality was 
observed only for visual aspects. There was again a significant interaction 
between question modality and centrality, F (1, 54) = 9.69, p < .01, η2 = .02, 
suggesting that participants were more accurate for auditory-central than for 
auditory-peripheral questions, F (1, 54) = 14.20, p < .001, η2 = .21, whereas 
there was no difference between visual-central and visual-peripheral 
questions (F < 1). There were no other significant interactions (all ps > .09). 
 
In sum, eye-closure significantly increased the total number of correct 
responses provided about both types of videos, which was driven by an 
increase in fine-grain, but not coarse-grain, correct responses. In addition, 
eye-closure significantly increased testimonial accuracy. 
 
3.3.3.8 Correlations between Arousal and Recall 
It was assessed whether the level of emotional arousal elicited by the violent 
video affected recall of the violent video. Table 3.2 shows the correlations 
between each measure of emotional arousal and number and proportion 
correct for the violent video. Because two correlations were assessed for each 
arousal measure (i.e., number and proportion correct), significance levels 
were adjusted with a Bonferroni correction (α = .025).  
Recall performance did not correlate significantly with the emotional-
arousal score (i.e., collapsed ratings of how violent, emotional, and upsetting 
the video was), but proportion correct marginally correlated with interest 
rating. Participants who found the violent video more interesting tended to 
recall it with a higher level of accuracy. Recall performance did not correlate 
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with the square-root transformed amplitude of skin conductance responses 
(SCRs), but proportion correct marginally correlated with SCR frequency. 
Participants who reacted to the violent video with more frequent SCRs tended 
to remember it less well.  
 
Table 3.2 Experiment 2: Correlations between arousal and recall. 
Correlations between measures of emotional arousal during the violent video 
and the number and proportion correct for the violent video.   
Measure of emotional arousal 
Pearson’s r 
Number 
correct 
Proportion 
correct 
Self-report ratings: emotional-arousal score .02 .10 
Self-report ratings: interest rating .22 .28* 
Skin conductance responses: frequency -.40* -.38* 
Skin conductance responses: transformed amplitude -.28 -.19 
Heart rate variability: heart rate .12 .24 
Heart rate variability: transformed VLF power -.44** -.42* 
Note. *denotes significance at α < .05 
**denotes significance at Bonferroni-corrected level of α < .025 
 
There were no significant correlations between heart rate during the 
violent video and recall performance. However, there was a significant 
negative correlation between square-root transformed power in the VLF 
domain during the violent video and number correct, and a marginally 
significant negative correlation with proportion correct. Thus, participants 
who reacted to the violent video with increased sympathetic activity tended to 
remember it less well than participants who were less physiologically aroused. 
Implications of these findings will be considered in the Discussion. 
 
3.3.3.9 Confidence 
Confidence ratings were only obtained if participants provided a response; 
hence “don’t know” responses were not taken into account in the analyses 
presented in this section. Preliminary analyses were conducted separately for 
fine-grain and coarse-grain responses. Although the confidence-accuracy (CA) 
relation was somewhat different for each type of response (for more 
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information on the relation between grain size and confidence, see Goldsmith 
et al., 2005; Weber & Brewer, 2008), the effects of eye-closure were similar for 
both types of responses. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, fine-grain and 
coarse-grain correct responses were combined into one ‘correct’ category for 
the analyses presented in this thesis.  
First, it was examined how eye-closure and type of video16 affected 
average confidence ratings for correct and incorrect responses (see Figure 
3.12). A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Type of Video: 
non-violent, violent) x 2 (Type of Response: correct, incorrect) mixed ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the last two factors revealed three significant main 
effects (see below), but no significant interactions (all ps > .12). As expected, 
mean confidence ratings were significantly higher for correct responses than 
for incorrect responses, F (1, 46) = 161.66, p < .001, η2 = .58. Furthermore, 
participants who had their eyes open gave significantly higher confidence 
ratings overall than participants who had their eyes closed, F (1, 46) = 4.80, p < 
.05, η2 = .09. Finally, participants were significantly more confident in their 
responses about the violent videos than in their responses about the non-
violent videos, F (1, 46) = 4.52, p < .05, η2 = .01.  
 
 
Figure 3.12  Experiment 2: Mean confidence ratings. Average confidence 
ratings (1 = not confident at all; 5 = extremely confident) for correct and 
incorrect responses about (a) non-violent and (b) violent videos, provided by 
participants with eyes open or closed. Errors bars represent standard errors. 
                                                      
16 Question modality and question centrality could not be included as variables in this 
analysis, because there were not enough incorrect responses in each question category. 
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Second, it was examined whether a generally confident rememberer is 
also likely to be generally accurate. The average confidence rating per video 
was calculated for each participant, resulting in 112 ratings (each participant 
watched two videos). The distribution of proportion correct was normalised 
by inverting and square-root transforming the data. The average confidence 
rating expressed by a particular participant for a particular video was 
significantly negatively correlated with the transformed proportion correct for 
that video, r = -.29, p < .01. Because proportion correct was inverted, this 
meant that participants who were generally confident in their responses about 
a particular video were also generally accurate in their responses about that 
video. Separate general CA correlations for each interview condition (N = 56 
per correlation) did not differ significantly from each other, Fisher’s z = .10, p = 
.92 (eyes-open: r = -.35, p < .01; eyes-closed: r = -.34, p < .05). 
Third, it was examined whether responses that were expressed with 
high confidence were also likely to be accurate. To calculate this specific CA 
correlation, each individual confidence rating for all answered questions was 
taken into account (ignoring which participant provided the answer), resulting 
in 2005 ratings in total. Point-biserial CA correlations were calculated between 
the confidence rating for a particular response and the accuracy of that 
response (correct or incorrect). Overall, the specific CA correlation was 
significant and medium to large in size, r
pb
 = .43, p < .001. In other words, a 
particular response expressed with high confidence was relatively likely to be 
accurate. Analysis of separate specific CA correlations for each interview 
condition (eyes-open group: N = 997; eyes-closed group: N = 1008) showed 
that the correlation was slightly higher for participants who kept their eyes 
open, r
pb
 = .45, p < .001, than for participants who closed their eyes, r
pb
 = .41, p < 
.001, but this difference was not significant, Fisher’s z = 1.21, p = .23.  
Fourth, a calibration technique was used to plot the proportion of 
correct responses against participants’ confidence ratings (see Figure 3.13). 
Calibration assesses the level of correspondence between subjective and 
objective probabilities of accuracy. Due to the five-point rating scale used for 
confidence assessments in the present study, it was not technically possible to 
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assess calibration.17 For the present purposes, however, perfect calibration was 
defined as following: responses rated as 5 should be 100% accurate, responses 
rated as 4 should be 75% accurate, responses rated as 3 should be 50% 
accurate, responses rated as 2 should be 25% accurate, and responses rated as 
1 should be 0% accurate (cf. Brewer & Day, 2005).  
 
Figure 3.13  Experiment 2: Confidence-accuracy calibration. Mean 
percentage of correct responses by confidence rating for the eyes-open and 
eyes-closed conditions. The black line denotes perfect calibration. Errors bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.13, participants in both interview conditions were 
underconfident, achieving a higher proportion correct than would be expected 
on the basis of their confidence ratings. Furthermore, visual inspection18 of the 
calibration graph suggests that the eyes-closed group was more likely to be 
                                                      
17 To assess correspondence between subjective and objective probabilities, each should be 
measured on the same scale (i.e., 0-100%). I was unaware of this requirement while 
conducting the present experiment, but the findings obtained with a 1-5 scale reported here 
were broadly replicated with a 0-100% confidence scale in Experiment 5. 
18 Note that the standard error bars permit an estimation of the stability of group differences. 
Overlapping standard error bars (as observed for confidence ratings of 2 and 5) suggest non-
reliable differences (see also Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010). 
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underconfident than the eyes-open group, at nearly every level of confidence. 
For instance, for confidence ratings at the mid-point of the scale, perfect 
calibration would have predicted 50% accuracy for the corresponding 
answers. In reality, participants who provided this rating were 65.8% accurate 
in the eyes-open condition, and 82.9% accurate in the eyes-closed condition. 
In sum, participants in the eyes-closed condition were more often correct, but 
did not adjust their confidence ratings in accordance with their accuracy, 
which will be discussed in more detail in the Discussion.  
 
3.3.3.10 Retrieval Strategies  
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to select which retrieval 
strategies they had used from a list of options provided (see Appendix C). 
Table 3.3 shows the number of participants in each interview condition who 
selected each retrieval strategy. Participants reported using between 1 and 5 
strategies, with 2.89 strategies used on average (SD = 1.15).  
 
Table 3.3 Experiment 2: Self-reported retrieval strategies. Number of 
participants who selected each retrieval strategy, by interview condition.  
Retrieval Strategy 
Interview Condition 
Eyes open 
(N = 28) 
Eyes closed 
(N = 28) 
Remembered main story line, reconstructed details 16 15 
Concentrated hard on remembering the video 14 19 
Visualised/pictured the video in my mind’s eye 21 26 
Replayed the voices and sounds in my head 13 21 
Pure guessing 6 6 
Other 4 1 
Did not use any memory retrieval strategies 0 0 
 
To examine whether eye-closure during the interview influenced self-
reported retrieval strategies, Pearson’s chi-square (χ2) tests were conducted. 
Although more participants in the eyes-closed condition than in the eyes-
open condition reported having used visual imagery, the difference between 
conditions was not significant, χ2(1) = 3.31, p = .14. Unexpectedly, participants 
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who closed their eyes were more likely to report having used auditory imagery 
than participants who kept their eyes open, and this difference approached 
significance, χ2(1) = 4.79, p = .05. Eye-closure did not significantly affect any of 
the other self-reported retrieval strategies (all ps > .27). 
Next, the relation between self-reported use of mental imagery and 
recall performance was examined. First, Bonferroni-corrected point-biserial 
correlations between self-reported visual imagery (yes/no) and number 
correct, fine-grain correct, coarse-grain correct, and proportion correct for 
visual and auditory questions were assessed (i.e., eight comparisons in total; α 
= .006). None of the correlations reached significance (all ps > .03). Second, 
Bonferroni-corrected point-biserial correlations between self-reported 
auditory imagery (yes/no) and the same eight recall variables were assessed. 
None of the correlations between auditory imagery and recall of auditory 
details were significant (all ps > .09). However, there was a significant positive 
correlation between self-reported use of auditory imagery and fine-grain 
correct recall of visual aspects, r
pb
 = .51, p < .001, and a significant negative 
correlation between auditory imagery and coarse-grain correct recall of visual 
aspects, r
pb
 = -.43, p = .001. Thus, participants who reported replaying the 
voices and sounds in their head were more likely to give specific instead of 
vague responses to questions about visual details. This unexpected finding 
will be addressed in the Discussion. 
 
3.3.4 Discussion 
The primary aim of the present study was to examine whether eye-closure was 
more or less effective for recall of violent compared to non-violent events, 
while providing manipulation checks to assess emotional arousal. First, the 
benefits of eye-closure observed in Experiment 1 were partially replicated for 
different violent and non-violent events in the present study. Second, violent 
videos were rated as significantly more violent and upsetting than non-violent 
videos, and generated significantly more frequent skin conductance 
responses. Third, eye-closure was found to be equally beneficial for recall of 
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violent and non-violent events. Finally, eye-closure significantly reduced 
witness confidence, and seemed to facilitate the use of mental imagery.  
 
3.3.4.1 Emotional Arousal 
In Deffenbacher et al.’s (2004) influential meta-analysis on the effects of 
emotional arousal on memory, no physiological measurements of arousal 
were included, which limited potential interpretations of their findings (see 
section 2.1.3.3). In the present study, both subjective and physiological 
measures of emotional arousal were included. Compared to baseline periods, 
both violent and non-violent videos significantly increased electrodermal 
activity (in terms of frequency and amplitude of skin conductance responses) 
and cardiovascular activity (in terms of power in the very low frequency 
domain). Although the physiological correlates of the very low frequency 
domain are still relatively unknown (Task Force, 1996), Matthews, Paulus, 
Simmons, Nelesen, and Dimsdale (2004) argue that activity in this domain 
reflects influences of the sympathetic nervous system on heart rate. Thus, it 
seems that both violent and non-violent videos in the present study 
heightened sympathetic activity.  
Violent videos were rated as significantly more violent and upsetting 
than non-violent videos, and as marginally more emotional. The subjective 
ratings were consistent with the finding that violent videos elicited 
significantly more frequent skin conductance responses than non-violent 
videos. Thus, it seems that violent videos were indeed more arousing than 
non-violent videos. However, due to the lack of differences in heart rate 
variability between the violent and non-violent videos, there was no evidence 
for either an orienting response (decelerated heart rate) or a defensive 
response (accelerated heart rate). Because two quite different patterns of 
physiological responding might cancel each other out (Deffenbacher et al., 
2004; see also section 2.1.3.1), the distribution of the heart rate data was 
inspected. However, the bimodal pattern that would be expected if individual 
differences caused the non-significant findings (i.e., some participants would 
show heart rate deceleration, whereas others would show heart rate 
acceleration in response to the violent video) was not observed.  
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It should be noted that potential differences between the violent and 
non-violent videos in terms of cardiovascular response may not have been 
apparent because physiological data were obtained for only 29 participants in 
the present study. In light of the current non-significant findings and previous 
inconsistent findings with regards to heart rate (e.g., Burke et al., 1992; 
Christianson, 1987), future physiological assessments are needed to provide 
more insight into the type of physiological response elicited by violent videos 
in the laboratory. In addition, because the self-report ratings of emotional 
arousal did not correlate with the physiological measures of arousal, it might 
be useful to include more extensive subjective measures of emotional arousal. 
For instance, Valentine and Mesout (2009) used Spielberger’s (1983) 20-item 
State Anxiety Inventory, which correlated significantly with heart rate, unlike 
the three ratings of emotional arousal used in the present study. 
 
3.3.4.2 Comparison of Violent and Non-Violent Events 
In terms of the number of correct responses, there was no evidence of either 
impairment (Deffenbacher, 1994) or improvement (Christianson, 1992) as a 
result of event violence. In terms of the proportion of correct responses, 
however, there was a difference between violent and non-violent videos. In 
line with Deffenbacher et al.’s (2004) meta-analytic findings, testimonial 
accuracy was significantly lower for violent events than for non-violent events, 
due to a higher number of incorrect responses. Furthermore, physiological 
arousal during the violent video (in terms of frequency of skin conductance 
responses and power in the very low frequency domain) tended to correlate 
negatively with recall performance for that video. This finding provides 
support for Deffenbacher’s (1994) argument that memory impairment will be 
observed only if the violent event elicits sympathetic activity in the viewer.  
Perhaps, participants provided more incorrect responses for the violent 
videos because their scripts for the violent events are more elaborate and vivid 
than their scripts for the non-violent events. An informal observation while 
scoring participants’ responses was that the incorrect responses provided 
about violent acts were more consistent across participants than those 
provided about non-violent acts. For instance, many participants who saw the 
violent “Lost” episode falsely reported that the woman hit the man with the 
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back of the rifle and that the man bandaged the shot wound; and many 
participants who saw the violent “Survivors” episode reported that the boys 
tried to strangle the man and that the man said that the older boy had killed 
the younger boy. Such shared false memories were much less frequent for the 
non-violent videos. Indeed, previous research has found that people tend to 
have well-defined scripts of criminal acts (e.g., Aizpurua et al., 2009; Holst & 
Pezdek, 1992), and that script-consistent errors are often incorporated into 
eyewitness testimony (e.g., García-Bajos & Migueles, 2003; V. L. Smith & 
Studebaker, 1996). In sum, the reduced testimonial accuracy for violent events 
may have been due to incorporation of script-consistent errors into memory 
for the violent event. The notion of violent event scripts will be considered in 
more detail in the General Discussion of this chapter (section 3.4.3).  
In terms of centrality of the to-be-remembered information, the 
attentional narrowing hypothesis (Christianson, 1992; Easterbrook, 1959) was 
partly confirmed. Although the number-correct data did not provide support 
for the hypothesis, the fine-grain correct data did. The hypothesis holds that 
emotional arousal enhances attention to (and subsequent recall of) central 
aspects of the event, at the expense of peripheral aspects. In line with this 
idea, central aspects for the violent events in the present study were more 
likely to be reported in fine-grain detail than peripheral aspects, whereas there 
was no difference in fine-grain recall between central and peripheral aspects 
for the non-violent events. This finding again highlights the usefulness of 
Goldsmith et al.’s (2002) distinction between fine-grain and coarse-grain 
correct responses, which allowed for a more sensitive analysis of the data.  
A final note of caution is warranted regarding the interpretation of the 
observed differences between violent and non-violent events. Although two 
violent events and two non-violent events were used in the present study, it is 
difficult to generalise from this small sample of stimulus materials (cf. Wells & 
Windschitl, 1999). Despite attempts to match the violent and non-violent 
versions of each episode in terms of plot, characters, and setting, the violent 
videos were rated as significantly more interesting than the non-violent 
videos. Due to this confound, it is impossible to know whether the reduced 
testimonial accuracy for violent videos was due to increased arousal or due to 
increased interest. However, it seems unlikely that more interesting events are 
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remembered with less accuracy; indeed, the correlational data showed that 
participants who rated the video as more interesting actually remembered it 
with a higher level of accuracy. Nevertheless, the difference in testimonial 
accuracy could have been due to the fact that different questions were asked 
for the violent and non-violent events (see Appendix A.2). For instance, some 
of the information classed as visual-peripheral for the violent videos (e.g., 
“Where on his body does the curly-haired man get shot?”) may have been 
more salient than some of the information classed as visual-peripheral for the 
non-violent videos (e.g., “What was in the fridge?”). To address these 
confounds, future research should use a wider range of violent and non-
violent events, preferably while keeping the questions consistent across 
violent and non-violent events (cf. Loftus & Burns, 1982). 
 
3.3.4.3 The Eye-Closure Effect 
Despite the difference in testimonial accuracy between violent and non-
violent videos, eye-closure was equally effective for both types of event. 
Although this finding is perhaps not as theoretically interesting as I had 
hoped, it is highly encouraging from an applied point of view. That is, eye-
closure may be useful in a broad range of eyewitness interviews, concerning 
both violent and non-violent crimes. Unlike in Experiment 1, no eye-closure 
effects were observed for coarse-grain recall in the present study (perhaps due 
to floor effects). In line with Experiment 1, however, eye-closure was 
particularly effective for the retrieval of fine-grain visual information 
(although the interaction between eye-closure and question modality was 
only marginally significant in the present study). These findings will be 
considered in the General Discussion of this chapter (section 3.4.4).  
 
3.3.4.4 Confidence 
Unsurprisingly, participants were more confident in their correct responses 
than in their incorrect responses. Furthermore, participants were more 
confident in their responses about the violent videos than in their responses 
about the non-violent videos, even though testimonial accuracy was 
significantly lower for violent videos. This seems to suggest that false 
memories of violence are held with relatively high levels of confidence. 
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Unexpectedly, eye-closure significantly reduced overall levels of confidence. 
Although there was no significant interaction between eye-closure and type of 
response, Figure 3.12 seems to indicate that eye-closure reduced confidence 
particularly for incorrect responses about the violent videos. This points to the 
possibility that eye-closure may not only improve recall, but may also improve 
meta-cognitive assessments of the accuracy of one’s own recall. However, in 
light of the non-significant findings of eye-closure on confidence observed by 
Wagstaff et al. (2004; 2010), this finding needs to be replicated before firm 
conclusions can be drawn.  
The average confidence rating provided by a particular witness was a 
moderately accurate predictor of her accuracy (r = .29), and the confidence 
rating provided for a particular response was an even better predictor of its 
accuracy (r = .43). However, the calibration graph showed that participants 
were correct more often than would have been predicted based on their 
confidence ratings. Furthermore, the tendency towards underconfidence was 
especially pronounced in witnesses who had their eyes closed. This highlights 
the importance of using multiple approaches to assess the relation between 
confidence and accuracy, since no significant group differences were detected 
in the analysis of general and specific CA correlations (cf. Brewer & Day, 2005; 
Juslin et al., 1996; Olsson, 2000). The implications of this finding will be 
addressed in the final Chapter (section 7.2.5). 
 
3.3.4.5 Retrieval Strategies 
In the present study, participants were asked to report on their retrieval 
strategies, to examine whether eye-closure increased the self-reported use of 
mental imagery (cf. Caruso & Gino, 2011). Eye-closure tended to increase the 
self-reported use of visual imagery, but this tendency was not significant, 
possibly because almost all participants reported using this strategy. 
Interestingly, there was a marginally significant difference between groups in 
terms of auditory imagery: participants who closed their eyes during the 
interview were more likely to report having replayed the voices and sounds in 
their head than participants who kept their eyes open. This finding suggests 
that eye-closure not only has the potential to facilitate visual imagery (cf. Wais 
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et al., 2010), but may also facilitate other forms of mental imagery, such as 
auditory imagery. It should be noted, however, that participants might lack 
insight into their own cognitive processes (e.g., Holmes, Waters, & Rajaram, 
1998; Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Lundeberg, Fox, & Punćochaŕ, 1994; Merckelbach 
& Wessel, 1998). Therefore, this finding needs to be replicated with more 
objective measures (e.g., image-evoking qualities; Paivio, 1969). 
 In line with previous research on the use of mnemonic techniques 
(Carlson et al., 1976; Wang & Thomas, 2000), it was expected that the self-
reported use of mental imagery would be associated with higher recall 
performance. Unexpectedly, the only significant association observed was 
cross-modal in nature: participants who reported using auditory imagery were 
more likely to provide a fine-grain (as opposed to coarse-grain) correct 
response to questions about visual details. This finding provides an interesting 
parallel to previously reported cross-modal effects in the opposite direction 
(i.e., that visual imagery facilitates recall of auditory-verbal stimuli; cf. Brooks, 
1967, 1968; J. M. Clark & Paivio, 1991; Paivio, 1969). Cross-modal and 
modality-specific processes in the eye-closure effect will be examined in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
 
3.3.4.6 Conclusion 
The present findings suggest that witnesses are less accurate in their 
testimony about violent events than in their testimony about non-violent 
events, perhaps due to the incorporation of script-consistent false details. 
Crucially, however, benefits of eye-closure were observed for both violent and 
non-violent events, highlighting the broad potential applicability of the eye-
closure instruction. In addition, the confidence data seemed to suggest that, in 
addition to improving recall, eye-closure might improve meta-cognitive 
judgments, although this finding is in need of replication. Finally, the role of 
mental imagery in the eye-closure effect does not seem to be modality-specific 
in nature (at least not when measured by self-report). In the next section, the 
broader implications of the findings obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 will be 
discussed. 
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3.4 General Discussion 
 
Taken together, the experiments presented in this chapter confirm that the 
eye-closure instruction can benefit recall of violent as well as non-violent 
events. In Experiment 1, eye-closure increased the number of coarse-grain 
correct responses overall, and increased the number of fine-grain correct 
responses for visual, but not auditory, aspects of the violent event. In 
Experiment 2, eye-closure did not affect coarse-grain responses, but 
significantly increased fine-grain responses, again predominantly for visual 
aspects of the violent and non-violent events. In this general discussion of the 
findings, I will consider effect sizes, testimonial accuracy, the nature of false 
memories, and the modality and grain size of the to-be-remembered 
information. 
 
3.4.1 Effect Size 
In previous research on the eye-closure effect, Perfect et al. (2008) compared 
the overall effect size of the eye-closure effect (d = .98) to the overall effect size 
of the Cognitive Interview (CI; d = .87; Köhnken et al., 1999). To present a 
complete picture, I also calculated Cohen’s d for the eye-closure effects 
observed in the present experiments. In Experiment 1, no significant effect of 
eye-closure was observed overall, but according to Cohen’s (1988, 1992) 
admittedly arbitrary classification, eye-closure had a large effect on recall of 
visual details (d = .79). In Experiment 2, eye-closure had a moderate to large 
effect on the total number of correct responses (d = .71), which was most 
pronounced for fine-grain recall of visual aspects (d = .93). Due to the 
considerable differences between studies on the CI and the present 
experiments, it is difficult to compare effect sizes across studies. Nevertheless, 
as noted by Perfect et al., “the magnitude of the eye-closure effect does not 
seem to suffer in comparison” (p. 321). The size of the eye-closure effect will 
be examined in more detail in the final chapter (see section 7.2.2), when all the 
relevant findings have been presented. 
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3.4.2 Testimonial Accuracy 
In both experiments, eye-closure boosted not only the number of correct 
responses, but also significantly increased the proportion of correct 
responses, particularly for visual aspects of the events. In Experiment 1, eye-
closure increased testimonial accuracy of participants’ reports about visual 
information by 18.6%. In Experiment 2, eye-closure increased testimonial 
accuracy of participants’ reports about visual information by 9.1%. Although 
these effects are relatively modest, even a small increase in testimonial 
accuracy is somewhat unique amongst investigative interview procedures. For 
instance, the Cognitive Interview does not improve (or impair) testimonial 
accuracy (Köhnken et al., 1999; Memon, Meissner, et al., 2010; Memon & 
Stevenage, 1996), and hypnosis significantly decreases testimonial accuracy 
(Dinges et al., 1992; Erdelyi, 1994; Kebbell & Wagstaff, 1998).  
However, the current finding that eye-closure increased testimonial 
accuracy may have been due to the nature of the recall test. Because witnesses 
were provided with the option to omit their response, correct and incorrect 
answers were not strictly reciprocal. Nevertheless, because a response could 
only be scored as either fine-grain correct, coarse-grain correct, incorrect, or 
omitted, the different types of responses were not wholly independent either; 
hypothetically speaking, if participants produced 20 fine-grain correct 
responses, they would no longer be able to provide any other type of response. 
When recall is tested in free recall, on the other hand, the number of incorrect 
details reported is not dependent on the number of correct details reported. 
Therefore, it is possible that eye-closure will no longer increase testimonial 
accuracy when recall is tested in free recall (cf. Perfect et al., 2008; 
Experiments 3 and 5). To examine this possibility, Experiments 3 and 6 in the 
present thesis will assess the effect of eye-closure in free recall.  
 
3.4.3 Violent Event Scripts 
Although participants gave relatively few incorrect responses overall, some of 
these errors were remarkably consistent across participants. For instance, 
many participants in Experiment 1 falsely remembered the man cutting the 
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woman’s dress open with the knife, and many participants in Experiment 2 
falsely remembered the woman hitting the man with the back of the rifle. 
While comparing violent events with non-violent events in Experiment 2, it 
was found that incorrect responses were not only more numerous for violent 
events, but also more consistent across participants. This finding might be 
explained by the existence of shared event scripts for violent acts (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977). As outlined in section 2.1.2.3, people’s memories for events 
seem to be influenced by their pre-existing knowledge and beliefs, a large part 
of which is shared with other people who belong to the same cultural group.  
People in Western societies have been found to have relatively well-
defined and vivid scripts of certain crimes (e.g., García-Bajos & Migueles, 2003; 
Greenberg et al., 1998; Holst & Pezdek, 1992; List, 1986). The present findings 
suggest that university students in the United Kingdom also have relatively 
well-defined shared scripts of violent acts. It is suspected that the popularity of 
violent movies and TV series is in large part responsible for these shared 
scripts. Because witnesses are more likely to report false information when 
they are prompted by specific questions than when they provide a free 
account of what they witnessed (Aizpurua et al., 2009; Lipton, 1977; Loftus, 
1979; Migueles & García-Bajos, 1999), it is unclear whether participants will 
still report script-consistent errors when their memory is tested in free recall. 
This issue will be examined in the next chapter.  
 
3.4.4 Modality and Grain Size 
The interactions observed between eye-closure and question modality in 
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that eye-closure is most beneficial for fine-grain 
recall of visual, as opposed to auditory, information. However, there is a 
potential alternative explanation for the interaction. Because participants 
generally performed better on questions about visual details than on 
questions about auditory details, it might be that eye-closure is particularly 
beneficial for recall of easy-to-remember, as opposed to difficult-to-
remember, information. That is, question modality was confounded with 
question difficulty. One finding inconsistent with this interpretation of the 
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data, however, is that participants in Experiment 2 provided significantly more 
fine-grain responses about auditory aspects than about visual aspects; yet the 
benefits of eye-closure on fine-grain recall were primarily observed for visual, 
not auditory, information. Thus, even when visual items were harder to 
remember than auditory items (at least to a level of fine-grained detail), eye-
closure was still most effective for recall of visual items. This suggests that the 
interaction was driven by the modality, rather than the difficulty, of the 
information (see also section 7.2.4.2). 
Both experiments reported thus far show that the pattern of findings 
differs markedly depending on the specificity of the responses provided. In 
Experiment 1, eye-closure had general benefits on coarse-grain recall, but 
modality-specific benefits on fine-grain recall. In Experiment 2, eye-closure 
did not have a significant effect on correct coarse-grain recall, but had 
significant benefits for fine-grain recall, especially for visual aspects of the 
witnessed event. These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing 
between vague and precise answers, which has not been done in previous 
research on the eye-closure effect (e.g., Mastroberardino et al., 2010; Perfect, 
Andrade, & Eagan, 2011; Perfect et al., 2008; Wagstaff et al., 2004). Thus, the 
concept of grain size (Goldsmith et al., 2002) has proven useful in assessing 
the effects of eye-closure on recall. Potential explanations for the role of grain 
size in the eye-closure effect will be explored in section 7.2.4.  
 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
The findings suggest that the eye-closure instruction may be used in police 
interviews regarding both violent and non-violent crime. Eye-closure seems to 
be particularly helpful for the retrieval of fine-grain visual information, which 
may provide important leads in criminal investigations (e.g., detailed 
descriptions of the offender’s appearance, clothing, or vehicle). Indeed, 
information reported by eyewitnesses is often considered the most important 
determinant of whether criminal cases are solved (e.g., Kebbell & Milne, 1998). 
Thus, the eye-closure instruction has the potential to improve the quality and 
quantity of evidence obtained in criminal cases.  
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
 The eye-closure effect was extended to recall of a violent event. 
 Eye-closure seemed to be particularly beneficial for recall of fine-grain 
visual information. 
 Eye-closure was equally effective for non-violent and physiologically 
arousing violent versions of similar videotaped events. 
 Eyewitness reports about violent events were less accurate than reports 
about non-violent events, possibly due to the incorporation of script-
consistent false memories. 
 Witnesses who were more physiologically aroused while witnessing the 
violent event performed less well on the recall test. 
 Eye-closure reduced the overall level of confidence in responses, and 
increased underconfidence in terms of confidence-accuracy 
calibration.  
 According to self-report measures, eye-closure tended to facilitate 
mental imagery, particularly auditory imagery.  
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Chapter 4 
Memory after a Delay 
 
4.1 Experiment 3: Delay 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided useful new insights into the effect of eye-
closure on recall of violent events, but a number of questions remain. The 
present experiment enhanced the realism of the experimental conditions by 
introducing a delay of a week between observation of the event and the 
interview, by incorporating repeated retrieval attempts, and by assessing the 
effects of eye-closure in free and cued recall.  
 
4.1.1.1 Delay 
In previous eye-closure research, participants were interviewed only a few 
minutes after watching the video (see Experiments 1 and 2; Mastroberardino 
et al., 2010; Perfect, Andrade, & Eagan, 2011; Perfect et al., 2008). In real life, 
however, eyewitnesses often experience substantial delays between 
witnessing a crime and being interviewed about it (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; 
Flin et al., 1992; Gabbert et al., 2009). Given that Burke et al. (1992) found that 
the largest extent of forgetting takes place in the first week after witnessing the 
event, the present study introduced a delay of a week between the event and 
the interview. When people are trying to remember events that occurred 
longer ago, they are more likely to look away or close their eyes than when 
they are retrieving memories of recent events (Glenberg et al., 1998). This 
suggests that eye-closure might be especially helpful after a delay. 
Furthermore, Smith’s (1988) outshining hypothesis suggests that retrieval aids 
(such as mental context reinstatement) are more effective when there are 
relatively few retrieval cues available to the rememberer. Because accessibility 
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to retrieval cues deteriorates over time (Lipton, 1977; Turtle & Yuille, 1994), it 
is expected that eye-closure will be more effective during a delayed interview. 
 
4.1.1.2 Repeated Retrieval 
Eyewitnesses are typically asked to recount a witnessed crime on multiple 
occasions, both in informal settings (such as retelling the story to family, 
friends, and colleagues) and in formal settings (such as the initial statement to 
the police, the follow-up interview at the police station, and testimony 
provided in court). As explained in section 2.1.4.1, repeated attempts to 
remember can help witnesses retrieve previously unreported information 
(reminiscence; e.g., Turtle & Yuille, 1994), which is desirable in a police 
investigation. However, repeated recall attempts can also result in an increase 
in the number of errors reported (Bornstein et al., 1998; Turtle & Yuille, 1994). 
The present study examined the effect of eye-closure on the amount and 
accuracy of new information reported during the second interview. 
 In addition, the present experiment assessed whether recall after a 
week would be influenced by eye-closure during the initial interview. If eye-
closure during the initial interview results in the report of more information 
about the event, the witness may be able to draw upon this relatively elaborate 
previous testimony during a subsequent interview. In addition, it is possible 
that eye-closure during an initial retrieval attempt strengthens the memory 
representation of the event itself, potentially facilitating subsequent retrieval 
of memories about the event. In other words, the benefits of eye-closure 
during the first interview might ‘carry over’ to the second interview. 
Consistent with this idea, Gabbert and colleagues have shown that a good-
quality initial recall attempt prevents forgetting and protects against the 
incorporation of misinformation in subsequent testimony (Gabbert et al., 
2009; Gabbert et al., in preparation; Hope et al., 2011; see also Bjork, 1975). 
However, the few studies addressing the role of repeated recall in the 
effectiveness of the Cognitive Interview have found no evidence of any carry-
over effects from the first to the second interview (Brock, Fisher, & Cutler, 
1999; McCauley & Fisher, 1995; Memon et al., 1997). Therefore, it was 
hypothesised that eye-closure during the first session would not affect recall 
performance during the second session.  
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4.1.1.3 Free and Cued Recall 
In the experiments reported in Chapter 3, participants were asked to answer 
questions about the witnessed events, but they were not asked to provide a 
free report of their experiences. Eyewitnesses in real life, on the other hand, 
are typically asked to provide a free report of the event first, which is followed 
by questioning (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Ministry of Justice, 2011; Perfect et 
al., 2008; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). To enhance the ecological validity of the 
research, witnesses in the present experiment were first asked to provide a full 
free report of the event, and were asked questions only after they had 
completely finished their free report. In free recall, witnesses have full control 
over what they choose to report, and are able to withhold information about 
which they are not certain (Goldsmith & Koriat, 1999; Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996; Koriat et al., 2000). Indeed, many studies have found that witnesses are 
generally more accurate when providing a free report than when prompted 
with questions (Aizpurua et al., 2009; Fisher, 1995; Lipton, 1977; Memon, 
Holley, Wark, Bull, & Köhnken, 1996; Roediger & Payne, 1985; Scoboria, 
Mazzoni, & Kirsch, 2008). Therefore, testimonial accuracy was expected to be 
higher in free recall than in cued recall. The proportion of statements that 
were correct in free recall was compared with the proportion of responses that 
were correct in cued recall to examine this hypothesis.  
It is possible that eye-closure affects free and cued recall in different 
ways. In previous studies with adult witnesses (see section 2.3.1.2), when free 
recall was followed by cued recall, interview techniques such as MCR, the CI, 
and eye-closure tended to be more beneficial in the free recall phase than in 
the cued recall phase (e.g., Davis et al., 2005; Emmett et al., 2003; Wagstaff et 
al., 2004; Wagstaff et al., 2011). It is possible that the techniques provide 
accessibility to retrieval cues, which are lacking in free recall (Thomson & 
Tulving, 1970). In cued recall, on the other hand, provision of cues may not be 
as necessary because strong cues are already provided by the questions 
themselves (S. M. Smith, 1988). Thus, in terms of the amount of information 
obtained, eye-closure may be more effective in free recall than in cued recall 
(although Perfect et al., 2008, found it to have equivalent benefits for free and 
cued recall of mundane events).  
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In terms of testimonial accuracy, on the other hand, eye-closure may 
have greater benefits in cued recall than in free recall. As explained in section 
3.4.2, correct and incorrect responses in cued recall are not fully independent. 
Therefore, if eye-closure increases the number of correct responses, it will at 
the same time decrease the number of incorrect and omitted responses. In 
free recall, on the other hand, an increase in correct details reported does not 
inevitably decrease the report of incorrect details, and eye-closure may in fact 
increase the report of both correct and incorrect details, as hypnosis does 
(e.g., Dinges et al., 1992; see also Perfect et al., 2008; Experiments 3 and 5). The 
present experiment was designed to investigate how eye-closure affects the 
quantity and accuracy of information reported in free recall. 
 
4.1.1.4 Type of Information 
Another benefit of free recall measures is that they allow us to investigate 
which type of spontaneously reported information is most likely to be 
facilitated by the eye-closure instruction. In line with the findings reported in 
the previous chapter, it was hypothesised that eye-closure would benefit recall 
of visual details more than recall of auditory details. Furthermore, whereas 
previous research on the Cognitive Interview has shown that the CI facilitates 
the recall of both central and peripheral details (Ginet & Verkampt, 2007), 
previous studies on the eye-closure effect have not distinguished on the basis 
of centrality. In the present study, a comprehensive coding scheme was 
established by combining the distinction between gist and detail (e.g., 
Bransford & Franks, 1971; Kintsch et al., 1990; Neisser, 1981; Sanford & Garrod, 
1981) with the distinction between central and peripheral detail (e.g., Burke et 
al., 1992; Christianson, 1992; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). Thus, statements could 
be coded as gist, central detail, or peripheral detail. The coding structure used 
was inspired by Thorndyke’s (1977) plot structure approach (illustrated in 
Figure 2.1). More details on the coding procedure can be found in the 
Methods section. It was hypothesised that eye-closure would increase recall of 
both central and peripheral details (cf. Ginet & Verkampt, 2007), but it was 
unclear whether it would also facilitate recall of the gist of the event. 
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4.1.1.5 Auxiliary Variables 
A number of variables reported in previous experiments were not the main 
focus of the present experiment, but were included for the sake of replication. 
In line with previous findings, eye-closure was expected to have the greatest 
impact on fine-grain correct responses in cued recall. As in Experiment 2, 
participants rated their confidence in responses provided in cued recall. It was 
hypothesised that eye-closure would again reduce overall confidence in 
(correct and incorrect) responses. Furthermore, one additional variable of 
interest was added in the present experiment. One of the potential reasons 
why eye-closure may improve recall performance is because it reduces the 
need to attend to visual social cues (cf. Markson & Paterson, 2009). On the 
other hand, closing the eyes during an investigative interview creates an 
unusual and potentially uncomfortable social situation (Doherty-Sneddon et 
al., 2001). To investigate whether eye-closure increased or reduced feelings of 
comfort, participants in the present study were asked to indicate how 
comfortable they had felt during the session.  
 
4.1.1.6 Aims and Hypotheses 
The primary aim of the present study was to investigate whether eye-closure is 
still effective after a week and repeated recall attempts. Three central 
hypotheses were formulated with respect to this aim. First, based on findings 
that individuals are more likely to spontaneously block out the environment 
when recalling events that happened longer ago (Glenberg et al., 1998), it was 
hypothesised that eye-closure would have greater benefits during delayed free 
recall than during immediate free recall. Second, consistent with research on 
the Cognitive Interview (e.g., Memon et al., 1997), eye-closure during the first 
free recall test was not expected to have carry-over effects on recall 
performance during the second session. Finally, it was hypothesised that eye-
closure would enhance both free and cued recall (cf. Perfect et al., 2008), but 
would have the greatest impact on free recall (cf. Wagstaff et al., 2011). 
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4.1.2 Method 
4.1.2.1 Participants 
Fifty-five students from the University of York signed up to participate in the 
study for course credit or a small monetary reward. Six participants failed to 
appear for the second experimental session and one participant had seen the 
TV series before; their data were removed from the analysis. Among the 
remaining 48 participants (18 males and 30 females), ages ranged from 18 to 
38 (M = 21.00, SD = 3.30). All participants were native English speakers and 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing. 
 
4.1.2.2 Materials 
The stimulus materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1 (see 
section 3.2.2.2).  
 
4.1.2.3 Design 
Prior to the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
interview conditions (N = 12 in each condition): eyes open during both 
sessions (open-open); eyes closed during both sessions (closed-closed); eyes 
open in the first session but closed in the second session (open-closed); or 
eyes closed in the first session but open in the second session (closed-open).  
For the free recall phase, the experiment manipulated two between-
subjects variables (eye-closure in each session) and one within-subjects 
variable (timing of the interview). It employed a 2 (Immediate Condition: eyes 
open, eyes closed) x 2 (Delayed Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Time of 
Test: immediate, delayed) mixed design with repeated measures on the last 
factor. The dependent variables were the number of correct statements 
reported and the proportion of statements reported that were correct. 
For the cued recall phase, the experiment manipulated two between-
subjects independent variables (eye-closure in each session) and one within-
subjects independent variable (question modality). The study used a 2 
(Immediate Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Delayed Condition: eyes 
open, eyes closed) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) mixed design with 
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repeated measures on the last factor. The dependent variables were identical 
to Experiment 1. 
 
4.1.2.4 Procedure 
All participants arrived individually at a small laboratory and provided 
informed consent. Participants watched the videotaped event, and engaged in 
a two-minute distracter task (backwards spelling of animal names). Upon 
completion, participants provided their first free recall of the event. 
Participants were instructed to describe the event in as much detail as 
possible, and were informed that the interviewer would not interrupt their 
story. Participants in the closed-closed and closed-open conditions were 
instructed to keep their eyes closed throughout the interview, whereas those 
in the open-open and open-closed condition received no instructions. If 
participants in one of the instructed eye-closure conditions inadvertently 
opened their eyes, they were reminded to keep them closed. None of the 
participants in the uninstructed conditions spontaneously closed their eyes; 
all of them were facing the interviewer throughout the interview. All interviews 
were audio-taped for subsequent analysis. After providing their testimony, 
participants were dismissed and asked to come back to the laboratory exactly 
one week later. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory one week later, participants were told 
that they would first provide another free recall of the event, after which they 
would be asked questions. Participants in the closed-closed and open-closed 
conditions were instructed to keep their eyes closed throughout the session 
(with a brief break in-between the free and cued recall phases), whereas 
participants in the open-open and closed-open conditions received no 
instructions. However, some of the participants in the latter condition asked if 
they should close their eyes again, and they were asked to keep their eyes 
open. Upon completion of the free recall phase, participants answered 16 
questions about the video (see Appendix A.1). They were asked to remember 
as much as possible, but not to guess: a “don’t know” response was allowed. In 
addition, they were asked to rate their level of confidence in each response on 
a scale from 1 (not confident at all) to 5 (extremely confident). At the end of 
the interview, participants were asked whether they had ever seen the TV 
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series before, and were asked to rate how comfortable they had felt during that 
session on a scale from 1 (not comfortable at all) to 5 (extremely comfortable). 
Finally, they completed a demographic information sheet, were debriefed, 
and thanked for their participation.  
 
4.1.2.5 Data Coding 
All the audio-taped interviews were transcribed verbatim, and coded blind to 
interview condition. Prior to the experiment, a list was drawn up including 
potential statements that could be made about the event, accompanied by 
their corresponding codes. Any additional statements made by participants 
were added progressively while coding the free reports. To maximise scoring 
consistency, all transcripts were coded in line with the codes on the 
predetermined list. First, the statements provided during free recall were 
coded as correct, incorrect, or subjective. Because the accuracy of subjective 
statements could not be determined (e.g., “he was ugly”), these statements 
were excluded from further coding. Next, the 135 correct and 19 incorrect 
statements on the list were coded as gist, central detail, or peripheral detail. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the coding scheme with some example statements, 
modelled after Thorndyke’s (1977) plot structure approach (see Figure 2.1).  
 
 
Figure 4.1  Plot structure for “Six Feet Under” video. Example statements 
from the plot structure used to code statements provided in free recall.  
 
Video: “Six Feet Under”
ResolutionSetting Theme Plot
StateLocation Event Episode EpisodeGoal
They talk to 
each other
There is a 
struggle
Woman’s 
house
1.   Gist Man has cut 
off his own 
tattoo
He wants to 
cut off her 
tattoo
Woman 
wins
2.   Central
3.   Peripheral
She asks 
why he’s 
there
He chases 
her
She was on 
the floor
He shows 
her his 
wound
She tricks 
him to give 
her the knife
She hits 
him
Nathaniel 
and Isabel
He rips 
her shirt
Next to a 
painting
The wound 
is mouth-
shaped
She says “I 
should do 
mine”
...with her 
elbow
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Thus, statements were classified as gist if they referred to the essence of 
the story and did not reside in a particular sensory domain. Examples of gist in 
terms of setting, theme, plot, and resolution are provided in Figure 4.1. Only 8 
out of the 154 statements on the list were classified as gist. All remaining 
details were scored as either central or peripheral. Details were coded as 
central if they pertained to the most important or goal-relevant elements of 
the video in terms of setting, theme, plot, or resolution. There were 26 possible 
central details on the list. Details were coded as peripheral if they pertained to 
less important or goal-irrelevant elements of the video. There were 120 
peripheral details on the list. Finally, all central and peripheral details were 
coded as visual (information that was seen) or auditory (information that was 
heard; i.e., mostly verbal utterances, but also a few non-verbal sounds). Out of 
the 146 details, 102 were coded as visual and 44 were coded as auditory. 19 
The immediate and delayed free reports of ten randomly selected 
participants were scored independently by a second blind coder (401 
statements; 19% of the total sample). Inter-rater reliability was deemed to be 
acceptable for both accuracy (correct, incorrect), κ = .89, p < .001, and 
centrality of statements (gist, central, peripheral), κ = .96, p < .001. For the 342 
statements that were coded as either central or peripheral detail by both 
coders, inter-rater reliability was very high for modality of details (visual, 
auditory), κ = .99, p < .001. The codes of the first coder were retained for the 
main analysis.  
For the cued recall phase, responses could be coded as correct, 
incorrect, or omitted, and all correct responses were coded for grain size as in 
Experiment 1 (see section 3.2.2.6). Examples of each type of response are 
provided in Appendix A.1. Because the coding scheme for the questioning 
phase was identical to the coding scheme used in Experiment 1, no additional 
attempts were made to assess inter-rater reliability for the cued recall phase.  
                                                      
19 The statements provided in free report were not coded for grain size. Whereas it is relatively 
straightforward to determine whether an answer provided in response to a question is a full 
(fine-grain) or partial (coarse-grain) correct answer to that question, it is relatively difficult to 
make the same distinction in free recall. For instance, where a description of the door as 
having “a white frame and glass panes” would be coded as a fine-grain correct response to 
question 11 in cued recall, it would be scored as two separate correct details in free recall 
(“white frame” and “glass panes”).  
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4.1.3 Results 
This section will first examine number and proportion correct in free recall, 
with separate analyses based on modality and centrality. In addition, it will 
assess the number of new details reported during the second free recall 
(reminiscence). Next, it will examine number and proportion correct in 
delayed cued recall, with separate analyses based on grain size. Finally, it will 
discuss self-report ratings of confidence and feelings of comfort. 
 
4.1.3.1 Number Correct in Free Recall 
Figure 4.2 shows the number of correct visual and auditory statements 
provided during immediate and delayed free recall. Prior to analysis, the data 
were inspected for violations of parametric assumptions. Two participants 
performed exceptionally well, one remembering many correct auditory 
peripheral details (19 in the first session and 13 in the second session), and the 
other many correct visual peripheral details (46 in the first session and 31 in 
the second session). Because these significant outliers skewed the data, each 
of the values was replaced with the mean plus two standard deviations (Field, 
2004), which solved all problems with normality. 
 
 
Figure 4.2  Experiment 3: Number correct in free recall. Mean number of 
correct visual and auditory details, reported during (a) immediate and (b) one-
week delayed free recall. Experimental conditions were collapsed over session 
(e.g., in the immediate session, the eyes-open group is comprised of the open-
open and open-closed conditions). Error bars represent standard errors. 
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First, it was assessed whether eye-closure during the first and second 
session affected the total number of correct details reported during the first 
and second free recall phase, respectively. A 2 (Immediate Condition: eyes 
open, eyes closed) x 2 (Delayed Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Time of 
Test: immediate, delayed) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the total number 
of correct details reported. Participants reported 14.8% fewer details during 
delayed free recall than during immediate free recall, F (1, 44) = 62.06, p < .001, 
η
2
 = .55. There was no significant main effect of eye-closure during the 
immediate test (F < 1) and no significant interaction between immediate eye-
closure and time of test (F < 1). Thus, as expected, eye-closure during the first 
session did not affect performance during the second session (i.e., there was 
no carry-over effect). Surprisingly, it also failed to affect recall performance 
during the session itself, suggesting that eye-closure during immediate free 
recall is not an effective retrieval aid (see Figure 4.2).  
There was a marginally non-significant main effect of eye-closure 
during the delayed test, F (1, 44) = 3.16, p = .08, η2 = .07, which was qualified by 
a significant interaction between delayed eye-closure and time of test, F (1, 44) 
= 6.25, p < .05, η2 = .06. Simple effects analyses showed that eye-closure during 
delayed free recall did not affect recall performance during the previous 
session (which would have been impossible), F (1, 44) = 1.14, p = .29. However, 
eye-closure during the delayed session significantly increased the number of 
correct details reported in that session, F (1, 44) = 6.12, p < .05, η2 = .12, d = .72 
(see Figure 4.2). There were no other significant interactions (all Fs < 1).  
Because it could not be controlled how many visual and auditory 
details participants chose to report, modality of details could not be included 
as an independent variable in the previous analysis. As illustrated in Figure 
4.2, on average, participants reported significantly more visual than auditory 
correct details, t (47) = 14.10, p < .001, η2 = .81. A separate 2 (Immediate 
Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Delayed Condition: eyes open, eyes 
closed) x 2 (Time of Test: immediate, delayed) ANOVA on the number of 
correct visual details again revealed a significant main effect of delay, F (1, 44) 
= 16.93, p < .001, η2 = .24, and no significant effects or interactions involving 
eye-closure during the first session (all Fs < 1). There was a marginally 
significant main effect of eye-closure during the second session, F (1, 44) = 
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3.72, p = .06, η2 = .08, which was qualified by a significant interaction with time 
of test, F (1, 44) = 9.08, p < .01, η2 = .13. Participants who closed their eyes 
during the second session reported 36.7% more visual details during that 
session than participants who kept their eyes open, F (1, 44) = 7.95, p < .01, η2 = 
.15, d = .83. The same three-way ANOVA on the number of correct auditory 
details revealed a significant main effect of delay, F (1, 44) = 86.99, p < .001, η2 = 
.66, but no other significant main effects or interactions (all ps > .29). In sum, 
the benefits of eye-closure after a delay were most pronounced for visual 
details. 
To assess whether the effects of eye-closure depend on the centrality of 
the to-be-remembered information, the data were categorised as gist 
statements, central details, and peripheral details (see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1 Experiment 3: Number correct by centrality. For each type of 
statement, the table shows the potential number of statements that could 
have been recalled, and the average number that was recalled per session. 
Experimental conditions were collapsed over session. 
Statement Potential Session 
Interview Condition 
Eyes open Eyes closed 
Gist 8 
First 4.92 (.21) 5.46 (.21) 
Second 5.38 (.26) 5.17 (.24) 
Central 26 
First 12.83 (.53) 12.33 (.60) 
Second 10.5 (.53) 12.58 (.61) 
Peripheral 120 
First 17.46 (1.83) 18.04 (1.64) 
Second 11.17 (1.33) 15.75 (1.67) 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
A separate 2 (Immediate Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 
(Delayed Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Time of Test: immediate, 
delayed) ANOVA on gist statements revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions (all ps > .11). For central details, the ANOVA revealed a significant 
decrease as a result of delay, F (1, 44) = 11.28, p < .01, η2 = .17. Furthermore, 
there was a significant interaction between eye-closure during the second 
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session and time of test, F (1, 44) = 9.55, p < .01, η2 = .15. Participants who 
closed their eyes during the second session recalled 19.8% more central details 
during that session than participants who kept their eyes open (see Table 4.1), 
and simple effects analyses showed that this difference was significant, F (1, 
44) = 6.60, p < .05, η2 = .13, d = .74. No other significant main effects or 
interactions were found for central details (all ps > .14). For peripheral details, 
the ANOVA again revealed a significant decrease as a result of delay, F (1, 44) = 
54.47, p < .001, η2 = .54, but no other significant effects or interactions (all ps > 
.09). Nevertheless, simple effects analyses20 showed that the 41.0% increase in 
peripheral details associated with eye-closure in the second session was 
significant, F (1, 44) = 4.47, p < .05, η2 = .09, d = .62. In sum, the benefits of eye-
closure after a delay were observed for recall of central and peripheral details, 
but not for recall of gist. 
 
4.1.3.2 Proportion Correct in Free Recall 
Participants generally volunteered few incorrect details in free recall (M = 1.85, 
SD = .89). To calculate testimonial accuracy, the number of correct statements 
was divided by the total number of statements provided in free recall. 
Testimonial accuracy in free recall was close to ceiling in all interview 
conditions (see Figure 4.3). Prior to analysis, problems with normality were 
solved by inverting and square root transforming all proportions.  
A 2 (Immediate Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Delayed 
Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Time of Test: immediate, delayed) 
ANOVA on the transformed proportions revealed a significant decrease in 
accuracy as a result of delay, F (1, 44) = 12.35, p < .01, η2 = .22, but no other 
significant effects or interactions (all Fs < 1). Separate ANOVAs for visual and 
auditory statements revealed no significant effects or interactions (all ps > .08). 
Thus, eye-closure during the second session increased the amount of 
information provided in that session without decreasing the accuracy of that 
information. 
                                                      
20 The interaction between eye-closure during the second session and time of test failed to 
reach significance because participants who closed their eyes during the second session also 
tended to have reported more peripheral details in the first session. Of course, it is impossible 
for eye-closure to have an effect backwards in time, and simple effects analyses confirmed 
that this tendency was not significant, F (1, 44) = 1.48, p = .23.  
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Figure 4.3  Experiment 3: Proportion correct in free recall. Mean proportion 
of visual and auditory details that were correct, reported during (a) immediate 
and (b) one-week delayed free recall. Experimental conditions were collapsed 
over session. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
4.1.3.3 Reminiscence 
One of the most important goals of conducting multiple interviews is to elicit 
new information that was not reported during an earlier interview. For this 
reason, it was examined whether eye-closure affected the number and 
accuracy of new details obtained during the second free recall (i.e., 
reminiscence). Out of the 48 participants, 47 reported at least one new detail 
during the second free recall, and 45 reported at least one new detail that were 
correct. On average, participants recalled 4.54 (SD = 3.01) new correct details 
and 1.40 (SD = 1.05) new incorrect details.  
First, a 2 (Immediate Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Delayed 
Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) ANOVA was conducted on the number of 
correct new details added during delayed free recall. Participants who closed 
their eyes during the second session recalled significantly more correct new 
details than participants who kept their eyes open, F (1, 44) = 5.43, p < .05, η2 = 
.10, d = .67. There were no other significant effects (both ps > .11). Separate 
ANOVAs for visual and auditory details showed that eye-closure during the 
second session nearly doubled the number of correct new visual details 
recalled (from 2.54 on average in the eyes-open condition to 4.83 in the eyes-
Visual Auditory
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 C
o
rr
ec
t
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Visual Auditory
Eyes open
Eyes closed
Interview Condition
(a) Immediate (b) Delayed
Chapter 4                                                                                             Memory after a Delay 
 
128 
 
closed condition), F (1, 44) = 9.56, p < .01, η2 = .17, d = .88, whereas it had no 
significant effect on correct new auditory details, F (1, 44) = 2.23, p = .14.  
Second, a 2 (Immediate Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Delayed 
Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) ANOVA on the proportion of new details 
that were correct revealed no significant effects of eye-closure during either 
session (all Fs < 1). Similarly, separate ANOVAs on proportion correct for 
visual and auditory new details, respectively, revealed no significant effects (all 
Fs < 1). In sum, eye-closure during delayed free recall did not simply help 
witnesses to repeat previously reported information, but actually increased 
the amount of new visual information obtained, without affecting the 
testimonial accuracy of that information. 
 
4.1.3.4 Number Correct in Cued Recall 
Figure 4.4 shows the total number of correct responses (i.e., fine-grain plus 
coarse-grain) as a function of eye-closure during questioning.21  
 
 
Figure 4.4  Experiment 3: Total correct in cued recall. Mean total number of 
correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the event, 
provided by participants with eyes open or closed during questioning. Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
                                                      
21 Because none of the analyses revealed any effects of eye-closure during the first session on 
cued recall performance during the second session, this variable is not included in the Figures 
presented in this section. 
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A 2 (Immediate Condition: eyes closed, eyes open) x 2 (Delayed 
Condition: eyes closed, eyes open) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) 
mixed ANOVA on the total number of correct responses revealed a significant 
main effect of question modality, F (1, 44) = 41.91, p < .001, η2 = .43. 
Participants gave significantly more correct responses to questions about 
visual details than about auditory details. Eye-closure during the first 
interview had no significant effect on cued recall performance a week later, F 
(1, 44) = 2.62, p = .11. Participants who closed their eyes during questioning, 
however, provided significantly more correct responses, F (1, 44) = 6.77, p < 
.05, η2 = .13, d = .74. This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction 
between delayed eye-closure and question modality, F (1, 44) = 7.24, p < .05, η2 
= .07. Simple effects analyses showed that eye-closure during questioning 
significantly increased correct recall of visual aspects, F (1, 44) = 10.06, p < .01, 
η
2
 = .19, d = .92, whereas it did not affect recall of auditory aspects (F < 1). All 
other interactions were non-significant (all ps > .10). 
 
4.1.3.5 Fine-Grain Correct in Cued Recall 
Figure 4.5 shows the number of fine-grain correct responses provided.  
 
Figure 4.5  Experiment 3: Fine-grain correct in cued recall. Mean number of 
fine-grain correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of 
the event, provided by participants with eyes open or closed during 
questioning. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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A 2 (Immediate Condition: eyes closed, eyes open) x 2 (Delayed 
Condition: eyes closed, eyes open) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) 
ANOVA on fine-grain correct recall showed a main effect of modality, F (1, 54) 
= 10.68, p < .01, η2 = .18, with more fine-grain answers pertaining to visual 
details than to auditory details. Eye-closure during the first session had no 
significant effect on delayed fine-grain recall, F (1, 44) = 2.22, p = .14, but there 
was a significant main effect of eye-closure during questioning, F (1, 54) = 
13.88, p < .001, η2 = .22, d = 1.07. Participants who closed their eyes during 
questioning gave substantially more fine-grain correct responses than 
participants with eyes open. There was a marginally significant interaction 
between delayed eye-closure and modality, F (1, 44) = 3.73, p = .06, η2 = .06, 
suggesting that eye-closure during questioning was more effective for fine-
grain correct recall of visual information, F (1, 44) = 10.22, p < .01, η2 = .19, d = 
.94, than for fine-grain correct recall of auditory information, F (1, 44) = 3.65, p 
= .06, η2 = .08, d = .53. All other interactions were non-significant (all ps > .30). 
 
4.1.3.6 Coarse-Grain Correct in Cued Recall 
Figure 4.6 shows the number of coarse-grain correct responses provided.  
 
Figure 4.6  Experiment 3: Coarse-grain correct in cued recall. Mean number 
of coarse-grain correct responses to questions about visual and auditory 
aspects of the event, provided by participants with eyes open or closed during 
questioning. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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A 2 (Immediate Condition: eyes closed, eyes open) x 2 (Delayed 
Condition: eyes closed, eyes open) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) 
ANOVA on coarse-grain correct recall revealed only a significant main effect of 
modality, F (1, 54) = 13.88, p < .001, η2 = .22, with more coarse-grain responses 
to questions about visual details than to questions about auditory details. All 
other effects were non-significant (all ps > .23), which might have been due to 
floor effects. In sum, closing the eyes during questioning helped participants 
to provide more fine-grain correct responses (particularly about visual aspects 
of the event), but did not significantly affect the number of coarse-grain 
correct responses provided. 
 
4.1.3.7 Proportion Correct in Cued Recall 
On average, participants gave 3.27 incorrect responses (SD = 1.51; see 
Appendix A.1). Figure 4.7 shows the proportion of responses that were correct.  
 
 
Figure 4.7  Experiment 3: Proportion correct in cued recall. Mean 
proportion of answers that were correct, in response to questions about visual 
and auditory aspects of the event, provided by participants with eyes open or 
closed during questioning. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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A 2 (Immediate Condition: eyes closed, eyes open) x 2 (Delayed 
Condition: eyes closed, eyes open) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) 
ANOVA on proportion correct revealed no main effects of modality, F (1, 44) = 
1.78, p = .19, or of eye-closure during the first session, F (1, 44) = 1.07, p = .31, 
but there was a significant main effect of eye-closure during the second 
session, F (1, 44) = 6.37, p < .05, η2 = .12, d = .77. As illustrated in Figure 4.7, 
participants who closed their eyes during questioning were significantly more 
accurate than participants who kept their eyes open. Furthermore, there was a 
significant interaction between eye-closure during questioning and question 
modality, F (1, 44) = 4.60, p < .05, η2 = .09. Simple effects analyses showed that 
the increase in testimonial accuracy associated with eye-closure during 
questioning was significant for questions about visual details, F (1, 44) = 11.39, 
p < .01, η2 = .21, d = .99, but not for questions about auditory details (F < 1). All 
other interactions were non-significant (all ps > .19).  
 
4.1.3.8 Confidence 
Confidence ratings were obtained for all answered questions. For the sake of 
simplicity, fine-grain and coarse-grain correct responses were combined into 
one ‘correct’ category. Preliminary analyses revealed that eye-closure during 
the first session did not affect confidence ratings provided during questioning 
in the second session; therefore, the analyses reported here only concern the 
effect of eye-closure during the second session. First, average confidence 
ratings for correct and incorrect responses were examined. A 2 (Interview 
Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Type of Response: correct, incorrect) 
mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on 
mean confidence ratings. There was a significant main effect of type of 
response, F (1, 46) = 48.20, p < .001, η2 = .51, with higher confidence ratings for 
correct responses (M = 3.35, SD = .63) than for incorrect responses (M = 2.56, 
SD = .71). There was no significant effect of eye-closure (F < 1) and no 
interaction between eye-closure and type of response (F < 1). Thus, unlike 
Experiment 2, eye-closure in the present study did not affect mean confidence 
ratings. 
 Second, it was investigated whether a generally confident rememberer 
in the present study was also likely to be generally accurate. The average 
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confidence rating per participant was significantly correlated with proportion 
correct for that participant, r = .40, p < .01. Separate analyses for each 
interview condition revealed that the general confidence-accuracy (CA) 
correlation was significant and large for the eyes-closed group, r = .60, p < .001, 
whereas it was not significant for the eyes-open group, r = .26, p = .22. 
However, these correlation coefficients did not differ significantly, Fisher’s z = 
1.37, p = .17.  
Third, point-biserial correlations between the confidence rating for a 
particular response and accuracy of that response (correct or incorrect) were 
calculated. All participants together provided 562 responses in total, which 
were used to calculate the specific CA correlation. Overall, there was a 
significant medium-sized specific CA correlation, r
pb
 = .33, p < .001. In other 
words, a particular response expressed with high confidence was relatively 
likely to be accurate. Separate analyses for the eyes-open condition (N = 273) 
and the eyes-closed condition (N = 289) showed that eye-closure did not 
significantly affect the specific CA correlation, Fisher’s z = .37, p = .75 (eyes-
open: r
pb
 = .34, p < .001; eyes-closed: r
pb
 = .32, p < .001). In sum, across interview 
conditions, responses that were expressed with high confidence were also 
moderately likely to be accurate. 
Fourth, the calibration graph shown in Figure 4.8 reveals that 
participants were again generally underconfident in their responses, achieving 
a higher percentage correct than would have been expected on the basis of 
their confidence ratings. As in Experiment 2, this underconfidence was 
somewhat more pronounced for the eyes-closed group than for the eyes-open 
group, although the group differences in the present study were smaller. 
Chapter 4                                                                                             Memory after a Delay 
 
134 
 
 
Figure 4.8  Experiment 3: Confidence-accuracy calibration. Mean 
percentage correct by confidence rating for the eyes-open and eyes-closed 
conditions. The black line denotes perfect calibration. Errors bars represent 
standard errors. 
 
4.1.3.9 Feelings of Comfort 
At the end of the second session, participants were asked to rate on a five-
point scale how comfortable they had felt during that session. As shown in 
Table 4.2, the lower end of the scale was used infrequently. Therefore, prior to 
analysis, self-report ratings were collapsed into a dichotomous variable, 
comparing participants who reported being extremely comfortable (i.e., 
ratings of 5; N = 17) with participants who were less than extremely 
comfortable (ratings of below 5; N = 31). In terms of this dichotomous 
variable, closing the eyes or keeping the eyes open during the second session 
did not significantly affect how comfortable participants felt during that 
session, χ2 (1) = .82, p = .55. 
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Table 4.2 Experiment 3: Ratings of comfort. Frequency of comfort ratings 
on a five-point scale, by participants with their eyes open or closed during the 
second session.  
Interview Condition 
not comfortable 
at all 
Comfort extremely 
comfortable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Eyes open  0 0 1 13 10 
Eyes closed 0 2 4 11 7 
Total 0 2 5 24 17 
 
 
Next, it was examined whether ratings of comfort during the second 
session correlated with recall performance in that session. First, point-biserial 
correlations22 were inspected between the dichotomous comfort variable and 
the number and proportion correct in free recall. Neither of the correlations 
reached Bonferroni-corrected levels of significance (α = .025; number correct: 
r
pb
 = .26, p = .08; transformed proportion correct: r
pb
 = .11, p = .46). However, in 
terms of cued recall performance, dichotomous comfort ratings were 
significantly correlated with the number of correct responses, r
pb
 = .37, p < .01, 
and marginally correlated with the proportion of responses that were correct, 
r
pb
 = .31, p = .03. In other words, participants who reported feeling extremely 
comfortable were more likely to have performed well during questioning than 
participants who reported feeling less than extremely comfortable.  
 
4.1.4 Discussion 
The present data show that, whereas eye-closure during immediate free recall 
had no direct or carry-over effects on recall performance, eye-closure during 
the one-week delayed interview substantially increased the amount of visual 
information obtained from witnesses in both free and cued recall. In delayed 
free recall, eye-closure increased the number of correct visual details reported 
by 36.7%. In delayed cued recall, eye-closure increased correct recall of visual 
aspects by 35.3%, and fine-grain correct recall of visual aspects by 42.7%. This 
                                                      
22 I calculated the more conservative point-biserial correlations instead of biserial correlations, 
because it was not clear that the continuous dichotomy underlying the comfort variable was 
normally distributed  (see e.g., Howell, 1997, p. 288).  
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section will first discuss the role of delay and repeated retrieval, followed by a 
consideration of the type of information enhanced by eye-closure. The section 
will conclude with a brief discussion of the findings concerning confidence 
ratings and feelings of comfort. A comparison between free and cued recall 
will be reported in section 7.2.2. 
 
4.1.4.1 Delay and Repeated Retrieval 
Let us first consider the effect of eye-closure in the first session. Unexpectedly, 
eye-closure during immediate free recall did not increase the amount of 
information reported during that session. Given that Perfect et al. (2008) 
showed that eye-closure was effective in immediate free recall, it is unclear 
why this effect was not observed in the present experiment. However, rather 
than dwell on these findings here, I will address this issue in section 7.2.2, after 
further relevant evidence from Experiment 6 has been presented. Another 
possibility under examination in the present study was that eye-closure during 
the first session would ‘protect’ the memory against forgetting (Gabbert et al., 
2009; Hope et al., 2011), thereby enhancing subsequent recall performance. 
However, as in previous research with the Cognitive Interview (Brock et al., 
1999; McCauley & Fisher, 1995; Memon et al., 1997), no such carry-over effects 
were observed; neither in free recall nor in cued recall after a week. 
 Let us now consider recall performance in the second session. First of 
all, in line with previous research (e.g., Lipton, 1977; Turtle & Yuille, 1994), 
witnesses in the present study reported significantly less information and were 
significantly less accurate in free recall after a week had passed. However, 
witnesses who closed their eyes during delayed free recall remembered 
significantly more visual information than witnesses who kept their eyes open. 
Inspection of the number of new details reported during the second free recall 
phase revealed that eye-closure did not just help witnesses to retain the 
information that they had already reported during the first interview, but also 
helped them to recall new accurate visual details that had not been reported 
previously. Obtaining new information is one of the main purposes of 
conducting multiple eyewitness interviews (Turtle & Yuille, 1994). The present 
data suggest that instructing witnesses to close their eyes during a repeated 
interview can help the police to achieve this goal.  
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Eye-closure during questioning substantially increased both the 
number and the proportion of correct responses, particularly for questions 
about visual aspects of the event. Because there was no immediate 
questioning phase in the present study, the effects of eye-closure during 
delayed cued recall cannot be compared directly to an immediate cued recall 
phase. However, it is noteworthy that eye-closure during immediate cued 
recall about the same event in Experiment 1 increased the total number of 
correct responses about visual aspects by ‘only’ 18.2%, whereas eye-closure 
during delayed cued recall in the present experiment increased correct recall 
of visual aspects by 35.5%. Because this observation is based on a comparison 
across two experiments that involved different conditions (most notably, the 
presence of two free recall attempts prior to questioning in the present 
experiment), it should be interpreted with the appropriate caution. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the eye-closure instruction is at least no less 
effective after a delay. 
Like mental context reinstatement and the Cognitive Interview (cf. 
Cutler et al., 1987a; Larsson, Granhag, & Spjut, 2003; Memon, Meissner, et al., 
2010), eye-closure might be particularly successful at enhancing retrieval 
performance after a delay. Glenberg et al. (1998) found that people tend to 
avert gaze more for retrieval of memories from the distant past than for 
retrieval of recent memories. Smith (1988) argued that providing retrieval cues 
(for instance via mental context reinstatement or eye-closure) will be most 
beneficial in a situation in which relatively few retrieval cues are available. 
Because accessibility to retrieval cues deteriorates with the passage of time, 
retrieval aids such as eye-closure should thus be most effective after a delay. 
Indeed, the eye-closure effect observed in delayed recall in the present 
experiment seemed to be somewhat more substantial than the eye-closure 
effects observed in immediate recall in the previous experiments (see also 
section 7.2.2). However, it should be noted that the role of delay in the present 
study was confounded with the number of retrieval attempts. To tease apart 
the effects, future research should manipulate the role of delay and repeated 
recall attempts independently. For the present purposes of enhancing 
ecological validity, however, the most important finding was that eye-closure 
was still highly effective after a one-week delay and repeated recall attempts. 
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4.1.4.2 Type of Information 
It is clear from the present findings that eye-closure has the greatest benefits 
for the recall of visual information. Witnesses who closed their eyes during the 
delayed interview recalled 36.7% more visual information in free recall and 
35.5% more visual information in cued recall, whereas eye-closure had no 
significant benefits for the recall of auditory information. In addition, as in 
Experiment 2, the benefits of eye-closure in cued recall were observed for fine-
grain correct responses but not for coarse-grain correct responses about visual 
aspects. The role of modality and grain size in the eye-closure effect will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 6, which is concerned with the theoretical 
underpinnings of eye-closure. 
 In addition, the coding scheme in free recall allowed for a distinction 
between gist, central details, and peripheral details. Whereas eye-closure 
during the second session did not affect the reporting of gist, it significantly 
increased the reporting of both central and peripheral information. From an 
applied perspective, this is a promising finding, since it shows that the eye-
closure instruction may enhance recall of information that is potentially 
important in a criminal investigation. In Experiment 6, the type of information 
reported in free recall will be examined in even more detail. Therefore, further 
discussion of the type of information reported in free recall that may be 
enhanced by eye-closure will be deferred to the final chapter (section 7.2.4). 
 
4.1.4.3 Testimonial Accuracy 
As predicted, the testimonial accuracy of witnesses’ testimony tended to be 
higher in free recall (mean proportion correct: .94) than in cued recall (mean 
proportion correct: .72), in line with Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) strategic 
control model. Furthermore, whereas eye-closure during the second session 
significantly increased the proportion correct in cued recall, it did not affect 
the proportion correct in free recall. Thus, when the number of incorrect 
details is completely independent from the number of correct details 
reported, eye-closure does not seem to improve testimonial accuracy. 
Nevertheless, unlike hypnosis, it also does not decrease testimonial accuracy, 
which is an important finding from an applied point of view. Testimonial 
accuracy will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter (section 7.2.3).  
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 Although reporting of incorrect details was relatively rare in free recall, 
the false information that was reported was again remarkably consistent 
across participants. Across all 48 participants, only 19 incorrect statements 
were reported in total. Among these statements, the ones that seemed to be 
most consistently reported were again violent in nature, for instance that the 
man pushed the woman up against the wall, that he said he was going to kill 
her, and that he cut open her shirt with the knife. As mentioned in section 
3.2.4.2, some of these statements were also reported in response to specific 
questions. The present findings show that these violent false memories tend to 
be reported even in the absence of specific questions, suggesting that shared 
event scripts of violent acts may have a quite powerful influence on memory 
for violent events (see also section 3.4.3).   
 
4.1.4.4 Confidence 
Eye-closure during questioning in the present study did not reduce witnesses’ 
overall confidence in their responses. This finding is in line with Wagstaff et 
al.’s (2010) findings, but at odds with the findings reported in Experiment 2. 
However, as in Experiment 2, witnesses who closed their eyes in the current 
study failed to adjust their confidence levels upward to reflect their superior 
accuracy, which resulted in an increased level of underconfidence compared 
to witnesses who kept their eyes open. Nevertheless, an increase in 
underconfidence is probably preferable to the increase in overconfidence 
associated with hypnosis (e.g., Wagstaff et al., 2004), because the practical 
consequences of underconfidence tend to be less severe than those of 
overconfidence. The influence of eye-closure on confidence ratings will be 
addressed in more detail in the final chapter (section 7.2.5), once all the 
relevant findings have been presented. 
 
4.1.4.5 Feelings of Comfort 
Most participants in the present study reported feeling very or extremely 
comfortable during the interview. Interestingly, participants who reported 
feeling extremely comfortable during the second session (5 out of 5) were 
more likely to have performed well during questioning than participants who 
reported feeling somewhat less comfortable (2, 3, or 4 out of 5). However, it is 
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unclear whether increased feelings of comfort improved recall performance, 
or conversely, whether higher recall performance increased participants’ 
subsequent ratings of comfort.  
There was no evidence that eye-closure affected participants’ self-
reported feelings of comfort. Thus, the data supported neither the idea that 
eye-closure reduces social pressure (cf. Markson & Paterson, 2009), nor the 
idea that it makes people feel uncomfortable (cf. Doherty-Sneddon et al., 
2001). It should be noted, however, that the self-report ratings obtained in the 
present study may not have accurately reflected the level of comfort actually 
experienced by participants (cf. Blackhart, Brown, Clark, Pierce, & Shell, 2011). 
First, retrospective introspection may not have offered adequate insight into 
their feelings during the interview. Second, ironically, participants may not 
have felt comfortable enough to indicate that they were uncomfortable during 
the interview. Therefore, the self-report findings in the present study do not 
exclude the possibility that eye-closure affects how comfortable witnesses feel. 
 
4.1.4.6 Conclusion 
The finding that eye-closure was still highly effective after a week is promising 
from an applied perspective, since eyewitnesses in real life typically 
experience substantial delays. Furthermore, eye-closure facilitated recall of 
previously unreported visual information, thereby increasing the overall 
amount of relevant information obtained from witnesses across interviews. 
However, the finding that eye-closure did not affect immediate free recall is 
surprising. Experiment 6 will also include an immediate free recall phase, to 
assess the consistency of this finding. Before turning to this experiment, 
however, the next chapter will examine the theoretical underpinnings of the 
eye-closure effect.  
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4.2 Chapter Summary 
 Eye-closure improved free and cued recall after a one-week delay, but 
did not affect free recall after a few minutes. 
 Eye-closure increased the amount of information reported in delayed 
free recall without harming testimonial accuracy of that information. 
 Eye-closure was particularly beneficial for recall of visual information, 
and increased the report of both central and peripheral details. 
 Eye-closure increased fine-grain correct but not coarse-grain correct 
responses about visual aspects of the witnessed event. 
 Unlike hypnosis, eye-closure tended to reduce rather than inflate 
confidence in incorrect responses. 
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Chapter 5 
Environmental Distractions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents two experiments looking into the nature of the 
impairment in eyewitness memory caused by visual and auditory distractions 
in the interview environment. In light of the finding that eye-closure improves 
recall of visual information, Experiment 4 investigated whether “ear-closure” 
improves recall of auditory information. To increase the realism of the 
interview and to compare visual and auditory distractions in the environment 
directly, Experiment 5 manipulated each independently in a face-to-face 
interview.  
 
 
5.2 Experiment 4: Irrelevant Speech 
 
5.2.1 Introduction 
In all of the experiments presented thus far, eye-closure had the greatest 
benefits for recall of visual information. From a theoretical point of view, the 
next question was: if eye-closure predominantly improves recall of visual 
information, does “ear-closure” predominantly improve recall of auditory 
information? The present experiment compared an “ear-closure” condition, in 
which participants wore noise-reducing headphones, with an auditory-
distraction condition, in which participants were exposed to irrelevant speech.  
Due to the absence of an “ears-open” control condition, the experimental 
design in the present study was not an exact auditory parallel of the 
experimental design used to study eye-closure in the previous experiments. 
For this reason, the findings will be discussed in terms of the impairment 
Chapter 5                                                                                    Environmental Distractions 
 
143 
 
caused by irrelevant speech, rather than in terms of the benefits caused by 
“ear-closure”.  
 
5.2.1.1 Irrelevant Speech 
Most studies on irrelevant sound have focussed on its impact on short-term 
recall of simple stimuli. Although irrelevant speech does not seem to disrupt 
tasks that rely on phonological processing, such as judgments of rhyme and 
homophony (Baddeley & Salamé, 1986), it has consistently been found to 
disrupt tasks that rely on phonological storage, such as recall of visually 
presented digits (e.g., Colle & Welsh, 1976; Jones, 1993; Jones & Macken, 1995; 
Salamé & Baddeley, 1982, 1987). However, given that short-term storage relies 
primarily on a phonological form of coding, whereas long-term storage relies 
primarily on a semantic form of coding (Baddeley, 1966), we cannot conclude 
from these findings that irrelevant speech will also disrupt long-term storage. 
More recent studies have investigated the impact of irrelevant speech 
and other types of noise on long-term recall of prose passages. Some of these 
studies have examined the impact of chronic noise exposure (e.g., Banbury & 
Berry, 2005; Hygge, Evans, & Bullinger, 2002; Matsui, Stansfeld, Haines, & 
Head, 2004); others have examined the impact of noise during encoding 
(Enmarker, 2004; Knez & Hygge, 2002); and yet others have examined the 
impact of noise during both encoding and retrieval (e.g., Banbury & Berry, 
1998, Experiment 2; Hygge, Boman, & Enmarker, 2003). Across these different 
conditions, noise has been found to disrupt long-term memory for prose 
passages. Although these studies examined long-term recall, they concerned 
memory for text passages, not memory for events as in the present research. 
Furthermore, none of the studies investigated the impact of noise presented 
solely during retrieval. Miles, Jones, and Madden (1991) found that short-term 
recall of digits was not disrupted when irrelevant speech was presented only 
during retrieval, but as explained above, this type of recall is not comparable 
to long-term recall of events. In sum, the current study was the first to present 
irrelevant speech during retrieval of memories about a witnessed event.  
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5.2.1.2 Modality-Specific Interference 
The studies discussed above were concerned with the impact of irrelevant 
speech on the short-term retention of simple stimuli or the long-term 
retention of text passages. The irrelevant speech effect has not been studied in 
relation to retrieval of visual and auditory images from long-term memory. 
However, Baddeley and Andrade (2000) have investigated the impact of 
concurrent counting on the vividness of visual and auditory imagery. 
Counting, a task which involves the phonological loop (Baddeley, 2007), was 
found to interfere more with the vividness of auditory images retrieved from 
long-term memory than with the vividness of visual images. Tasks involving 
the visuospatial sketchpad, on the other hand (e.g., spatial tapping), were 
found to interfere more with the vividness of visual images than with the 
vividness of auditory images. In light of these findings, it is hypothesised that 
irrelevant speech (which also involves the phonological loop; Baddeley & 
Logie, 1992) will also interfere more with the vividness of auditory images than 
with the vividness of visual images. Because mental imagery tends to facilitate 
memory retrieval (see section 2.3.2.2), it is expected that this decline in 
vividness will be reflected in recall performance for questions about auditory 
aspects of the witnessed event. 
 
5.2.1.3 Aims and Hypotheses 
The aim of the present experiment was to examine whether auditory 
distractions in the interview environment impair recall performance. In line 
with findings on the irrelevant speech effect (e.g., Banbury & Berry, 1998), 
irrelevant speech was expected to impair overall recall performance. 
Furthermore, consistent with findings of modality-specific interference on 
vividness of imagery (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000), it was hypothesised that 
irrelevant speech would impair recall of auditory information more than recall 
of visual information. 
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5.2.2 Method 
5.2.2.1 Participants 
Fifty-six undergraduate psychology students from the University of York 
participated for course credit or a small monetary reward. The sample 
consisted of 16 males and 40 females, with ages ranging from 18 to 30 (M = 
19.87 years, SD = 2.41). All participants were native English speakers and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing.  
 
5.2.2.2 Materials 
The videotaped event was identical to the video used in Experiment 1 (see 
section 3.2.2.2). The headphones used were Beyerdynamic DT 770 
professional monitoring headphones (250 Ohms), which exclude ambient 
sounds. The irrelevant-speech stimulus was a fragment of the English-
language audio book “The power of now”, written and narrated by Eckhart 
Tolle. The irrelevant speech was presented at approximately 70 dB SPL(A) on 
average, with a range of approximately 14 dB.  
 
5.2.2.3 Design 
The experiment manipulated one between-subjects independent variable 
(irrelevant speech) and one within-subjects independent variable (question 
modality). It used a 2 (Experimental Condition: quiet, irrelevant speech) x 2 
(Question Modality: visual, auditory) mixed design with repeated measures on 
the last factor. The dependent variables were identical to Experiment 1. 
 
5.2.2.4 Procedure 
All participants were tested individually in a small laboratory. After signing an 
informed consent form, participants watched the video and engaged in a two-
minute distracter task involving the backwards spelling of animal names. After 
completing the task, participants were asked to put on the headphones. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either hear no sound via the 
headphones (quiet condition) or hear irrelevant speech, which they were 
instructed to ignore (irrelevant-speech condition). They then wrote their 
answers on a paper sheet with questions about the video (see Appendix A.1). 
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Participants were instructed to remember as much as possible, but not to 
guess; a “do not remember” response was permissible. Upon completion of 
the question sheet, participants removed the headphones and completed a 
demographic information sheet. At the end of session, they were asked 
whether they had seen the TV series before (none of them had), and were 
thanked and debriefed. 
 
5.2.2.5 Data Coding 
The completed answer sheets were coded blind to experimental condition. 
Responses could be coded as correct, incorrect, or omitted, and all correct 
responses were coded for grain size as in Experiment 1 (see section 3.2.2.6). 
Examples of each type of response are provided in Appendix A.1. Because the 
coding scheme was identical to the coding scheme used in Experiment 1, no 
additional attempts were made to assess inter-rater reliability.  
 
5.2.3 Results 
In this section, the effects of experimental condition will be presented in terms 
of the total number of correct responses, the number of fine-grain correct 
responses, the number of coarse-grain correct responses, and the proportion 
of responses that were correct.23 
 
  
                                                      
23 Unlike in the previous experiments, confidence ratings were not obtained in the present 
experiment because it took place before I became aware of the importance of confidence. 
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5.2.3.1 Total Number Correct 
Figure 5.1 displays the total number of correct responses (fine- plus coarse-
grain) provided by participants.  
 
 
Figure 5.1  Experiment 4: Total number correct. Mean total number of 
correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the video. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
A 2 (Experimental Condition: quiet, irrelevant speech) x 2 (Question 
Modality: visual, auditory) mixed ANOVA on the total number of correct 
responses revealed a significant main effect of question modality, F (1, 54) = 
10.35, p < .01, η2 = .16: participants gave significantly more correct responses to 
questions about visual details than to questions about auditory details. 
Although the data pattern displayed in Figure 5.1 was in the expected 
direction, there was no significant effect of experimental condition (F < 1), and 
no significant interaction between condition and modality, F (1, 54) = 3.57, p = 
.17. 
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5.2.3.2 Fine-Grain Correct 
The number of fine-grain correct responses is displayed in Figure 5.2.  
 
 
Figure 5.2  Experiment 4: Fine-grain correct. Mean number of fine-grain 
correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the video. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
A 2 (Experimental Condition: quiet, irrelevant speech) x 2 (Question 
Modality: visual, auditory) ANOVA on fine-grain correct responses revealed no 
significant effects of modality (F < 1), experimental condition, F (1, 54) = 1.61, 
p = .21, and no interaction between the two (F < 1). Thus, unlike participants 
in Experiments 1 and 3, participants in the present study did not provide 
significantly more fine-grain correct responses about visual aspects of the 
video than about auditory aspects. Furthermore, although there was a non-
significant tendency for irrelevant speech to decrease fine-grain correct recall, 
there was no hint of an interaction with question modality. 
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5.2.3.3 Coarse-Grain Correct 
Figure 5.3 shows the number of coarse-grain correct responses.  
 
 
Figure 5.3  Experiment 4: Coarse-grain correct. Mean number of coarse-
grain correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the 
video. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
A 2 (Experimental Condition: quiet, irrelevant speech) x 2 (Question 
Modality: visual, auditory) ANOVA on coarse-grain correct responses revealed 
no significant main effect of experimental condition (F < 1), but a significant 
main effect of question modality, F (1, 54) = 7.97, p < .01, η2 = .12: participants 
provided more coarse-grain correct responses to questions about visual 
details than to questions about auditory details. Interestingly, there was also a 
significant interaction between condition and modality, F (1, 54) = 4.16, p < 
.05, η2 = .06. Figure 5.3 shows that irrelevant speech tended to decrease the 
number of coarse-grain correct responses to questions about auditory aspects; 
whereas it tended to increase coarse-grain correct answers about visual 
aspects. However, simple effects analyses showed that neither of these 
contrasts was significant (both ps > .09). 
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5.2.3.4 Proportion Correct 
On average, participants answered 3.39 out of 16 questions incorrectly (SD = 
1.46). Examples of inaccurate responses are provided in Appendix A.1. The 
proportion of responses that were correct is depicted in Figure 5.4. A 2 
(Experimental Condition: quiet, irrelevant speech) x 2 (Question Modality: 
visual, auditory) ANOVA on proportion correct revealed no significant main 
effects and no interaction (all Fs < 1).  
 
 
Figure 5.4  Experiment 4: Proportion correct. Mean proportion of responses 
that were correct for questions about visual and auditory aspects of the video. 
Error bars represent standard errors.  
 
5.2.4 Discussion 
Prior to the experiment, it was predicted that irrelevant speech would 
decrease the number of correct responses provided, particularly for questions 
about auditory aspects of the event. In line with the predictions, irrelevant 
speech tended to decrease both fine- and coarse-grain correct responses to 
questions about auditory aspects of the event, but this tendency was not 
significant. The effects on recall of visual aspects varied as a function of grain 
size: irrelevant speech tended to decrease fine-grain correct recall but increase 
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coarse-grain correct recall of visual aspects, leaving the total number of 
correct responses unaffected. Because the number of fine-grain correct 
responses was not independent from the number of coarse-grain correct 
responses (see section 3.4.2), it is difficult to interpret this pattern of findings. 
 
5.2.4.1 Nature of Distraction 
Given that the pattern observed in the present study was in the expected 
direction, the non-significant findings may simply have been due to a lack of 
power. However, it is also possible that a more fundamental theoretical issue 
underlies the non-significant effect of irrelevant speech in the present study. 
In Baddeley and Andrade’s (2000) Experiment 4 and 5, the vividness of 
auditory images retrieved from long-term memory was significantly disrupted 
by concurrent counting from 1 to 10. In the present experiment, the retrieval 
of auditory images from long-term memory (which was required to answer the 
interview questions about auditory aspects of the event) was not significantly 
disrupted by exposure to irrelevant speech. Perhaps, the discrepancy is due to 
the nature of the auditory-distraction task. It is likely that counting involves 
different functional components of the phonological loop (e.g., subvocal 
rehearsal) than hearing irrelevant speech does (cf. Baddeley & Salamé, 1986). 
The components that are disrupted by counting, but not by irrelevant speech, 
may be involved in the retrieval of auditory images from long-term memory 
(see also Baddeley & Logie, 1992). To test this idea, future research could 
compare the impact of concurrent counting with the impact of irrelevant 
speech on the retrieval of visual and auditory images from long-term memory.  
 
5.2.4.2 Social Factors 
From an applied perspective, one significant limitation of the present 
experiment was the elimination of important social aspects of an investigative 
interview. Because the written answer sheet required no social interaction 
between the experimenter and the participant, the retrieval environment 
lacked socially-based environmental distractions. This absence offers an 
alternative (though not contradictory) potential explanation for the non-
significant findings. In line with Glenberg’s (1997) embodied cognition 
Chapter 5                                                                                    Environmental Distractions 
 
152 
 
account, environmental distractions that are relevant to survival, such as 
social cues, should take up more cognitive resources than distractions that are 
not relevant to survival. In the present experiment, the nature of the auditory 
distraction was not relevant to survival (after all, participants were instructed 
to ignore the irrelevant speech), and participants in neither the irrelevant-
speech condition nor the quiet condition were exposed to social cues during 
the retrieval task. The next experiment investigated this issue further by 
independently manipulating visual and auditory distractions during a face-to-
face interview.  
 
5.2.4.3 Conclusion 
In sum, the present study found no evidence for an irrelevant speech effect. 
The non-significant findings may signify the genuine absence of an effect, but 
they may also reflect theoretical or practical limitations of the research. For 
the next experiment, I decided to focus on the practical limitations rather than 
the theoretical limitations. Although the role of the phonological loop is 
theoretically interesting, it is less relevant to investigative interviewing 
practices. After all, eyewitnesses will not be asked to count out loud while 
completing a form with questions about a witnessed event. However, it is not 
unlikely that eyewitnesses will be exposed to visual and auditory distractions 
during a face-to-face interview with a police interviewer, for instance when 
they are interviewed at the scene of the crime (see next chapter). Therefore, 
the next experiment examined whether such distractions affect witnesses’ 
recall of an event, and if so, to what extent they do so in a general or modality-
specific manner. 
 
 
5.3 Experiment 5: Visual and Auditory Distractions  
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 4, auditory distraction did not cause significant general or 
modality-specific impairments in recall performance. The present study 
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investigated whether auditory distractions would impair recall in a more 
realistic interview setting. Furthermore, it provided a direct comparison of 
visual and auditory distractions, and examined potential differences between 
closing the eyes and looking at a blank screen. 
 
5.3.1.1 General and Modality-Specific Interference 
The primary aim of the present experiment was to examine to what extent the 
recall impairments caused by visual and auditory distractions in the interview 
environment are general in nature, and to what extent they are modality-
specific. As explained in section 2.3.2.3, the cognitive load hypothesis predicts 
that the eye-closure effect is due to a general improvement in concentration. 
The hypothesis is based on Glenberg’s (1997) embodied cognition account, 
which construes environmental monitoring and memory retrieval as two tasks 
competing for cognitive resources. Thus, closing the eyes helps witnesses to 
block out environmental distractions, thereby leaving more cognitive 
resources available for the retrieval task. The modality-specific interference 
hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that the eye-closure effect is due to the 
elimination of specifically visual distractions. It is based on the modality-
specific interference effect found in Working Memory (Baddeley, 1986, 2007; 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Because visual distractions have been found to 
disrupt the vividness of visual imagery more than the vividness of auditory 
imagery (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000), eye-closure is expected to be particularly 
beneficial for recall of information that can readily be visualised. The 
Cognitive Resources framework proposed in Chapter 2 incorporates both of 
these hypotheses, suggesting that sensory distractions in the environment 
have the potential to disrupt both general and modality-specific pools of 
cognitive resources. 
The findings obtained in the experiments presented hitherto provide 
some insight into general and modality-specific processes in the eye-closure 
effect. Eye-closure improved recall of both visual and auditory aspects in 
Experiment 2, but only improved recall of visual information in Experiments 1 
and 3. This suggests that eye-closure may have both general and modality-
specific benefits on recall performance. However, there are alternative 
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explanations for the findings that eye-closure was most beneficial for the 
recall of visual information. For instance, eye-closure might be most effective 
for information that is relatively easy to remember, given that participants 
generally remembered visual details better than auditory details (but see 
section 3.4.4). To provide a more direct test of the hypotheses, visual and 
auditory distractions in the interview environment were manipulated 
independently.  
In two separate studies, Perfect and colleagues manipulated visual and 
auditory distractions during the interview. Perfect, Andrade, and Eagan (2011) 
found that bursts of white noise (compared to quiet) impaired the accuracy, 
but not the quantity, of responses about a witnessed scene, and Perfect, 
Andrade and Syrett (2011) found that a visual display of two moving boxes 
(compared to one moving box) during the interview impaired the accuracy, 
but not the quantity of responses about a news bulletin. These impairments 
were observed for recall of both visual and auditory aspects of the to-be-
remembered stimuli. However, it is difficult to compare the effects of visual 
and auditory distractions across these two studies, because the to-be-
remembered stimuli and the content of the distractions differed across 
experiments. 
The present study compared visual and auditory distraction in one 
study, keeping the nature of the to-be-remembered stimuli and the 
distractions consistent. Participants were exposed to either visual or auditory 
presentations of the same Hebrew words during the interview (presented on a 
computer screen or via speakers, respectively). The stimuli were presented in 
a foreign language to eliminate any semantic effects, focussing on the sensory 
aspects of the distractions. Previous studies have shown that both short-term 
and long-term recall performance can be significantly disrupted by irrelevant 
speech in a foreign language (Banbury & Berry, 1998; Colle & Welsh, 1976; 
LeCompte & Shaibe, 1997; Salamé & Baddeley, 1987), as well as dynamic 
irrelevant visual displays (Glenberg et al., 1998; Logie, 1986; McConnell & 
Quinn, 2000; Parker & Dagnall, 2009; Quinn & McConnell, 1996; but see 
Andrade, Kemps, Werniers, May, & Szmalec, 2002). Therefore, the distraction 
manipulations in the present study were expected to impair recall of the 
Chapter 5                                                                                    Environmental Distractions 
 
155 
 
witnessed event. The data will be fitted to the Cognitive Resources framework, 
to assess the relative impact of general and modality-specific impairment. 
 
5.3.1.2 Looking at a Blank Visual Field  
In the Cognitive Interview manual, Fisher and Geiselman (1992) mention that 
eyewitnesses may be reluctant to close their eyes (see also section 7.3). They 
propose that focussing “on a solid visual field, like a blank wall” (p. 133) may 
serve as an effective alternative to eye-closure. An additional aim of the 
present study was to investigate whether looking at a blank computer screen 
would be just as effective as closing the eyes. If eye-closure helps memory by 
reducing distraction from the environment, memory benefits should also be 
observed when participants look at a blank screen. However, if the effect is 
unique to the act of closing the eyes (perhaps because eye-closure increases 
alpha activity; Wagstaff et al., 2004), memory benefits should not be observed 
when participants look at a blank screen. 
In a study examining cued recall of visual images, Wais et al. (2010) also 
included a condition in which participants looked at a blank screen. They 
found that participants in the blank-screen condition performed roughly in-
between participants in the eyes-closed condition and participants in the 
visual-distraction condition. In a study assessing performance on a visual-
imagination matrix task, on the other hand, Markson and Paterson (2009) 
found no significant difference in performance between the eyes-closed and 
blank-screen conditions, whereas both were superior to looking at a face. 
Consistent with these findings, it is predicted that participants who look at a 
blank screen will perform better than participants who are exposed to sensory 
distractions. However, because closing the eyes more effectively blocks out the 
environment than looking at a blank computer screen does, it is expected that 
eye-closure will be somewhat more effective in improving recall.  
 
5.3.1.3 Auxiliary Variables 
In light of previous findings, it was expected that visual and auditory 
distractions during the interview would have the greatest impact on recall of 
fine-grain information. In addition, participants in the present study were 
asked to express their confidence in the form of a percentage (0-100%) rather 
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than on a five-point scale. This scale allows for a clearer analysis of 
confidence-accuracy calibration (N. Brewer, personal communication, March 
19, 2010), since it measures the subjective probability of accuracy (i.e., 
confidence rating) on the same scale as the objective probability of accuracy 
(i.e., the likelihood that an answer is correct lies between 0 and 100%). It was 
unclear whether eye-closure would reduce participants’ confidence in their 
responses (as in Experiment 2), or have no significant effect on average 
confidence (as in Experiment 3), but it was expected that eye-closure would 
again increase underconfidence in terms of confidence-accuracy calibration.  
 
5.3.1.4 Aims and Hypotheses 
The primary aim of the present study was to contrast general and modality-
specific influences of visual and auditory distractions in the interview 
environment. It was predicted that any type of distraction would lead to a 
general impairment in recall performance. In addition, it was hypothesised 
that visual distraction would be most disruptive to recall of visual information, 
whereas auditory distraction would be most disruptive to recall of auditory 
information. The secondary aim was to investigate whether looking at a blank 
screen can serve as a useful alternative to eye-closure. It was predicted that 
participants in the eyes-closed and blank-screen conditions would perform 
better than participants in the visual-distraction and auditory-distraction 
conditions.  
 
5.3.2 Method 
5.3.2.1 Participants 
Eighty-seven undergraduate psychology students from the University of York 
participated for course credit or a small monetary reward. Seven participants 
who had seen the video before were excluded from the analysis, leaving 80 
participants. The sample consisted of 19 males and 61 females, with ages 
ranging from 18 to 47 (M = 20.82 years, SD = 3.92). All participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, were native English speakers, and 
did not understand Hebrew.  
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5.3.2.2 Materials 
The “Lost” violent video from Experiment 2 was used again for the present 
experiment (see section 3.3.2.2). Participants who did not close their eyes 
looked at a 17-inch monitor placed in front of them at approximately 15 
inches from their face. Around the screen, all that was visible was a blank wall 
and a desk that was empty save for a keyboard and speakers. The screen was 
switched off in the blank-screen and auditory-distraction conditions. In the 
visual-distraction condition, participants looked at 12 Hebrew words (in 
Hebrew script) gradually appearing and disappearing in random locations on 
the screen at a rate of 1 per second, looped throughout the interview. In the 
auditory-distraction condition, participants listened to the same Hebrew 
words being spoken via speakers, at 55 to 60 dB SPL(A). Pilot work confirmed 
that the spoken words did not interfere with the ability to hear the questions. 
 
5.3.2.3 Design 
The experiment manipulated one between-subjects independent variable 
(interview condition) and one within-subjects independent variable (modality 
of questions). The study comprised a 4 (Interview Condition: blank screen, 
eyes closed, visual distraction, auditory distraction) x 2 (Question Modality: 
visual, auditory) mixed design with repeated measures on the last factor. The 
dependent variables were identical to Experiment 1. 
 
5.3.2.4 Procedure 
All participants were tested individually in a small laboratory. After signing an 
informed consent form, participants watched the event. They then engaged in 
a five-minute word finder distracter task, before taking part in the interview. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four interview conditions, with 
20 participants in each condition. Participants in the blank-screen condition 
were instructed to keep looking at the blank screen of the monitor throughout 
the interview. Participants in the eyes-closed condition were instructed to keep 
their eyes closed throughout the interview. Participants in the visual-
distraction condition were instructed to keep looking at the screen throughout 
the interview, and to ignore the Hebrew words popping up on the screen. 
Participants in the auditory-distraction condition were instructed to keep 
Chapter 5                                                                                    Environmental Distractions 
 
158 
 
looking at the blank screen throughout the interview, and to ignore the spoken 
Hebrew words in the background. Participants who failed to comply with the 
instructions at any point during the interview were reminded appropriately. 
All participants were specifically instructed to ask the interviewer to repeat a 
question if they could not hear it properly. They were asked to remember as 
much as they could, but not to guess: a “do not remember” response was 
allowed. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were in their 
answer on a scale from 0% (not confident at all) to 100% (extremely 
confident). After answering the interview questions, participants completed a 
demographic information sheet. At the end of the session, they were asked 
whether they had seen the TV series before, and were thanked and debriefed. 
 
5.3.2.5 Data Coding 
All interviews were audio-taped and transcribed for subsequent analysis. The 
transcripts were coded blind to interview condition. Responses could be 
coded as correct, incorrect, or omitted, and all correct responses were coded 
for grain size as in Experiment 2 (see section 3.3.2.7). Sixteen interviews (320 
responses; 20% of the total sample) were randomly selected and scored 
independently by a second blind coder. Inter-rater reliability (for the decision 
to score a response as fine-grain correct, coarse-grain correct, incorrect, or 
omitted) was high, κ = .96, p < .001. The codes of the first coder were retained 
for the main analysis.  
 
5.3.3 Results 
For each dependent variable presented in the Results section, three research 
questions will be assessed. First, was there a general difference in recall 
performance between the low-distraction (blank-screen, eyes-closed) and 
high-distraction (visual-distraction, auditory-distraction) conditions? Second, 
were visual and auditory distractions associated with modality-specific 
impairments in recall? And third, was there a difference in performance 
between the blank-screen and eyes-closed condition? At the end of the Results 
section, confidence ratings will be assessed. 
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5.3.3.1 Total Number Correct 
The total number of (fine- plus coarse-grain) correct responses is shown in 
Figure 5.5. The distribution for the total number of responses about visual 
aspects was significantly skewed and could not be transformed into a normal 
distribution. Therefore, non-parametric tests were also performed, with 
results confirming the findings reported below (see Appendix B.4).  
 
Figure 5.5  Experiment 5: Total number correct. Mean total number of 
correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the video. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
First, to assess general disruptive effects of distraction, a 4 (Interview 
Condition: blank screen, eyes closed, visual distraction, auditory distraction) x 
2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the 
total number of correct responses. There was a significant main effect of 
question modality, F (1, 76) = 7.41, p < .01, η2 = .09. Overall, more correct 
responses were provided for questions about visual aspects of the event than 
for questions about auditory aspects. Moreover, there was a significant main 
effect of interview condition, F (3, 76) = 6.64, p < .001, η2 = .21. Planned 
contrasts showed that participants in the low-distraction conditions gave 
significantly more correct responses than participants in the high-distraction 
conditions, t (76) = 4.31, p < .001, η2 = .20.  
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Second, because I had the a priori prediction that visual and auditory 
distraction would selectively impair memory for aspects presented in the 
same modality, it was examined whether there was an interaction between 
type of distraction and question modality in the two high-distraction 
conditions. A 2 (Type of Distraction: visual, auditory) x 2 (Question Modality: 
visual, auditory) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the total number of correct 
responses. Figure 5.5 shows that the pattern was in the expected direction, but 
the interaction between type of distraction and question modality was not 
significant, F (1, 38) = 1.89, p = .18. 
Third, to assess potential differences between looking at a blank screen 
and closing the eyes, a 2 (Type of Instruction: blank screen, eyes closed) x 2 
(Question Modality: visual, auditory) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the 
total number of correct responses. There was no significant effect of type of 
instruction, F (1, 38) = 1.12, p = .30, and no interaction between type of 
instruction and question modality (F < 1). 
 
5.3.3.2 Fine-Grain Correct 
Figure 5.6 shows the number of fine-grain correct responses provided.  
 
Figure 5.6  Experiment 5: Fine-grain correct. Mean number of fine-grain 
correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the video. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
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A 4 (Interview Condition: blank screen, eyes closed, visual distraction, 
auditory distraction) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) ANOVA on fine-
grain correct responses again revealed a significant main effect of question 
modality, F (1, 76) = 13.21, p < .001, η2 = .14, but in the opposite direction from 
one reported above: participants provided more fine-grain correct responses 
to questions about auditory information than to questions about visual 
information. Furthermore, there was again a significant main effect of 
interview condition, F (3, 76) = 6.83, p < .001, η2 = .21. Planned contrasts 
showed that participants who were not exposed to sensory distraction gave 
significantly more correct fine-grain responses than participants who were 
exposed to sensory distraction, t (76) = 4.31, p < .001, η2 = .20.  
To test whether visual and auditory distractions had modality-specific 
effects on fine-grain correct recall, a 2 (Type of Distraction: visual, auditory) x 
2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) ANOVA was conducted. For fine-grain 
correct recall, there was a significant interaction between type of distraction 
and question modality, F (1, 38) = 8.66, p < .01, η2 = .16. Figure 5.6 shows that 
visual distraction impaired fine-grain recall of visual details significantly more 
than fine-grain recall of auditory details, F (1, 38) = 14.94, p < .001, η2 = .28, 
whereas auditory distraction disrupted fine-grain recall of visual and auditory 
details to a similar extent (F < 1).  
To test for differences between the low-distraction conditions, a 2 (Type 
of Instruction: blank screen, eyes closed) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, 
auditory) ANOVA was conducted on fine-grain correct responses. There was 
no significant effect of type of instruction, F (1, 38) = 1.58, p = .22, and no 
interaction between type of instruction and question modality (F < 1). 
 
5.3.3.3 Coarse-Grain Correct 
Figure 5.7 shows the number of coarse-grain correct responses. For coarse-
grain responses about auditory aspects, the variances across conditions were 
significantly heterogeneous, F (3, 76) = 3.56, p < .05, and data transformations 
did not solve this problem. Therefore, non-parametric tests were also 
performed, which confirmed the findings reported below (see Appendix B.4). 
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Figure 5.7  Experiment 5: Coarse-grain correct. Mean number of coarse-
grain correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the 
video. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
A 4 (Interview Condition: blank screen, eyes closed, visual distraction, 
auditory distraction) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) ANOVA on 
coarse-grain correct responses revealed a significant effect of question 
modality, F (1, 76) = 38.55, p < .001, η2 = .33, with significantly more coarse-
grain answers provided about visual aspects than about auditory aspects. 
However, there was no significant main effect of interview condition, F (3, 76) 
= 1.20, p = .32, perhaps due to floor effects. 
To assess modality-specific effects, a 2 (Type of Distraction: visual, 
auditory) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) ANOVA was conducted on 
coarse-grain correct responses. There was no significant interaction between 
type of distraction and question modality, F (1, 38) = 1.18, p = .28. Finally, to 
assess differences between the low-distraction conditions, a 2 (Type of 
Instruction: blank screen, eyes closed) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, 
auditory) ANOVA was conducted. There was no significant effect of type of 
instruction, F (1, 38) = 1.06, p = .31, and no interaction between type of 
instruction and question modality (F < 1). 
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5.3.3.4 Proportion Correct 
On average, participants answered 3.31 out of 20 questions incorrectly (SD = 
1.89). The proportion of responses that were correct is depicted in Figure 5.8. 
The distributions for proportion correct relating to visual and auditory aspects 
were significantly skewed and could not be normalised. Non-parametric tests 
(see Appendix B.4) confirmed all but one of the parametric test results, which 
will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
Figure 5.8  Experiment 5: Proportion correct. Mean proportion of responses 
that were correct for questions about visual and auditory aspects of the video. 
Error bars represent standard errors.  
 
A 4 (Interview Condition: blank screen, eyes closed, visual distraction, 
auditory distraction) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) ANOVA on 
proportion correct revealed no significant effect of question modality (F < 1), 
but a significant main effect of interview condition, F (3, 76) = 5.04, p < .01, η2 = 
.17. Planned contrasts showed that participants in the low-distraction 
conditions were significantly more accurate than participants in the high-
distraction conditions, t (76) = 3.61, p < .001, η2 = .15.  
To test for modality-specific effects, a 2 (Type of Distraction: visual, auditory) x 
2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) ANOVA was conducted on proportion 
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correct. There was a significant interaction between type of distraction and 
question modality, F (1, 38) = 6.60, p < .05, η2 = .15. As illustrated in Figure 5.8, 
there was a marginally significant tendency for visual distraction to decrease 
testimonial accuracy more for visual than for auditory aspects, F (1, 38) = 3.93, 
p = .05, η2 = .09, and a non-significant tendency for auditory distraction to 
decrease testimonial accuracy more for auditory than for visual aspects, F (1, 
38) = 2.73, p = .11, η2 = .07. 
To compare the low-distraction conditions, a 2 (Type of Instruction: 
blank screen, eyes closed) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) ANOVA 
was conducted on proportion correct. There was no significant main effect of 
type of instruction, F (1, 38) = 2.33, p = .14, and no interaction between type of 
instruction and question modality (F < 1). However, the non-parametric test 
conducted on proportion correct (see Table B.6 in Appendix B.4) did reveal a 
significant difference between the two conditions, U = 274.00, p < .05, η2 = .10. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.8, participants in the eyes-closed condition (Mdn = 
.89) were somewhat more accurate than participants in the blank-screen 
condition (Mdn = .85). 
 
5.3.3.5 Confidence 
Participants provided confidence ratings on a scale from 0% (not confident at 
all) to 100% (extremely confident). For the confidence analysis, fine-grain and 
coarse-grain correct responses were again combined for simplicity. First, the 
effect of interview condition on average confidence ratings for correct and 
incorrect responses was examined. The confidence distributions were 
normalised by inverting and square-root transforming the data. A 4 (Interview 
Condition: blank screen, eyes closed, visual distraction, auditory distraction) x 
2 (Type of Response: correct, incorrect) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the 
transformed mean confidence ratings. There was a significant main effect of 
type of response, F (1, 74) = 44.08, p < .001, η2 = .32, reflecting that participants 
gave higher confidence ratings for correct responses (M = 84.26%, SD = 8.02%) 
than for incorrect responses (M = 58.76%, SD = 21.92%). There was no 
significant effect of interview condition, F (3, 74) = 1.63, p = .19, and no 
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significant interaction between interview condition and type of response, F (3, 
74) = 1.01, p = .39.  
 Second, the correlation between the average confidence rating per 
participant and the proportion correct for that participant was calculated. 
There was a significant general confidence-accuracy (CA) correlation, r = .27, p 
< .05. Separate analyses for each interview condition showed that the 
correlation was somewhat lower for the low-distraction conditions (blank 
screen: r = .20, p = .41; eyes closed: r = .24, p = .31) than for the high-distraction 
conditions (visual distraction: r = .40, p = .08; auditory distraction: r = .46, p < 
.05), but the difference between the low- and high-distraction conditions was 
not significant, Fisher’s z = .74, p = .46.  
Third, the specific CA correlation between the confidence rating 
provided for a particular response and the accuracy of that response was 
examined. All participants together provided 1489 responses in total, and 
there was a significant point-biserial correlation between confidence and 
accuracy for a specific response, r
pb
 = .38, p < .001. Separate analyses showed 
that the correlation was similar across interview conditions (blank screen: r = 
.40, p < .001; eyes closed: r = .33, p < .001; visual distraction: r = .35, p < .001; 
auditory distraction: r = .45, p < .001). 
Fourth, a calibration technique was used to plot the proportion of 
correct responses against participants’ confidence ratings. Because certain 
parts of the confidence scale were used relatively infrequently, confidence 
ratings were collapsed into six categories (0-20%, 21–40%, 41–60%, 61–80%, 
81–99%, 100%) to provide more stable estimates of percentage correct. 
Accuracy in each category was compared with the weighted mean confidence 
rating in that category. Furthermore, since the patterns looked highly similar 
for the two conditions with relatively few distractions (blank-screen and eyes-
closed) and for the two conditions with relatively many distractions (visual-
distraction and auditory-distraction), the four conditions were collapsed into 
two, to present a clearer picture of the data (see Figure 5.9).  
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Figure 5.9  Experiment 5: Confidence-accuracy calibration. Mean 
percentage correct by confidence rating in the low-distraction conditions 
(blank-screen and eyes-closed) and high-distraction conditions (visual-
distraction and auditory-distraction). The black line denotes perfect 
calibration. Errors bars represent standard errors. 
 
Figure 5.9 reveals that participants in the low-distraction conditions 
tended to be more underconfident in their responses than participants in the 
high-distraction conditions. Participants in the high-distraction conditions 
were closer to perfect calibration at lower levels of confidence (particularly 
between 21% and 60%), but participants in the low-distraction conditions 
were closer to perfect calibration at higher levels of confidence (between 81% 
and 100%). Visual inspection of separate calibration graphs for recall of visual 
and auditory details revealed no clear differences based on question modality, 
therefore these data are not presented here. 
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5.3.4 Discussion 
It was found that participants in the low-distraction conditions performed 
significantly better than participants in the high-distraction conditions, both 
in terms of number and proportion correct. Furthermore, visual distraction 
tended to impair fine-grain correct recall and testimonial accuracy more for 
questions about visual aspects than for questions about auditory aspects, 
whereas auditory distraction impaired fine-grain correct recall and 
testimonial accuracy more for auditory details than for visual details. Finally, 
eye-closure was somewhat more effective than looking at a blank screen, but 
most differences between these two conditions were non-significant. In sum, 
the findings provide evidence for general as well as modality-specific 
disruptive effects of sensory distractions in the interview environment, which 
can be overcome by closing the eyes or looking at a blank screen. 
 
5.3.4.1 General and Modality-Specific Interference 
In line with the Cognitive Resources framework explained in section 2.3.2.4 
(see Figure 5.10), environmental distractions in the present study caused both 
general and modality-specific impairments in memory retrieval. Contingent 
upon a few assumptions, the framework allows for a quantitative analysis of 
the relative importance of general and modality-specific impairments caused 
by visual and auditory distractions, respectively. To demonstrate how such a 
qualitative analysis could be conducted, the data for fine-grain correct 
responses in the present study were fitted to the Cognitive Resources 
framework. This dependent variable was selected because modality-specific 
effects were most pronounced in fine-grain correct recall (see section 5.3.3.2). 
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Figure 5.10  Application of the Cognitive Resources framework. Schematic 
representation of (a) the basic framework, (b) the allocation of resources for 
witnesses who were exposed to visual distraction in Experiment 5, and (c) the 
allocation of resources for witnesses who were exposed to auditory distraction 
in Experiment 5. 
 
 Let us first consider the impact of visual distraction (see Figure 5.10b). 
The impairment in recall of auditory details as a result of exposure to visual 
distraction can be explained by a reduction in general resources available for 
the retrieval task. Compared to the eyes-closed condition, visual distraction 
impaired auditory recall by 17% (from 6.75 to 5.60 fine-grain responses). If we 
assume that a reduction in general resources has an equal impact on visual 
and auditory recall, then visual distraction would have impaired recall of 
visual details through a reduction in general resources by 17% as well (17% of 
6.10 = 1.04 fine-grain responses). The remainder of the impairment in visual 
recall caused by visual distraction (1.80 – 1.04 = .76 fine-grain responses) can 
then be explained by a reduction in the “visual pool” of cognitive resources. In 
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other words, approximately 58% of the impairment caused by visual 
distraction in fine-grain correct recall in the present study was general in 
nature (1.04 out of 1.80), whereas approximately 42% was modality-specific 
(.76 out of 1.80). This distribution is illustrated in Figure 5.10b. 
Next, let us consider the impact of auditory distraction (see Figure 
5.10c). The impairment in recall of visual details as a result of exposure to 
auditory distraction can be explained by a reduction in general resources. 
Compared to the eyes-closed condition, auditory distraction impaired visual 
recall by 20% (from 6.10 to 4.85 fine-grain responses). If we assume that a 
reduction in general resources has an equal impact on visual and auditory 
recall, then auditory distraction would have impaired recall of auditory details 
through a reduction in general resources by 20% as well (20% of 6.75 = 1.35 
fine-grain responses). The remainder of the impairment in auditory recall 
caused by auditory distraction (2.00 – 1.35 = .65 fine-grain responses) can then 
be explained by a reduction in the “auditory pool” of cognitive resources. In 
other words, approximately 68% of the impairment in fine-grain correct recall 
caused by auditory distraction in the present study was general in nature (1.35 
out of 2.00), whereas approximately 32% was modality-specific (.65 out of 
2.00). This distribution is depicted in Figure 5.10c. 
Because these percentages are specific to the particular manipulations 
used in the present study, and because they rely on a number of theoretical 
assumptions, they should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the 
framework permits an assessment of the data that goes beyond the conclusion 
that “both processes played a role”. Thus, it seems that auditory distraction in 
the present study caused a recall impairment that was predominantly general 
in nature (68%), whereas visual distraction resulted in a somewhat more equal 
division of general (58%) and modality-specific (42%) impairment.  
Interestingly, these findings are compatible with the results obtained by 
Perfect and colleagues. In terms of auditory distraction, Perfect, Andrade, and 
Eagan (2011) found that bursts of white noise affected recall accuracy for 
visual and auditory details to the same extent, suggesting a general effect. In 
terms of visual distraction, Perfect, Andrade and Syrett’s (2011) findings seem 
to provide some evidence for a combination of general and modality-specific 
effects. Thus, even though visual distraction impaired recall accuracy for both 
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visual and auditory details, it had a greater effect on recall of visual details (see 
Figure 1 in their article). In conclusion, both general and modality-specific 
processes seem to be involved in the eye-closure effect, and the Cognitive 
Resources framework allows for a more detailed analysis of the relative impact 
of each type of process.  
  
5.3.4.2 Looking at a Blank Visual Field 
An additional variable of interest in the present study was whether looking at a 
blank screen would be just as effective as closing the eyes. As observed in 
previous research (Wais et al., 2010), performance in the blank-screen 
condition fell in-between the eyes-closed condition and the high-distraction 
conditions. Compared with the high-distraction conditions, eye-closure 
increased the number of correct fine-grain responses by 32%, whereas looking 
at a blank screen resulted in a 21% increase. The difference between the eyes-
closed and blank-screen conditions was not significant. In addition, eye-
closure increased testimonial accuracy rates by 12%, whereas looking at a 
blank screen increased accuracy by 7%. According to non-parametric tests, 
this difference was significant. In sum, although looking at a blank screen is 
better than being exposed to visual or auditory distractions, it is not quite as 
effective as closing the eyes.  
The slight difference between closing the eyes and looking at a blank 
visual field is probably due to the fact that there were still a few visual 
distractions in the blank-screen condition. For instance, the edges of the 
computer screen, the desk, and the wall behind the screen were all visible. 
Nevertheless, the data do not suggest that the eye-closure effect is unique to 
the physical act of closing the eyes (e.g., due to an increase in alpha activity; 
Wagstaff et al., 2004).  From an applied perspective, this is an encouraging 
finding. Apparently, when a witness is reluctant to close her eyes, looking at a 
blank visual field can be a useful, albeit slightly less effective, alternative to 
eye-closure (cf. Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). It should be noted, however, that 
the blank screen at which participants were looking during the interview was 
also the screen on which the video had been presented earlier. Future 
research should investigate whether focussing on any blank space improves 
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memory retrieval, to rule out context-specific effects (cf. Godden & Baddeley, 
1975). 
 
5.3.4.3 Confidence 
The confidence data revealed that distractions in the interview environment 
did not significantly affect average confidence ratings or confidence-accuracy 
correlations. However, participants in the low-distraction conditions were 
more underconfident than participants in the high-distraction conditions. 
Perhaps, the absence of distractions allowed participants to pay more 
attention to meta-cognitive aspects of the retrieval task (cf. Brewer, Keast, & 
Rishworth, 2002). In other words, when cognitive resources were available to 
reflect on the retrieval task, participants realised that it was rather difficult, 
and that they should adjust their confidence levels accordingly. This issue will 
be addressed in more detail in section 7.2.5. 
 
5.3.4.4 Conclusion 
The present findings show that visual and auditory distractions in the 
interview environment can cause both general and modality-specific 
impairments in recall performance, and that the general impairments seem to 
be most dominant. Thus, in line with Glenberg’s (1997) embodied cognition 
account, environmental distractions demand cognitive resources, and these 
demands detract from resources allocated to the retrieval task. Moreover, 
environmental distractions take both visual and auditory forms, and each 
form interferes predominantly with recall of information in the same modality 
(cf. Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). The good news is that retrieval impairments 
may be prevented by closing the eyes or, to a lesser extent, by looking at a 
blank visual field during the interview. 
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5.4 General Discussion 
 
The two experiments presented in this chapter were intended to shed more 
light on the theoretical underpinnings of the eye-closure effect. In Experiment 
4, the auditory counterpart of the eye-closure effect was not found to be 
significant. In Experiment 5, it was found that sensory distractions in the 
interview environment can cause both general and modality-specific 
impairments in retrieval performance, and that these can be overcome by eye-
closure or looking at a blank screen.   
 
5.4.1 Auditory Distractions 
In section 5.2.4, two potential explanations were proposed for the non-
significance of the irrelevant speech effect in Experiment 4. In light of the 
findings of Experiment 5, the explanation based on the nature of the auditory-
distraction task does not seem to provide a convincing account of the data. 
After all, irrelevant speech (in a foreign language) in Experiment 5 did disrupt 
the retrieval of auditory images from long-term memory. The explanation 
based on the presence or absence of social interaction, however, does seem to 
provide a possible reason for the divergent findings. Thus, when social 
interaction is required, as in Experiment 5, the addition of irrelevant sensory 
distractions in the interview environment may result in an overload on 
cognitive resources, which is reflected in impaired recall performance. When 
social interaction is not required, on the other hand, as in Experiment 4, 
simple sensory distractions on their own may not be sufficient to overload the 
system, and therefore do not cause a significant impairment in recall 
performance. 
 In an interesting recent study, Perfect et al. (2011) found that the 
overload caused by auditory distractions during a face-to-face interview can 
be overcome by eye-closure during the interview. Auditory distraction was 
presented in the form of bursts of white noise, which were played directly after 
each question had been posed. The bursts significantly increased the number 
of errors made by witnesses. More importantly, the increase in errors was 
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completely eliminated when witnesses closed their eyes during the interview. 
Thus, it seems that eye-closure can overcome the retrieval impairments 
caused by auditory distractions. Extrapolating these findings to an applied 
context, it seems likely that the eye-closure instruction will be particularly 
beneficial when witnesses are interviewed in a noisy environment. This 
prediction will be examined in a more realistic context in Experiment 6.  
 
5.4.2 Modality and Grain Size 
Unlike most previous experiments reported in this thesis, the modality-
specific interaction in Experiment 4 was observed for coarse-grain, not fine-
grain, correct recall. However, this interaction was mostly driven by an 
increase in coarse-grain recall of visual aspects as a result of irrelevant speech 
(see Figure 5.3), which was probably due to the fact that irrelevant speech 
tended to decrease fine-grain correct recall of visual (and auditory) aspects. 
Because the number of fine-grain responses and the number of coarse-grain 
responses provided in cued recall were not independent, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions from this finding.  
In Experiment 5, however, fine-grain recall was more affected by 
environmental distractions than coarse-grain recall. If we assume that fine-
grain recall involves a greater degree of mental imagery than coarse-grain 
recall, then this result is compatible with the finding that concurrent visual 
and auditory tasks disrupt the vividness of images retrieved from long-term 
memory (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). It seems that witnesses who were not 
exposed to visual distraction were better at conjuring up and inspecting a 
mental image of what they saw in the event. For instance, by inspecting a 
mental image of how the fight started, they would have been able to report 
that the man with the eye-patch threw the jug of iced tea at the other man 
(fine-grain answer), rather than simply concluding from a gist-based memory 
that the man with the eye-patch started it (coarse-grain answer). In a similar 
vein, witnesses who were not exposed to auditory distraction seemed to be 
better at conjuring up and inspecting a mental image of what they heard in the 
event. For instance, by replaying the voices in their “mind’s ear”, witnesses 
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could have retrieved a verbatim memory of what the older woman said (“I will 
wait for you by the stream”; fine-grain answer), instead of reporting the gist of 
what she said (e.g., “I will wait by the water”; coarse-grain answer). Thus, 
although speculative, it seems that the recall impairment caused by 
environmental distractions may be due to a disruption of visual and auditory 
imagery.  
 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
The experiments presented in this chapter showed that neither the cognitive 
load hypothesis nor the modality-specific interference hypothesis is likely to 
provide a complete explanation of the eye-closure effect. Instead, the effect 
might be best understood in terms of a combination of general and modality-
specific processes, which is reflected in the Cognitive Resources framework. 
Thus, the visual and auditory distractions in the present study caused both 
general and modality-specific impairments in retrieval performance. Closing 
the eyes during the interview blocks out visual distractions in the 
environment, and has also been found to reduce interference from auditory 
distractions (Perfect, Andrade, & Eagan, 2011). Therefore, eye-closure (or 
looking at a blank space) has the potential to help witnesses remember more, 
particularly when they are interviewed in a distracting environment. However, 
the environmental distractions in the present experiments were highly 
unrealistic. After all, it is unlikely that a witness will be exposed to a recording 
of an audio book, or of Hebrew words. The experiment reported in the next 
chapter investigated realistic potential distractions in the interview 
environment, by interviewing witnesses outside on a busy street. 
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5.5 Chapter Summary 
 Irrelevant speech did not significantly impair performance on a written 
cued-recall test. 
 Witnesses who were exposed to visual or auditory distractions during 
the interview remembered less accurate information than witnesses 
who closed their eyes or looked at a blank screen. 
 Auditory distractions in the interview environment interfered most with 
fine-grain correct recall and testimonial accuracy of auditory details, 
whereas visual distractions interfered most with fine-grain correct 
recall and testimonial accuracy of visual details. 
 Closing the eyes was only slightly more effective in improving recall 
performance than looking at a blank computer screen. 
 Fitting the data to the Cognitive Resources framework revealed that 
visual distractions caused both general and modality-specific 
impairments in recall, whereas auditory distractions caused 
predominantly general impairments. 
 When witnesses were distracted by sensory stimuli in the environment, 
they were less likely to be underconfident in their responses. 
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Chapter 6 
Memory for a Live Altercation 
 
6.1 Experiment 6: Staged Argument 
 
6.1.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 5, the visual and auditory distractions in the interview 
environment were meaningless to the participants, and rather artificial. 
Although this allowed for a closer inspection of the theoretical underpinnings 
of the eye-closure effect, it did not reflect a realistic interview situation. The 
present experiment examined the role of real-life distractions during the 
interview, by conducting interviews in a distracting environment (on a busy 
street) versus in a quiet environment (on a quiet corridor). Furthermore, the 
study assessed recall of a forensically relevant live event, and involved 
witnesses from a racially diverse, gender-balanced sample from the United 
States.  
 
6.1.1.1 Type of Event 
Perfect et al. (2008) found that eye-closure was effective for mundane live and 
videotaped events. This finding is potentially relevant for police interviewing 
about non-violent crime. The previous experiments showed that eye-closure 
is also effective for violent videotaped events. However, a question left to be 
answered is whether eye-closure also improves recall of violent live events. 
This question is relevant in legal settings, since eyewitness evidence may 
provide important leads in the investigation of violent crimes (Kebbell & 
Milne, 1998). Despite the relevance of this question, exposing participants to a 
violent live event is ethically unjustifiable. Therefore, the present study 
examined the effect of eye-closure on recall for a forensically relevant live 
event instead. Violent crimes such as assault and homicide are usually 
preceded by a verbal argument, especially if alcohol is involved (Murdoch & 
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Ross, 1990; Pihl & Peterson, 1995; Pittman & Handy, 1964). Thus, what 
happens during a verbal argument is potentially relevant to a criminal 
investigation. For this reason, in the present experiment, a verbal altercation 
was staged for unsuspecting witnesses, to test whether eye-closure improves 
recall for the type of live event that real eyewitnesses might be asked about. 
Ihlebæk, Løve, Eilertsen, and Magnussen (2003) compared eyewitness 
memory for videotaped and live presentations of a staged robbery. In their 
study, participants who viewed the robbery on video provided almost twice as 
much information about the robbers’ clothing as participants who witnessed 
the robbery live, and the information they provided was also significantly 
more likely to be accurate (83.3% correct for video witnesses; 72.7% correct for 
live witnesses). Thus, it seems that laboratory studies using videotaped events 
may overestimate the performance of eyewitnesses in real life. In light of the 
qualitative differences in memory for videotaped versus live events, it is 
important to investigate whether the benefits of certain interview procedures 
replicate when witnesses are interviewed about a forensically relevant live 
event. In meta-analyses of the Cognitive Interview, Köhnken et al. (1999) 
found that the CI was even more beneficial for recall of live events than for 
recall of videotaped events, and Memon and colleagues (2010) found that the 
CI was equally effective for videotaped and live events.24 In a similar vein, the 
eye-closure instruction has been found to be equally effective for recall of 
videotaped and live mundane events (Perfect et al., 2008). Therefore, it was 
hypothesised that eye-closure would also aid recall of a forensically relevant 
live event.  
 
6.1.1.2 Interview Location 
In previous research on the eye-closure effect, witnesses were always 
interviewed in a designated interview room. In real life, however, initial 
eyewitness statements are sometimes taken at another location (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992). Indeed, on a survey of experienced European police 
interviewers (see section 7.3 for more information), the majority of police 
interviewers indicated that they had interviewed eyewitnesses at locations 
                                                      
24 The types of events used in these studies was a mixture of “arousing” events (i.e., crime or 
accident scenarios) and mundane events. 
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other than a designated interview room, both inside and outside. Examples of 
alternative locations inside were the home or work of the witness, hotels, and 
restaurants. Examples of alternative locations outside were prisons or 
detention centres, on the street, and at or near the scene of the crime. In most 
of these alternative locations, elaborate interview procedures such as the 
Cognitive Interview are unlikely to be feasible. However, it would probably be 
feasible to ask witnesses to close their eyes. Therefore, the present study 
investigated whether eye-closure enhanced recall for witnesses interviewed 
outside on the street, near the “scene of the crime” (in this case, the location of 
the verbal altercation), compared to witnesses interviewed on a quiet corridor 
inside a university building. Based on previous literature, at least two 
competing hypotheses exist concerning the role of interview location in the 
eye-closure effect. 
First, in line with Glenberg’s (1997) embodied cognition account, it 
could be hypothesised that eye-closure will be more beneficial for witnesses 
interviewed outside than for witnesses interviewed inside. According to 
Glenberg, keeping the eyes open interferes with recall performance because 
monitoring the environment takes up cognitive resources. Furthermore, 
Glenberg et al. (1998) found that looking at a complex stimulus is more 
disruptive to retrieval performance than looking at a simple stimulus. 
Therefore, monitoring an environment full of distractions and possible 
dangers, such as a busy sidewalk in New York, should be more disruptive than 
monitoring an environment with relatively few distractions and potential 
dangers, such as a quiet corridor. By closing the eyes, the interviewee 
necessarily blocks out the visual distractions in the environment. Moreover, 
Perfect et al. (2011) found that eye-closure also helps witnesses to overcome 
auditory distractions in the environment. Therefore, eye-closure should be 
more helpful in an environment with many distractions (outside on the street) 
than in an environment with few distractions (inside on a quiet corridor). 
From now on, I will refer to this prediction as the distraction hypothesis. 
Second, in line with the literature on context-dependent memory (see 
S. M. Smith & Vela, 2001), it could be hypothesised that eye-closure will be 
more helpful for witnesses interviewed inside than for witnessed interviewed 
outside. According to context-dependent memory, information is best 
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retrieved in the context in which it was encoded. In the present experiment, 
for witnesses interviewed outside, the retrieval context was highly similar to 
the context of the witnessed event. For witnesses interviewed inside, on the 
other hand, the context was markedly different. Therefore, witnesses 
interviewed inside would likely benefit from mental context reinstatement 
(e.g., Hammond et al., 2006; S. M. Smith, 1979). Closing the eyes is 
recommended to facilitate mental context reinstatement (e.g., Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992). Moreover, Caruso and Gino (2011) found that eye-closure 
induced people to mentally simulate events more extensively, even in the 
absence of instructions to do so. Therefore, even though witnesses in the 
present study were not instructed to mentally reinstate context, it is possible 
that eye-closure inspired them to do so spontaneously. This should be most 
helpful for witnesses interviewed inside, for whom the recall context was 
considerably different from the context of the witnessed event. From now on, I 
will refer to this prediction as the context hypothesis. 
 
6.1.1.3 Witness Characteristics  
Previous research on the effect of eye-closure on episodic memory has 
typically involved undergraduate students from the United Kingdom (Perfect, 
Andrade, & Eagan, 2011; Perfect et al., 2008; Wagstaff et al., 2004; Wagstaff et 
al., 2010). Similarly, the experiments presented thus far in this thesis have 
involved homogeneous samples of predominantly Caucasian participants 
from the United Kingdom. The present study, on the other hand, involved a 
racially diverse sample from the United States. It was hypothesised that the 
eye-closure effect would replicate in this sample. 
 Unlike previous experiments, the present sample included a substantial 
number of male participants. This allowed for an investigation of gender 
differences in the eye-closure effect. Male and female individuals have been 
found to differ in the type of information they remember best (e.g., Chipman 
& Kimura, 1998; Clifford & Scott, 1978; Herlitz, Airaksinen, & Nordström, 1999; 
Herlitz, Nilsson, & Backman, 1997; Loftus, Banaji, Schooler, & Foster, 1987). 
Furthermore, females have been found to be more field-dependent than 
males (i.e., they have more difficulty separating central information from its 
context; Messick & Damarin, 1964), and the effectiveness of mental context 
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reinstatement has been found to rely on field dependency (Emmett et al., 
2003). In light of these findings, it is possible that there are gender differences 
in the effectiveness of eye-closure.   
 
6.1.1.4 Type of Information 
As in the previous experiment, all statements provided in free recall were 
scored for accuracy, modality, and centrality. In the present experiment, an 
additional categorisation was added based on the content of the reported 
information. Analyses of real eyewitness statements have shown that 
witnesses predominantly report information about actions, and that their 
descriptions of actions are more likely to be accurate than their descriptions of 
persons (Woolnough & MacLeod, 2001; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). From an 
applied perspective, it is useful to know what kind of information is most 
affected by eye-closure. If the eye-closure instruction improves recall of 
information that is crucial to police investigations, such as the perpetrator’s 
appearance and actions, it would be of higher practical significance than if it 
improves recall of relatively unimportant information, such as the 
surroundings of the criminal event. The previous experiments showed that 
eye-closure was equally effective for central and peripheral information, but 
the present study provided a more in-depth analysis by coding the reported 
information in terms of specific content as well.  
Previous research on the effectiveness of the Cognitive Interview has 
distinguished between statements pertaining to persons, actions, objects, and 
surroundings (e.g., A. M. Wright & Holliday, 2007). Due to the verbal nature of 
the witnessed event in the present study, an additional coding category was 
added for descriptions of verbal aspects (following from Woolnough & 
MacLeod, 2001). The type of information found to benefit most from the 
Cognitive Interview varies between studies, possibly due to the variability in 
stimulus materials used. The CI seems to have the most consistent impact on 
recall of actions (e.g., Akehurst et al., 2003; Holliday & Albon, 2004; A. M. 
Wright & Holliday, 2007), but benefits have also been observed for person 
descriptions (e.g., Milne & Bull, 2003a; Milne, Bull, Koehnken, & Memon, 
1995), object descriptions (e.g., Holliday, 2003a; Memon et al., 1997), and 
surrounding descriptions (e.g., Holliday, 2003b; A. M. Wright & Holliday, 
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2007). In light of these findings, it was hypothesised that eye-closure would 
improve recall for all types of descriptions, but would have the greatest impact 
on action descriptions.  
 
6.1.1.5 Auxiliary Variables 
In light of previous findings, it was again expected that eye-closure would have 
a greater impact on recall of visual details than on recall of auditory details. 
Furthermore, in cued recall, eye-closure was expected to increase fine-grain 
correct recall but not coarse-grain correct recall. Consistent with the findings 
from Experiment 3 and Perfect et al. (2008), eye-closure was expected to have 
benefits in both free and cued recall. Finally, as in Experiment 5, participants 
in the present study were asked to express their confidence on a scale from to 
0 to 100%. It was expected that eye-closure would again result in greater 
underconfidence in terms of confidence-accuracy calibration.  
 
6.1.1.6 Aims and Hypotheses 
The overall aim of the present study was to investigate whether eye-closure is 
effective for recall of a personally experienced verbal altercation, and whether 
the eye-closure effect is affected by interview location. The main hypothesis 
was that the eye-closure effect would replicate for recall of the live altercation 
in a racially diverse sample. In addition, two competing hypotheses were 
formulated with regard to interview location: the distraction hypothesis 
predicted that eye-closure would be most effective for witnesses interviewed 
in a distracting (but similar) environment (cf. Glenberg, 1997; Glenberg et al., 
1998), whereas the context hypothesis predicted that eye-closure would be 
most effective for witnesses interviewed in a dissimilar (but quiet) 
environment (cf. Caruso & Gino, 2011; S. M. Smith & Vela, 2001).  
 
6.1.2 Method 
6.1.2.1 Participants 
Ninety-seven undergraduate students from John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice (City University of New York) participated in the study for course 
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credit. Due to a technical failure with the audio-recording equipment, one 
participant was excluded from the analysis, leaving 96 participants. The 
sample consisted of 40 males and 56 females, with ages ranging from 18 to 48 
(M = 20.03, SD = 3.83). All participants were fluent English speakers and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing. The ethnic composition of 
the sample was mixed, with 46 Hispanic/Latino participants, 18 African-
American, 18 Caucasian, 9 Asian/Pacific Islander, and 5 participants of 
another race. The experiment was approved by the John Jay Institutional 
Review Board, and participants signed an informed consent form in line with 
the guidelines of the Board. 
 
6.1.2.2 Design 
For the free recall phase, the experiment manipulated two between-subjects 
independent variables (eye-closure and location). It employed a 2 (Interview 
Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Interview Location: inside, outside) 
between-subjects design. For the cued recall phase, the experiment 
manipulated two between-subjects independent variables (eye-closure and 
location) and one within-subject independent variable (modality of 
questions). The study used a 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 
2 (Interview Location: inside, outside) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) 
mixed design with repeated measures on third factor. The dependent 
variables were identical to Experiment 3. 
 
6.1.2.3 Procedure and Materials 
The event was staged 38 times, following the same script each time. Four 
research assistants were involved in each session: one playing the role of 
experimenter, two staging the live altercation, and one videotaping the event. 
The experimenter received up to four participants per session in a designated 
experimental room. Participants were informed that they would be 
participating in an experiment on social interactions, and that they would be 
assigned to different experimental locations. Once all participants had signed 
the informed consent form, they walked with the experimenter in the 
direction of another university building. After five minutes, they arrived at a 
busy street corner in New York, where the research assistants were positioned.  
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The staged event lasted approximately four minutes, and started when 
the experimenter introduced the participants to the two research assistants, 
Sarah and Julia, who would be assigning them to experimental rooms. First, 
the research assistants explained the room assignment, which was a rather 
complex process. Sarah showed the participants several pictures of animals, 
each of which corresponded to a specific experimental room. She then asked 
one participant for his or her participation number, and assigned him or her 
to a room. At this point, however, Julia disagreed with the room assignment, 
and asked another participant for his or her participation number. The two 
research assistants started arguing about the room assignment, and Julia tried 
to pull the assignment papers out of Sarah’s hands, which scattered on the 
floor. The disagreement then escalated into an argument about things that 
had occurred earlier that day. The argument became progressively more 
heated, to a point where Sarah got so upset that she walked away from the 
scene. This marked the end of the staged event. The entire event was filmed 
from a nearby phone booth by another research assistant, to obtain an 
objective record of each session against which participants’ responses could 
be scored. The research assistant was pretending to make a phone call in the 
phone booth, and the video camera was hidden in her clothes. None of the 
participants noticed the camera. 
At the end of the staged event, the experimenter informed the 
participants that the argument they had just witnessed was not real. She told 
participants that each of them would be interviewed about the event, and 
explained why the use of deception had been necessary to simulate a real-life, 
unexpected event. The four research assistants then each took one participant 
on another five-minute walk to a different location where they would be 
interviewed about the event. During the walk, the investigator engaged the 
participant in casual conversation, to prevent rehearsal of the event he or she 
had just witnessed. Participants were randomly assigned to be interviewed 
either inside or outside, either with eyes open or with eyes closed. There were 
24 participants in each of the four interview conditions (inside-open, inside-
closed, outside-open, outside-closed). The inside location was a quiet corridor 
in the John Jay building, which had white walls and floors and was empty save 
for a filing cabinet. The outside interviews took place on the same street as the 
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staged event (i.e., Tenth Avenue in New York), but four blocks northwards. 
Therefore, although the event location and the outside interview location 
differed in terms of specific features (e.g., specific stores located on that part of 
the street), they were highly similar in overall appearance.  
Upon arrival at the interview location, participants were informed that 
those scoring in the top 25% on the memory test would be enrolled in a lottery 
to win $50, to increase their motivation to perform well. The investigator 
explained that participants would first provide a free report of the witnessed 
event, after which they would be asked specific questions. Participants in the 
eyes-closed condition were asked to keep their eyes closed throughout the 
interview. Once participants had told the interviewer everything they could 
remember about the staged event, they answered eight questions about visual 
aspects of the event, and eight about auditory aspects (see Appendix A.3). The 
questions were asked in the order in which the corresponding information 
appeared in the event; hence the different types of questions were mixed, and 
in a fixed order throughout. Participants were asked to indicate their level of 
confidence in their answer on a scale from 0% (not confident at all) to 100% 
(extremely confident). All interviews were audio-taped for subsequent 
analysis. At the end of the interview, participants completed a demographic 
information sheet (consisting of questions about gender, age, and race). 
Finally, each interviewer thanked and debriefed their interviewee. 
 
6.1.2.4 Pilot 
Prior to the main experiment, three pilot sessions were conducted, involving 
ten pilot participants in total. The goals of the pilot sessions were to provide 
an opportunity for the research assistants to practise their acting 
performance, to check whether the event was believable, to ensure that the 
participants did not notice the camera, and to check whether the interview 
questions were appropriate. The pilot participants indicated that the event 
was believable; none of them reported suspicions that the argument had been 
fake, and some of them reacted with genuine surprise when they were told 
that the argument was not real. None of the pilot participants noticed the 
research assistant who was filming the event. Finally, the pilot participants 
performed approximately equally well on the eight questions about visual 
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aspects and eight questions about auditory aspects; therefore, the original set 
of questions was retained for the main experiment. None of the pilot 
participants took part in the main experiment.  
 
6.1.2.5 Data Coding 
Three research assistants transcribed all the audio-taped interviews verbatim. 
Two different research assistants coded all transcripts, blind to interview 
condition. An exhaustive coding scheme was generated, listing all possible 
statements about the event with their corresponding scores. The two 
independent coders scored the transcripts on the basis of this scheme, 
progressively adding any details mentioned by participants that were not in 
the original list. First, the statements provided during free recall were coded as 
correct, incorrect, or subjective. The present study did not include a coding 
category for gist statements, because gist proved difficult to define, and could 
often be considered to be subjective (e.g., “they didn’t like each other”). Thus, 
all statements that could not be scored for accuracy (e.g., “she was pretty”) or 
modality (e.g., “she was rude”) were classified as subjective and excluded from 
further analysis. All participants together reported 83 correct and 10 incorrect 
statements, which were coded as visual or auditory, and as central or 
peripheral (based on plot relevance; cf. Burke et al., 1992). Of all reported 
details, 38 were scored as visual and 55 as auditory. In addition, there were 20 
central details on the list (e.g., “they started arguing”) and 73 peripheral details 
(e.g., “one called the other a big baby”). Finally, all statements were scored in 
terms of content, resulting in 51 verbal descriptions (e.g., “they told us about 
the different rooms”), 14 action descriptions (e.g., “she walked away”), 10 
person descriptions (e.g., “she had brown hair”), 10 surrounding descriptions 
(e.g., “it was raining”), and 8 object descriptions (e.g., “the papers were wet”). 
Inter-rater reliability was established for each of the two coders. Thus, a 
third coder randomly selected ten interviews for each coder and double-coded 
all statements provided in free recall and all responses provided in cued recall. 
In total, 283 statements in free recall were double-coded (23.0% of the total 
sample). Inter-rater reliability was high for both coders in terms of accuracy 
(Coder 1: κ = .91, p < .001; Coder 2: κ = .92, p < .001) and modality of details 
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(Coder 1: κ = .98, p < .001; Coder 2: κ = .98, p < .001), and acceptable for 
centrality (Coder 1: κ = .95, p < .001; Coder 2: κ = .85, p < .001), and content of 
the information (Coder 1: κ = .92, p < .001; Coder 2: κ = .85, p < .001). The 
scores of the original two coders were retained for the main analysis. 
In the cued recall phase, answers were scored as correct, incorrect, or 
omitted, and all correct responses were coded for grain size as in previous 
experiments. Examples of each type of response are provided in Appendix A.3. 
For this phase, 320 responses were double-coded (20.8% of the total sample). 
Inter-rater reliability (for the decision to score a response as fine-grain correct, 
coarse-grain correct, incorrect, or omitted) for both coders was κ = .94, p < 
.001. Again, the scores of the original coders were retained for the main 
analysis. 
 
6.1.3 Results 
The aim of this experiment was to assess the effects of eye-closure and 
interview location on recall of a forensically relevant live event in a racially 
diverse sample. First, the results from the free recall phase will be presented, 
in terms of both the number of correct statements and the proportion of 
statements that were correct. Separate analyses will be conducted based on 
modality, centrality, and type of description. Second, the findings from the 
cued recall phase will be discussed, again in terms of both number and 
proportion correct, with separate analyses based on grain size. Finally, 
confidence ratings and witness characteristics will be examined.  
 
6.1.3.1 Number Correct in Free Recall 
Figure 6.1 shows the number of correct visual and auditory statements 
provided during free recall, by interview condition and location. Prior to 
analysis, the distributions of the dependent variables were normalised by 
square-root transformation. A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) 
x 2 (Interview Location: inside, outside) ANOVA on the square-root 
transformed total number of correct statements revealed a significant main 
effect of interview condition, F (1, 92) = 4.43, p < .05, η2 = .04, d = .51, but no 
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significant effect of interview location (F < 1). Participants who closed their 
eyes during the interview provided 25.4% more correct statements in free 
recall than participants who kept their eyes open. The interaction between 
interview condition and location approached significance, F (1, 92) = 3.59, p = 
.06, η2 = .04, and simple effects analyses suggested that the eye-closure 
instruction was more helpful for participants interviewed inside, F (1, 92) = 
8.00, p < .01, η2 = .08, d = .88, than for participants interviewed outside (F < 1; 
see Figure 6.1). 
 
 
Figure 6.1  Experiment 6: Number correct in free recall. Mean number of 
correct visual and auditory statements provided by participants interviewed 
(a) inside in a quiet location or (b) outside on the street. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
 
Participants reported significantly more auditory than visual correct 
details, t (95) = 8.03, p < .001, η2 = .58. Because the respective number of visual 
and auditory details reported was not under experimental control, modality 
could not be included as an independent variable in the previous analysis. A 
separate 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Interview 
Location: inside, outside) ANOVA on the square-root transformed number of 
visual details revealed significant main effects of interview condition, F (1, 92) 
= 6.61, p < .05, η2 = .06, d = .56, and interview location, F (1, 92) = 5.57, p < .05, η2 
= .05, but no significant interaction between the two (F < 1). Participants in the 
eyes-closed condition reported 37.6% more visual details than participants in 
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the eyes-open condition. In addition, participants interviewed inside reported 
27.1% more visual details than participants interviewed outside. Another two-
way ANOVA on the square-root transformed number of auditory details 
revealed no significant main effects of interview condition, F (1, 92) = 1.26, p = 
.26, or interview location (F < 1). There was a marginally non-significant 
interaction between interview condition and location, F (1, 92) = 3.06, p = .08, 
η
2 = .03, suggesting that eye-closure increased recall of auditory aspects for 
witnesses interviewed inside, F (1, 92) = 4.13, p < .05, η2 = .04, d = .66, but not 
for witnesses interviewed outside (F < 1).  
On average, participants reported 4.46 (SD = 1.95) out of 20 potential 
central details, and 7.21 (SD = 4.12) out of 73 potential peripheral details. 
Peripheral details significantly outnumbered central details, t (95) = 7.40, p < 
.001, η2 = .37. Separate 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 
(Interview Location: inside, outside) ANOVAs showed that eye-closure 
resulted in a significant 33.0% increase in peripheral details, F (1, 92) = 6.32, p 
< .05, η2 = .06, and a non-significant 13.9% increase in central details, F (1, 92) = 
2.18, p = .14. There were no significant effects or interactions involving 
interview location (all ps > .07). Table 6.1 shows the frequency of different 
types of descriptions. Due to the low frequency of certain types of details, 
analysis of variance was not appropriate. However, at least numerically, eye-
closure increased all types of details, save for descriptions of surroundings.  
 
Table 6.1 Experiment 6: Number correct by type of description. Mean 
number of correct details reported in free recall by witnesses with eyes open 
or closed. Experimental conditions are collapsed over interview location. 
Type of Detail 
Interview Condition  
Eyes open Eyes closed Total 
Person .73 (.14) 1.04 (.16) .89 (.11) 
Action 1.90 (.17) 2.40 (.19) 2.15 (.13) 
Object .79 (.18) 1.44 (.22) 1.11 (.14) 
Surrounding 1.04 (.14) 1.02 (.14) 1.03 (.10) 
Verbal 5.92 (.37) 7.13 (.57) 6.52 (.34) 
Total 10.35 (.55) 12.98 (.90) 11.67 (.54) 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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6.1.3.2 Proportion Correct in Free Recall 
In free recall, participants generally volunteered few incorrect details (M = 
1.14, SD = 1.46). The 96 participants together mentioned only 10 different 
incorrect details in total. These inaccuracies generally concerned the source of 
actions or statements rather than the content (i.e., who did or said what). As 
shown in Figure 6.2, the proportion of statements that were correct was high 
in all conditions. The distributions of the proportions could not be 
normalised, but non-parametric tests confirmed the non-significant results 
reported here (see Appendix B.4). A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes 
closed) x 2 (Interview Location: inside, outside) ANOVA on overall proportion 
correct revealed no main effects of interview condition, F (1, 92) = 1.13, p = .29, 
or interview location (F < 1), and no significant interaction between the two (F 
< 1). Separate ANOVAs for visual and auditory statements revealed no 
significant effects either (all ps > .16). 
 
Figure 6.2  Experiment 6: Proportion correct in free recall. Mean proportion 
of visual and auditory statements that were correct, provided by participants 
interviewed (a) inside in a quiet location or (b) outside on the street. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
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6.1.3.3 Number Correct in Cued Recall 
Figure 6.3 shows the total number of correct responses provided during 
questioning (i.e., fine-grain plus coarse-grain). A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes 
open, eyes closed) x 2 (Interview Location: inside, outside) x 2 (Question 
Modality: visual, auditory) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last 
factor was conducted on the total number of correct responses. There were no 
significant main effects of interview condition (F < 1), interview location (F < 
1), or question modality (F < 1), and no significant interactions (all ps > .20). 
To examine whether the eye-closure effect depended on the specificity of the 
responses, separate analyses were conducted for fine-grain and coarse-grain 
correct responses. 
 
 
Figure 6.3  Experiment 6: Total correct in cued recall. Mean total number of 
correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of the event 
provided by participants interviewed (a) inside in a quiet location or (b) 
outside on the street. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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6.1.3.4 Fine-Grain Correct in Cued Recall 
Figure 6.4 shows the number of fine-grain correct responses provided during 
questioning. A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Interview 
Location: inside, outside) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) mixed 
ANOVA on fine-grain correct recall revealed no significant main effects of 
interview condition (F < 1) or interview location (F < 1), but a significant effect 
of question modality, F (1, 92) = 6.85, p < .05, η2 = .06. Participants were 
significantly more likely to provide fine-grain correct responses to questions 
about auditory details than to questions about visual details. Moreover, there 
was a significant interaction between interview condition and question 
modality, F (1, 92) = 6.85, p < .05, η2 = .06. Participants who closed their eyes 
gave 23.8% more fine-grain correct answers to questions about visual aspects 
than participants who kept their eyes open, F (1, 92) = 4.40, p < .05, η2 = .05, d = 
.43. For auditory aspects, eye-closure tended to decrease fine-grain correct 
recall, but this tendency was not significant, F (1, 92) = 1.51, p = .22. There 
were no other significant interactions (all Fs < 1). 
 
 
Figure 6.4  Experiment 6: Fine-grain correct in cued recall. Mean number of 
fine-grain correct responses to questions about visual and auditory aspects of 
the event provided by participants interviewed (a) inside in a quiet location or 
(b) outside on the street. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
  
Visual Auditory
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f F
in
e-
G
ra
in
 C
o
rr
ec
t 
R
es
p
o
n
se
s
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Visual Auditory
Eyes open
Eyes closed
a) Inside b) Outside
Interview Condition
Chapter 6                                                                                Memory for a Live Altercation 
192 
 
6.1.3.5 Coarse-Grain Correct in Cued Recall 
Figure 6.5 shows the number of coarse-grain correct responses provided by 
participants. Prior to analysis, the distributions of the data for coarse-grain 
recall of visual and auditory aspects were normalised by log-transformation. A 
2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Interview Location: inside, 
outside) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) mixed ANOVA on the log-
transformed number of coarse-grain correct answers revealed no significant 
main effects of interview condition (F < 1) or interview location (F < 1), but a 
significant effect of question modality, F (1, 92) = 9.21, p < .01, η2 = .09. 
Participants gave significantly more coarse-grain correct answers to questions 
about visual aspects than to questions about auditory aspects. There were no 
significant interactions (all ps > .31). 
 
 
Figure 6.5  Experiment 6: Coarse-grain correct in cued recall. Mean number 
of coarse-grain correct responses to questions about visual and auditory 
aspects of the event provided by participants interviewed (a) inside in a quiet 
location or (b) outside on the street. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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6.1.3.6 Proportion Correct in Cued Recall 
On average, participants answered 1.09 out of the 16 interview questions 
incorrectly (SD = 1.46). Some examples of incorrect responses can be found in 
Appendix A.3. The proportion of responses provided during questioning that 
were correct is displayed in Figure 6.6. A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, 
eyes closed) x 2 (Interview Location: inside, outside) x 2 (Question Modality: 
visual, auditory) mixed ANOVA on proportion correct revealed no significant 
main effects of interview condition (F < 1), interview location (F < 1), or 
question modality, F (1, 92) = 2.16, p = .15. There were also no significant 
interactions (all Fs < 1). 
 
 
Figure 6.6  Experiment 6: Proportion correct in cued recall. Mean 
proportion of answers that were correct, in response to questions about visual 
and auditory aspects of the event, provided by participants interviewed (a) 
inside in a quiet location or (b) outside on the street. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
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6.1.3.7 Confidence 
Confidence ratings on a scale of 0 to 100% were obtained for all answered 
questions. For the confidence analysis, fine-grain and coarse-grain correct 
responses were again collapsed for the sake of simplicity. First, the effect of 
interview condition and location on average confidence ratings for correct and 
incorrect responses was examined (see Figure 6.7). The distributions for 
confidence ratings were normalised by inverting and square-root 
transforming the data.  
 
 
Figure 6.7  Experiment 6: Mean confidence ratings. Average confidence 
ratings (0 = not confident at all; 100 = extremely confident) for correct and 
incorrect responses provided (a) inside in a quiet location or (b) outside on the 
street, by participants with eyes open or closed. 
 
A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Interview 
Location: inside, outside) x 2 (Type of Response: correct, incorrect) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on the 
transformed mean confidence ratings. There was a significant main effect of 
type of response, F (1, 89) = 44.08, p < .001, η2 = .32: participants gave higher 
confidence ratings for correct responses than for incorrect responses. There 
were no significant main effects of interview condition, F (1, 89) = 1.07, p = .30, 
or interview location (F < 1), but there was a significant three-way interaction, 
F (1, 89) = 5.20, p < .05, η2 = .32. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 6.7. For 
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witnesses interviewed inside, eye-closure decreased confidence in both 
correct and incorrect responses, and this decrease was marginally significant 
for correct responses, F (1, 89) = 3.80, p = .05, η2 = .04, but not significant for 
incorrect responses (F < 1). For witnesses interviewed outside, eye-closure 
reduced confidence only for incorrect responses, but this decrease failed to 
reach significance, F (1, 89) = 2.69, p = .10. There were no other significant 
interactions (all ps > .12). 
 Second, it was investigated whether generally confident rememberers 
were also generally accurate. The average confidence rating per participant 
was not significantly correlated with the proportion of responses that were 
correct, r = .07, p = .50. Separate analyses revealed no significant general 
confidence-accuracy (CA) correlations in either of the interview conditions, 
although the correlation was somewhat higher for the eyes-open group, r = 
.25, p = .08, than for the eyes-closed group, r = -.12, p = .42. Nevertheless, these 
correlation coefficients did not differ significantly from each other, Fisher’s z = 
1.79, p = .07. Similarly, the general CA correlation was not significantly affected 
by interview location, Fisher’s z = .18, p = .37 (inside: r = .18, p = .22; outside: r 
= -.01, p = .96). 
Third, point-biserial correlations between confidence in a particular 
response and accuracy of that response were calculated. All participants 
together provided 1276 responses in total, and there was a significant and 
relatively large specific CA correlation, r
pb
 = .48, p < .001. Separate analyses 
showed that the correlation was similar across interview conditions, Fisher’s z 
= .29, p = .58 (eyes-open: r
pb
 = .47, p < .001; eyes-closed: r
pb
 = .49, p < .001) and 
across interview locations, Fisher’s z = .67, p = .50 (inside: r
pb
 = .46, p < .001; 
outside: r
pb
 = .49, p < .001). In sum, if a response was provided with a high level 
of confidence, it was quite likely to be accurate. 
Fourth, a calibration technique was used to plot the proportion of 
correct responses against participants’ confidence ratings. The calibration 
graph is depicted in Figure 6.8.  
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Figure 6.8  Experiment 6: Confidence-accuracy calibration. Mean 
percentage correct by confidence rating for the eyes-open and eyes-closed 
conditions. The black line denotes perfect calibration. Errors bars represent 
standard errors. 
 
To provide more stable estimates of percentage correct, confidence 
ratings were collapsed into six categories (0%, 1–39%, 40–59%, 60–79% 80–
99%, 100%).25 Accuracy in each confidence category was compared with the 
weighted mean confidence rating in that category. The calibration graph looks 
somewhat different from the calibration graphs in Experiments 2, 3, and 5 (see 
pages 100, 134, and 166, respectively); in the present study, participants 
tended to be overconfident in their responses. Visual inspection of Figure 6.8 
suggests that there was little difference between the eyes-open and eyes-
closed group for confidence ratings of 40% and higher. There seemed to be a 
                                                      
25 The confidence categories were slightly different from those used in Experiment 5, because 
the distribution of the confidence ratings was not the same (e.g., the number of ‘0%’ ratings in 
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few differences at the lower end of the scale, but no clear pattern emerged. 
These findings will be addressed in the Discussion.  
 
6.1.3.8 Witness Characteristics 
The present study replicated the eye-closure effect with a sample of witnesses 
from various racial backgrounds. Due to the small number of participants of 
each racial group per interview condition, witness race could not be included 
in an ANOVA. Nevertheless, two interesting trends are worth mentioning. 
First, in free recall, eye-closure increased number correct to a similar extent 
for all racial groups (Hispanic, African-American, Caucasian, Asian, and Other 
race), but substantially increased proportion correct only for African-
American participants (from .86 in the eyes-open condition to .97 in the eyes-
closed condition). Second, in cued recall, eye-closure did not affect proportion 
correct for any of the racial groups, but substantially increased number correct 
only for Caucasian participants (from 8.33 in the eyes-open condition to 10.56 
in the eyes-closed condition). In sum, it seems that the effect of eye-closure on 
recall may vary depending on the race of the witness, although the present 
data do not provide clear evidence regarding this issue. 
It was possible, however, to investigate the role of gender in the eye-
closure effect. For free recall, a 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) 
x 2 (Witness Gender: male, female) ANOVA on the square-root transformed 
number of correct statements revealed no significant main effect of witness 
gender (F < 1), and no interaction between gender and interview condition (F 
< 1). Similarly, a 2 x 2 ANOVA on proportion correct in free recall revealed no 
main effect of gender (F < 1) and no interaction between gender and eye-
closure (F < 1). Separate analyses for visual and auditory statements in free 
recall also revealed no gender differences in number or proportion correct (all 
ps > .16). In sum, male and female participants performed equally well in free 
recall, and eye-closure had similar effects for both genders. However, there 
were some gender differences in cued recall, which are depicted in Figure 6.9.  
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Figure 6.9  Experiment 6: Role of witness gender in cued recall. Mean total 
number of correct responses during questioning provided by male and female 
participants. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Witness Gender: 
male, female) x 2 (Question Modality: visual, auditory) ANOVA on the total 
number of correct responses provided in cued recall revealed a significant 
main effect of witness gender, F (1, 92) = 4.17, p < .05, η2 = .04, and a significant 
interaction between gender and interview condition, F (1, 92) = 6.01, p < .05, η2 
= .06. There were no other significant interactions involving gender (both Fs < 
1). As shown in Figure 6.9, female participants performed better on the cued 
recall test than male participants. However, eye-closure was more helpful for 
male participants, bringing their performance up to the level of the female 
participants. Simple effects analyses showed that eye-closure significantly 
increased number correct for male participants, F (1, 92) = 4.38, p < .05, η2 = 
.05, d = .59, but did not significantly affect number correct for female 
participants, F (1, 92) = 1.75, p = .19. Another three-way mixed ANOVA on the 
proportion correct in cued recall revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions involving witness gender (all ps > .10). In sum, eye-closure helped 
male, but not female, witnesses to provide more correct responses during 
questioning. The implications of this finding will be addressed in the 
Discussion. 
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Finally, the influence of witness gender on confidence ratings was 
assessed. A 2 (Interview Condition: eyes open, eyes closed) x 2 (Witness 
Gender: male, female) x 2 (Type of Response: correct, incorrect) mixed ANOVA 
on transformed mean confidence ratings revealed no significant main effects 
or interactions involving witness gender (all Fs < 1). Similarly, no different 
patterns based on gender were observed for general CA correlations, specific 
CA correlations, or CA calibration. 
 
6.1.4 Discussion 
The present findings provide evidence that closing the eyes helps 
eyewitnesses to recall a verbal altercation that they witnessed in real life. This 
is an important extension of the eye-closure effect, since reports about a 
verbal argument can provide the police with potentially relevant information 
in the investigation of violent crimes (cf. Murdoch & Ross, 1990; Pihl & 
Peterson, 1995; Pittman & Handy, 1964). In addition, the present study was the 
first to replicate the eye-closure effect in a racially diverse sample from the 
United States. Unlike in Experiment 3, eye-closure in immediate free recall in 
the present study significantly increased the amount of visual information 
reported, by 37.6%, without harming testimonial accuracy. Eye-closure tended 
to increase recall of various aspects of the witnessed event, including 
information that could be relevant in police investigations (e.g., descriptions 
of persons and actions). In cued recall, eye-closure did not have a significant 
main effect, but it did help witnesses to retrieve 23.8% more fine-grain correct 
answers to questions about visual aspects of the witnessed scene. The 
difference between free and cued recall will be further addressed in the 
General Discussion (section 7.2.2).  
 
6.1.4.1 Interview Location 
Prior to the experiment, two competing hypotheses were formulated 
concerning the role of interview location in the eye-closure effect. On the one 
hand, the distraction hypothesis predicted that witnesses interviewed outside 
would benefit more from eye-closure, since it would help them to block out 
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the severe distractions in the environment (which was not as necessary for 
witnesses interviewed inside). On the other hand, the context hypothesis 
predicted that witnesses interviewed inside would benefit more from eye-
closure, since it would help them to spontaneously reinstate the context of the 
witnessed event (which was not as necessary for witnesses interviewed 
outside). In free recall, there was a marginally significant interaction between 
eye-closure and location, suggesting that eye-closure was most effective for 
witnesses interviewed inside. This finding provides more support for the 
context hypothesis than for the distraction hypothesis.   
 The finding that context effects were seemingly more powerful than 
distraction effects is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that the context 
dependent memory phenomenon is somewhat unreliable and does not always 
replicate (e.g., Godden & Baddeley, 1980; Hygge et al., 2003; McSpadden et al., 
1988). However, the inconsistency between this observation and the current 
findings may be due the nature of the to-be-remembered stimuli. In most 
studies on context-dependent memory, the learning material is unrelated to 
the encoding environment itself. In the present study, on the other hand, the 
encoding environment was part of the event memory. If eye-closure facilitated 
spontaneous mental context reinstatement (Caruso & Gino, 2011; Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992), it would have brought back memories that were intricately 
related to that context. For example, Smith (1988) shared an anecdote about 
his father returning to his former house in Texas after 42 years. When his 
father saw the house, he suddenly remembered how an armadillo climbed up 
the drain pipe one day. Although seeing the drain pipe would probably not 
have cued memories of words learned while looking at the drain pipe, it is an 
effective reminder of a story involving the drain pipe. In sum, the context 
effect may be more powerful when the context is an integral part of the 
memory. In line with this reasoning, however, we would have expected that 
eye-closure would also have increased the number of details recalled about 
the surroundings of the event, which was not found in the present study. 
Therefore, this tentative explanation of the findings requires further 
investigation. 
 An alternative explanation of the finding that eye-closure was not 
effective for witnesses interviewed outside could be that the auditory 
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distractions outside were simply too severe to overcome. Perfect et al. (2011) 
found that eye-closure could overcome auditory distraction posed by bursts of 
white noise, but it is uncertain whether this finding would extend to more 
realistic auditory distractions. In the present study, witnesses interviewed 
outside could hear the traffic rushing by and people walking past. Unlike 
white noise, cars and people are potentially dangerous, and monitoring this 
potential danger in the environment (even with eyes closed) could have 
distracted witnesses from the task at hand. Future research could compare the 
distraction hypothesis and the context hypothesis more directly by varying the 
similarity of context and the level of distraction independently. Thus, future 
research could examine the eye-closure effect in four conditions: same-
context/quiet-environment, same-context/noisy-environment, different-
context/quiet-environment, and different-context/noisy-environment. If eye-
closure is most effective in a context that is dissimilar from the encoding 
context, regardless of the level of distractions in the environment, this would 
provide support for the context hypothesis. If eye-closure is most effective in a 
noisy environment, regardless of context similarity, this would provide 
support for the distraction hypothesis.  
From an applied perspective, the present findings should not 
discourage the use of eye-closure for witnesses interviewed outside. After all, 
eye-closure did not harm eyewitness testimony in free recall for witnesses 
interviewed outside, and it actually helped them to retrieve slightly more fine-
grain correct answers to questions about visual details. Thus, although the 
marginally significant interaction between eye-closure and interview location 
in free recall is theoretically interesting, the current findings do not warrant 
the conclusion that the eye-closure instruction should not be used when 
witnesses are interviewed outside. 
 
6.1.4.2 Confidence 
As in Experiment 2, eye-closure tended to reduce participants’ confidence in 
their responses provided during cued recall. In the present study, this 
tendency was most pronounced for correct responses provided by witnesses 
interviewed inside, and for incorrect responses provided by witnesses 
interviewed outside. It is unclear why this three-way interaction occurred. 
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Given that the simple effects related to the interaction were not significant, 
this result needs to be replicated before any meaningful conclusions can be 
drawn. Unlike the previous experiments, participants in the present study 
tended to be overconfident rather than underconfident. In addition, 
participants who closed their eyes in the present study were not generally 
more underconfident than participants who kept their eyes open. The effect of 
eye-closure on confidence will be further discussed in section 7.2.5. 
There are at least three potential explanations for the finding that 
participants in the present study were not as underconfident as participants in 
the previous experiments. First, it could be due to cultural differences; 
perhaps, students in New York are typically more confident in their answers 
than students in York. Second, it could be due to the type of event; perhaps, 
people are more confident in the responses they give about an event that they 
personally experienced than in the responses they give about an event that 
they watched on video. Third, it could be due to the confidence scale; perhaps, 
rating confidence on a scale of 0 to 100% induces people to provide higher 
ratings than rating confidence on a scale of 1 to 5. The latter explanation 
seems unlikely in light of the results obtained in Experiment 5 (see section 
5.3.3.5), in which the same confidence scale was used, yet no overconfidence 
was observed. To distinguish between the first two explanations, future 
research could assess the confidence-accuracy relationship for recall of the 
same event presented either live or on video (cf. Ihlebæk et al., 2003), in 
samples from different countries.  
  
6.1.4.3 Witness Characteristics 
The present study replicated the eye-closure effect in a racially diverse sample 
from the United States, as opposed to the predominantly Caucasian samples 
from the United Kingdom used in previous studies. Interestingly, the patterns 
observed in the present study suggests that eye-closure may have different 
types of benefits for different racial groups, but the sample sizes in each racial 
group were too small to draw any conclusions. Nevertheless, it would not be 
unthinkable that eye-closure is more effective for certain individuals than for 
others. For instance, the effectiveness of mental context reinstatement has 
been found to depend on individual differences such as cognitive style 
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(Emmett et al., 2003), and cognitive styles and abilities may vary across 
different racial groups (Rushton & Jensen, 2005). The role of individual 
differences in the eye-closure effect could be an interesting avenue for future 
research. 
 Overall, female witnesses in the present study provided more correct 
responses during questioning than male witnesses. This finding is consistent 
with previous research showing that women tend to outperform men on 
episodic memory tasks (Chipman & Kimura, 1998; Herlitz et al., 1999; Herlitz 
et al., 1997; Lewin & Herlitz, 2002). More surprising, however, was the finding 
that eye-closure improved cued recall for male witnesses but not for female 
witnesses. This finding was particularly surprising considering that the eye-
closure effect in previous studies was found with samples including 
predominantly female participants. Because the gender difference in the 
effectiveness of eye-closure in cued recall was relatively small, and because no 
gender differences were observed in free recall, the evidence regarding this 
issue is as of yet inconclusive. Furthermore, there are at least two potential 
explanations of the present findings that are not based on cognitive 
differences between sexes per se. First, male witnesses could have benefited 
more from eye-closure because they were more distracted by the interviewer 
when they had their eyes open (all interviewers in the present study were 
female). Second, eye-closure may have had a larger impact for male 
participants because their cued recall performance was poorer overall. For 
instance, Emmett et al. (2003) found that mental context reinstatement was 
more effective for witnesses who generally exhibited poorer memory 
performance than for witnesses who generally performed well. In sum, future 
studies need to replicate the gender difference in the eye-closure effect under 
more controlled conditions (e.g., systematically varying the gender of the 
interviewer) before it can be concluded that eye-closure helps male but not 
female witnesses. 
 
6.1.4.4 Conclusion 
The present study extended the eye-closure effect to recall of a forensically 
relevant live event, in a racially diverse sample of witnesses. This finding 
increases the ecological validity of the research, providing a stronger 
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argument that the findings will replicate in real-life contexts. In addition, eye-
closure was found to be more effective for witnesses who were interviewed in 
a quiet environment that was different from the context of the to-be-
remembered event, than for witnesses who were interviewed in a noisy 
environment that was similar to the context of the event. This finding 
promotes our theoretical understanding of the eye-closure effect, and points 
to important avenues for future research to compare the context hypothesis 
and the distraction hypothesis more directly. The experiment presented in 
this chapter was the final experiment of the thesis. The next chapter will 
summarise the results of all experiments and reflect on the theoretical and 
practical implications of the findings. 
 
 
6.2 Chapter Summary 
 The eye-closure effect was extended to recall of a forensically relevant 
live event. 
 Eye-closure increased the amount of information reported in free recall 
without harming the testimonial accuracy of that information. 
 Eye-closure was particularly beneficial for recall of visual information, 
and increased the report of different types of information (in terms of 
centrality and content). 
 Eye-closure increased fine-grain correct but not coarse-grain correct 
responses to questions about visual aspects of the witnessed events. 
 Eye-closure was particularly beneficial for witnesses interviewed inside 
in a quiet environment, suggesting that spontaneous context 
reinstatement may play a role in the eye-closure effect. 
 Witnesses in the present study tended to be overconfident in their 
responses, but eye-closure tended to reduce mean confidence.  
 Female witnesses performed better in cued recall, but eye-closure 
tended to be more effective for male witnesses in cued recall. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and General Discussion 
 
In the final chapter of this thesis, I will consider the theoretical and practical 
implications of the research findings. First, I will provide an overview of the 
research aims and the main findings, followed by a discussion of six themes 
recurring throughout the thesis. I will then present the findings from a survey 
of police interviewers, which assessed whether implementation of the eye-
closure instruction in practice would be useful and feasible. In the final part of 
the chapter, I will discuss the main limitations of the research and provide a 
number of suggestions for future research. 
 
 
7.1 Research Aims and Main Findings 
 
The overall goal of the present thesis was to investigate the benefits of eye-
closure on eyewitness memory. The first aim was to examine whether the eye-
closure effect extends to realistic situations. The second aim was to explore the 
theoretical underpinnings of the eye-closure effect. Here, I will present a brief 
overview of the main findings with respect to each research question (see 
section 2.4.2). The findings will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
1. Closing the eyes was found to be more beneficial for recall of visual 
details than for recall of auditory details (Experiments 1, 2, 3, 5, 6).  
2. Eye-closure mostly affected fine-grain rather than coarse-grain recall 
(Experiments 2, 3, 5, 6), but increased recall of both central and 
peripheral details (Experiments 2, 3, 6).  
3. The eye-closure instruction did not impair testimonial accuracy in free 
recall (Experiments 3, 6), and even tended to improve testimonial 
accuracy in cued recall (Experiments 1, 2, 3, 5). 
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4. Eye-closure tended to reduce rather than inflate participants’ confidence 
in their responses (Experiments 2, 3, 5, 6).  
5. The eye-closure effect was extended to recall of several violent events, 
and was found to be equally effective for violent and non-violent events 
(Experiments 1, 2). 
6. Eye-closure benefits were observed not only for cued recall, but also for 
free recall (Experiments 3, 6). 
7. Eye-closure was still effective when recall was tested after a week and 
repeated retrieval attempts (Experiment 3).  
8. No evidence was obtained for an “ear-closure” effect (Experiment 4).  
9. Visual and auditory distractions in the interview environment caused 
general and modality-specific impairments in recall performance 
(Experiment 5). 
10. The eye-closure effect was extended to recall of a realistic verbal 
altercation experienced live on the street, and was found to be more 
pronounced for witnesses interviewed in a quiet location than for 
witnesses interviewed on the street (Experiment 6). 
 
 
7.2 Recurring Themes 
 
The main findings will be discussed in light of six themes: the type of to-be-
remembered event, the format and timing of recall, testimonial accuracy, the 
type of information recalled, general and modality-specific interference, and 
the level of confidence expressed by witnesses. For each theme, theoretical 
and practical implications will be discussed. 
 
7.2.1 Type of Event 
7.2.1.1 Summary 
Across experiments, the eye-closure instruction was found to be effective for 
different types of events. In Experiments 1 and 3, eye-closure helped witnesses 
to remember the visual details of a brief video clip of a violent event. In 
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Experiments 2 and 5, closing the eyes improved recall of both violent and non-
violent versions of longer video clips. In Experiment 6, eye-closure improved 
recall of a verbal altercation that was experienced live by unsuspecting 
witnesses. In sum, the eye-closure effect seems to be robust across violent and 
non-violent events, and across videotaped and live events. 
 
7.2.1.2 Theoretical Implications 
Perfect and colleagues (2008) found that eye-closure improved recall of 
mundane events, and the experiments presented in this thesis show that the 
effect extends to recall of violent events, which were confirmed to be 
emotionally arousing in terms of subjective ratings and electrodermal activity. 
This suggests that the processes underlying the eye-closure effect are 
independent of the processes associated with the impact of emotional arousal 
on memory (e.g., Christianson, 1992; Deffenbacher et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
eye-closure improves recall for both videotaped and live events (cf. Perfect et 
al., 2008). Crucially, this also applies when the live event is forensically 
relevant (Experiment 6). This suggests that the processes underlying the eye-
closure effect are also independent of the processes associated with the 
differences between recall of videotaped and live events (Ihlebæk et al., 2003). 
In sum, despite potential differences in recall of certain events, eye-closure 
seems to be beneficial across different types of events. 
 
7.2.1.3 Practical Implications 
The finding that eye-closure was beneficial for recall of both violent and non-
violent events suggests that the eye-closure instruction may be recommended 
for use in police interviews concerning violent and non-violent crime alike. 
The finding that eye-closure improved recall of a personally experienced 
verbal altercation comes as close as ethically possible to the real 
circumstances faced by eyewitnesses. Since violent crime is often preceded by 
a verbal argument (Murdoch & Ross, 1990; Pihl & Peterson, 1995; Pittman & 
Handy, 1964), testimony about an altercation may provide useful information 
in a criminal investigation, such as who initiated the quarrel. The next section 
will reflect upon the role of recall format and timing in the eye-closure effect. 
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7.2.2 Recall Format and Timing 
7.2.2.1 Summary 
In free recall, eye-closure was found to increase the amount of visual 
information reported during an immediate interview (Experiment 6) and 
during a one-week delayed interview (Experiment 3) by approximately 37%. 
However, eye-closure during immediate free recall in Experiment 3 did not 
significantly affect recall performance. In cued recall, the benefits of eye-
closure were mostly limited to fine-grain correct recall of visual information, 
with somewhat more modest effect sizes (increases of 13.0%, 29.7%, 33.3%, 
and 23.8% in visual fine-grain recall in Experiments 1, 2, 5, and 6 respectively), 
except when witnesses were interviewed after a week (increase of 42.7% in 
Experiment 3).  
 
7.2.2.2 Theoretical Implications 
When memory was tested in immediate free recall, eye-closure was effective 
in Experiment 6 but not in Experiment 3. Although this discrepancy is difficult 
to explain, it could potentially be due to differences in experimental 
methodology. For instance, the retention interval between the event and the 
interview was not only slightly longer in Experiment 6 (five minutes as 
opposed to two minutes), but it was also filled with more meaningful events 
(crossing four busy streets and having a conversation with the interviewer, as 
opposed to backwards spelling of animal names in a quiet experimental 
room). Thus, it is possible that for participants in Experiment 3, the memory of 
the event was still fresh in their minds, whereas for participants in Experiment 
6, the intervening events reduced the accessibility of the memory. In that case, 
increasing accessibility to retrieval cues by closing the eyes would have been 
more beneficial for participants in Experiment 6 than for participants in 
Experiment 3. Some support for this explanation can be found in the 
performance in the eyes-open conditions: participants who kept their eyes 
open in immediate free recall in Experiment 3 reported approximately 35 
statements on average, whereas the same group in Experiment 6 reported only 
about 10 statements. Unfortunately, it is impossible to compare performance 
across experiments directly, due to methodological differences. For instance, 
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the difference in the number of statements could also have been due to the 
fact that Experiment 3 concerned a videotaped event, whereas Experiment 6 
concerned a live event (cf. Ihlebæk et al., 2003).  
There was a slight tendency for the eye-closure effect to be more 
pronounced in free recall than in cued recall. Similarly, studies with adults 
assessing the effectiveness of the Cognitive Interview and mental context 
reinstatement tend to find greater benefits in free recall (e.g., Davis et al., 2005; 
Emmett et al., 2003; Ready et al., 1997). This tendency might be explained in 
light of the nature of the retrieval task. Free recall provides witnesses with the 
opportunity to report everything that was encoded, and eye-closure can help 
them to retrieve this information. Cued recall, on the other hand, targets 
specific aspects of the event, which may have never been encoded in the first 
place (Wagstaff et al., 2010). Eye-closure may facilitate retrieval of information 
that was encoded, but it cannot facilitate retrieval of information that was 
never encoded. Therefore, although eye-closure has the potential to improve 
cued recall to some extent (for questions about information that was actually 
encoded), it should have the greatest impact in free recall (see also Wagstaff et 
al., 2004; 2010; 2011). 
The tendency for eye-closure to have greater benefits in free recall than 
in cued recall seems to be closely related to the tendency for eye-closure to 
have greater benefits during delayed recall than during immediate recall. 
Caruso and Gino (2011) found that eye-closure induces spontaneous mental 
simulation of events, which should facilitate reinstatement of the context of 
the to-be-remembered event (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). Mental context 
reinstatement increases accessibility to relevant retrieval cues (S. M. Smith, 
1979; S. M. Smith & Vela, 2001; Thomson & Tulving, 1970), which is most 
helpful in a situation in which few such cues are available (Eich, 1995; S. M. 
Smith, 1988). Therefore, eye-closure should be most effective when few cues 
are available, either due to recall format (free as opposed to cued recall), or 
due to retention interval (delayed as opposed to immediate recall).  
 
7.2.2.3 Practical Implications 
From an applied point of view, the finding that eye-closure was, if anything, 
more effective after a delay of a week is promising. In real life, eyewitnesses 
Chapter 7  Summary and General Discussion 
 
210 
 
typically experience delays between witnessing an event and being 
interviewed about it (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Flin et al., 1992; Gabbert et al., 
2009), and the findings from Experiment 3 suggest that eye-closure can still be 
helpful after such a delay. Furthermore, the findings suggest that eye-closure 
cannot only help witnesses to repeat previously reported information, but can 
also help them to retrieve new information from memory. This may lead to 
important new investigative leads in police investigations. 
Overall, eye-closure improved recall performance in nearly all studies, 
and even when eye-closure did not have significant benefits (in immediate 
free recall in Experiment 3), it did not harm recall performance either. In some 
cases, the amount of additional information elicited as a result of eye-closure 
(e.g., 42.7% in delayed cued recall in Experiment 3) rivalled the amount of 
additional information elicited with the Cognitive Interview (in their meta-
analysis, Köhnken et al., 1999, reported a 41% increase as a result of the 
Cognitive Interview). In other experiments, the amount of additional 
information elicited was somewhat smaller. However, given that the eye-
closure instruction requires virtually no training and no additional interview 
time, it could still serve as useful alternative in cases in which conducting a full 
Cognitive Interview is not feasible. Moreover, unlike the Cognitive Interview, 
the eye-closure instruction was associated with an increase in testimonial 
accuracy in cued recall, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
7.2.3 Testimonial Accuracy 
7.2.3.1 Summary 
Overall, testimony provided in free recall was more likely to be accurate 
(proportions correct above .90) than testimony provided in cued recall 
(proportions correct around .70). In free recall, eye-closure did not improve or 
harm testimonial accuracy. In cued recall, eye-closure increased testimonial 
accuracy in all experiments except Experiment 6, in which it did not improve 
or impair testimonial accuracy.   
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7.2.3.2 Theoretical Implications 
Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) strategic control model provides a useful 
framework for explaining the increase in testimonial accuracy in cued recall as 
a result of eye-closure. According to the model, in response to a question, 
witnesses generate a number of candidate items from memory. They then 
select the best candidate response, and monitor the likely accuracy of this 
response. Based on this monitoring process, they then decide whether to 
volunteer the response or not. Koriat and Goldsmith’s model suggests two 
potential mechanisms that could explain the finding that eye-closure 
increased the proportion of answers that were correct. First, eye-closure may 
have helped witnesses to retrieve more candidate answers from memory, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that one of them would be correct. Second, 
eye-closure may have helped witnesses to monitor the accuracy of the 
candidate items, thereby increasing the likelihood that they selected the 
correct answer from among the other candidate items. In either case, the eye-
closure instruction seems to affect the quality of the best-candidate response, 
rather than the willingness to volunteer that response (see also Perfect, 
Andrade, & Syrett, 2011). 
 
7.2.3.3 Practical Implications 
Unlike hypnosis (Dinges et al., 1992; Erdelyi, 1994; Kebbell & Wagstaff, 1998), 
eye-closure did not impair testimonial accuracy in free recall, and actually 
improved accuracy in cued recall in nearly all experiments. This finding has 
important implications for police interviewers. Unlike an increase in quantity, 
an increase in quality of eyewitness testimony would likely go unnoticed in 
practice, since it is often impossible to establish the accuracy of testimony 
provided by real eyewitnesses. The current findings suggest that eye-closure 
may not only increase the number of correct answers provided in response to 
questions posed by the police interviewer, but that it may also decrease the 
number of incorrect answers provided. Thus, the eye-closure instruction may 
have two benefits in practice; one that is relatively easy to detect (i.e., the 
increase in quantity in free recall), and one that is more difficult to detect, but 
crucial in police investigations (i.e., the increase in quality in cued recall). 
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7.2.4 Modality, Grain Size, and Content 
7.2.4.1 Summary 
Across all experiments, eye-closure was found to be most beneficial for recall 
of visual information. The interaction between interview condition and 
modality was significant in Experiments 1, 3, 5, and 6, and marginally 
significant in Experiment 2. In cued recall, eye-closure predominantly affected 
fine-grain rather than coarse-grain recall of visual details, although it 
increased coarse-grain recall irrespective of modality in Experiment 1. When 
information centrality was examined in Experiments 2, 3, and 6, eye-closure 
was found to benefit recall for both central and peripheral details (but not 
gist). Furthermore, eye-closure enhanced recall of information varying in 
content, including person, action, object, and verbal descriptions (Experiment 
6).  
 
7.2.4.2 Theoretical Implications 
Experiments 3 and 6 permitted a detailed analysis of the type of information 
that witnesses choose to report in free recall. According to Fisher and 
Geiselman (1992), “most people seem to have a preference for describing the 
visual characteristics of a scene rather than the auditory properties” (p. 111). 
This pattern was confirmed in Experiment 3, but the reverse pattern was 
observed in Experiment 6. The difference is probably due to the nature of the 
event. In Experiment 6, participants witnessed a verbal interaction in real life, 
and were probably paying most attention to what was said (since it would 
supposedly determine where they would be going to take part in the 
experiment). In Experiment 3, participants watched a video of a violent act, 
and were likely paying most attention to what was seen (since the violence was 
predominantly visual in nature). Crucially, even though participants in 
Experiment 6 reported mostly auditory details, the benefits of eye-closure 
were still predominantly observed for the recall of visual details. This suggests 
that the tendency for eye-closure to be more effective for recall of visual 
information (observed across all experiments) was not simply due to the 
dominance or difficulty of visual information as opposed to auditory 
information.  
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In most experiments presented in this thesis, eye-closure did not affect 
coarse-grain recall (except in Experiment 1). However, eye-closure increased 
fine-grain correct recall of visual aspects in all experiments. If one assumes 
that the retrieval of fine-grain information from memory relies on mental 
imagery to a greater extent than the retrieval of coarse-grain information does 
(see section 3.2.1.2), this finding provides support for the idea that eye-closure 
facilitates mental imagery (e.g., Caruso & Gino, 2011; Wais et al., 2010). 
According to participants’ self-reports in Experiment 2, eye-closure indeed 
encouraged the use of mental imagery; unexpectedly, however, it was 
particularly associated with increased self-reported use of auditory imagery. 
Thus, it seems that the eye-closure effect is not limited to a modality-specific 
facilitation of mental imagery, but rather facilitates various forms of imagery 
(at least according to self-report data). Regardless of the theoretical 
interpretation of the findings, the results obtained in the thesis provide 
support for the usefulness of a distinction based on grain size (e.g., Goldsmith 
et al., 2002; Yaniv & Foster, 1995), since eye-closure had a different impact on 
fine-grain and coarse-grain recall.  
   
7.2.4.3 Practical Implications 
Information obtained from witnesses is considered the single most important 
determinant in solving crimes (Fisher, 1995; Kebbell & Milne, 1998; Milne & 
Bull, 2003b). The experiments presented in this thesis show that eye-closure 
improves recall of specific visual aspects of the witnessed event. This type of 
information has the potential to be highly relevant in criminal investigations. 
For instance, eye-closure may help the witness to remember the colour of the 
offender’s car (see also the Washington sniper case discussed in section 2.1.5), 
or perhaps even part of the car’s license plate. Such detailed visual 
information could aid the police in finding a suspect. In sum, the information 
gain in detailed visual information as a result of eye-closure may help the 
police solve crimes, which could have a significant impact in society.  
In both experiments involving free recall measures, participants 
reported more peripheral details than central details. This is not surprising, 
given that only a limited number of details can be considered ‘central’ to an 
event, whereas the number of peripheral details is potentially infinite (see also 
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Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). Importantly, eye-closure increased the report of 
central details as well as peripheral details. The effect was somewhat more 
pronounced for peripheral details, but it should be noted that this type of 
detail (e.g., the colour of the car) can be highly relevant in criminal 
investigations.  
In Experiment 6, reported details were coded on the basis of content. 
Although the low frequency of certain types of descriptions precluded 
statistical analysis, witnesses who closed their eyes tended to recall more 
information about persons, actions, objects, and verbal utterances than 
witnesses who kept their eyes open. Thus, it seems that, just like the Cognitive 
Interview (e.g., Holliday, 2003a, 2003b; A. M. Wright & Holliday, 2007), the eye-
closure instruction has the potential to enhance the recall of different types of 
information. If replicated, this finding means that eye-closure in real 
eyewitness interviews can help the police obtain information that is relevant 
to their investigation, such as descriptions of the perpetrator’s appearance 
and actions. 
 
7.2.5 General and Modality-Specific Interference 
7.2.5.1 Summary 
Eye-closure was consistently found to have greater benefits for recall of visual 
information than for recall of auditory information. To examine the auditory 
counterpart of this finding, Experiment 4 investigated whether “ear-closure” 
(as opposed to irrelevant speech) would benefit recall of auditory information, 
but no significant effects were found. Experiment 5 addressed the impact of 
visual and auditory distractions more directly, and found that each caused 
both general and modality-specific impairments in recall performance. 
 
7.2.5.2 Theoretical Implications 
Two main hypotheses have been put forward to explain the eye-closure effect: 
the cognitive load hypothesis and the modality-specific interference hypothesis. 
The cognitive load hypothesis is based on Glenberg’s (1997) embodied 
cognition account, which holds that memory retrieval and environmental 
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monitoring are two concurrent tasks competing for cognitive resources. 
Therefore, if environmental distractions are blocked out by closing the eyes, 
general improvements in retrieval performance should be observed. The 
modality-specific interference hypothesis is based on findings that 
visuospatial tasks interfere specifically with the vividness of visual images 
retrieved from long-term memory (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Therefore, 
blocking out visual distractions in the environment through eye-closure is 
thought to particularly benefit recall of visual information. Although these two 
hypotheses have previously been construed as being mutually exclusive (e.g., 
Perfect, Andrade, & Eagan, 2011; Perfect et al., 2008), the findings presented in 
this thesis suggest that they might be additive. 
By fitting the data obtained in Experiment 5 to the Cognitive Resources 
framework, a more detailed picture was obtained regarding general and 
modality-specific effects of sensory distractions in the interview environment. 
Although the exact calculation of percentages relies on a number of 
theoretical assumptions and is specific to the conditions of the experiment, 
the Cognitive Resources framework provides the opportunity to go beyond the 
simple conclusion that both types of processes play a role. The framework 
may be applied to different data sets to obtain a more reliable estimate of the 
relative impact of general and modality-specific interference. For instance, the 
data obtained in a recent experiment by Perfect, Andrade and Syrett (2011) 
could be fitted to the framework, to assess to what extent the visual-
distraction stimulus used in their experiment caused general or modality-
specific impairments in episodic recall. Judging from their data display (see 
Figure 1 in their article), it is likely that the percentages obtained by fitting the 
data for their experiment would be similar to the percentages obtained for 
Experiment 5. In sum, the Cognitive Resources framework may be used in 
future research to clarify the nature of the impairment caused by sensory 
distractions, thereby providing more insight into the processes underlying the 
effects observed when such distractions are eliminated through eye-closure.  
 
7.2.5.3 Practical Implications 
From an applied point of view, the question to what extent the eye-closure 
effect is driven by general or modality-specific processes is not vitally 
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important. Nevertheless, practitioners will likely find it useful to know what 
type of information can be facilitated by eye-closure. For instance, if the 
investigative interview concerns evidence pertaining to a criminal 
conversation, eye-closure might be less helpful than if it concerns evidence 
pertaining to the appearance or actions of a perpetrator. On the other hand, it 
is possible that eye-closure during the interview will be more beneficial for the 
recall of auditory information when the witnessed event does not contain any 
visual information. To investigate this possibility, future research could study 
the eye-closure effect in an “earwitness” context (cf. Campos & Alonso-
Quecuty, 2006; Pezdek & Prull, 1993; Yarmey, 1992). 
 
7.2.6 Confidence 
7.2.6.1 Summary 
The significant confidence-accuracy (CA) correlations obtained across 
experiments suggested that (a) generally confident rememberers also tended 
to be generally accurate, and (b) responses provided with a high level of 
confidence were also likely to be accurate. However, CA calibration revealed 
that witnesses in Experiments 2, 3, and 5 (but not 6) tended to be 
underconfident in their responses. Despite the fact that eye-closure increased 
testimonial accuracy, it tended to reduce witnesses’ confidence in their 
responses. Therefore, the underconfidence observed in CA calibration was 
particularly pronounced for witnesses who had their eyes closed.  
 
7.2.6.2 Theoretical Implications 
Previous research has shown that eyewitnesses are typically overconfident in 
their identification decisions (e.g., Brewer & Day, 2005; Brewer & Wells, 2006; 
Sauer et al., 2010) as well as in their (fine-grain) responses to questions about 
narratives and events (Goldsmith et al., 2005; Weber & Brewer, 2008). In the 
present research, however, witnesses in all experiments except Experiment 6 
(involving the live altercation in New York) tended to be underconfident in 
their responses. The discrepancy between experiments did not seem to be a 
result of the confidence scale used in Experiment 6 (0-100% instead of 1-5), 
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since the same scale was used in Experiment 5. Participants in Experiment 6 
tended to be more confident than participants in Experiment 5, in both 
correct (90% versus 84%) and incorrect (77% versus 59%) responses, even 
though they were less likely to be accurate in cued recall (mean proportion 
correct: .70 versus .83). As explained in section 6.1.4.2, the difference between 
the two experiments could be due to the nature of the sample (New York 
participants compared to York participants) or to the nature of the event (a 
live event compared to a videotaped event).  
It has been argued that CA calibration provides a clearer picture of the 
relationship between confidence and accuracy than CA correlations do (Juslin 
et al., 1996; Olsson, 2000). The experiments presented in the present thesis 
were the first to investigate the effect of eye-closure on confidence-accuracy 
calibration. Interestingly, witnesses who had their eyes closed failed to adjust 
their confidence ratings in accordance with their higher level of accuracy. In 
fact, in Experiment 2, eye-closure was found to significantly reduce overall 
confidence. One potential explanation for the reduction in confidence could 
be related to participants’ meta-cognitive processes. Examining confidence in 
identification decisions, Brewer et al. (2002) found that participants who 
reflected on the encoding conditions and the characteristics of their 
identification decision displayed better CA calibration than participants who 
did not reflect on these issues. In the present study, participants who had their 
eyes closed (or looked at a blank screen) did not display superior CA 
calibration, but they generally provided more conservative confidence ratings. 
It is possible that closing the eyes facilitates reflection on the retrieval process, 
perhaps increasing witnesses’ awareness of the difficulty of the retrieval task. 
Consistent with this awareness, witnesses may have adjusted their confidence 
ratings downwards. Although speculative, this potential explanation of the 
increase in underconfidence observed as a result of eye-closure warrants 
further investigation.  
 
7.2.6.3 Practical Implications 
Because witnesses who closed their eyes were generally less confident in their 
responses, witnesses with their eyes open tended to be closer to perfect 
confidence-accuracy calibration. Ideally, of course, we would like eye-closure 
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to reduce confidence in incorrect responses, while increasing confidence in 
correct responses. Nevertheless, the tendency towards underconfidence 
associated with eye-closure is arguably preferable to the confidence inflation 
observed as a result of hypnosis (Dywan & Bowers, 1983; Sheehan et al., 1984; 
Zelig & Beidleman, 1981). After all, confidently-held false memories may have 
dangerous consequences (e.g., Gross et al., 2005; Scheck et al., 2003; 
Wagenaar, 1996), whereas the consequences of less confidently-held accurate 
memories are typically less detrimental. 
 
 
7.3 Survey of Police Interviewers 
 
The findings presented in this thesis suggest that eye-closure has the potential 
to improve eyewitness memory. Therefore, it is imperative to investigate 
whether the eye-closure instruction could be implemented in real police 
interviews, and whether it would make a difference in practice (e.g., if the 
majority of police interviewers are already asking witnesses to close their eyes, 
then implementation of the instruction will probably not have much of an 
impact). In order to obtain some preliminary answers to these questions, a 
number of experienced police officers from various European countries were 
surveyed during a European Police College training course on police 
interviewing. In this section, I will first describe who the participants were and 
how the data were gathered, after which I will present some relevant findings 
from the survey.  
 
7.3.1 Method 
7.3.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-seven course participants took part in the survey. Three participants 
indicated that they did not have direct experience with interviewing 
eyewitnesses, and were therefore excluded from the analysis. Of the remaining 
participants, 18 were male and 6 were female, with a mean age of 42.75 years 
(SD = 6.91). They came from 19 different European countries (the number of 
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participants from each country is specified between brackets): Denmark (3), 
Ireland (2), Poland (2), Sweden (2), Austria (1), Belgium (1), Cyprus (1), Finland 
(1), France (1), Germany (1), Italy (1), Latvia (1), Lithuania (1), Luxembourg (1), 
Portugal (1), Slovakia (1), Slovenia (1), Spain (1), and the United Kingdom (1). 
Exactly half indicated that they were currently involved with interviewing 
witnesses, and the other half indicated that they had been involved with 
interviewing witnesses in the past. On average, participants had been 
employed in law enforcement for 19.42 years (SD = 9.00), and had between 3 
and 30 years experience with interviewing eyewitnesses (M = 15.04, SD = 8.59). 
 
7.3.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
In May 2011, I was invited to give a 2.5-hour lecture on eyewitness memory 
and eye-closure during the opening session of the European Police College 
(CEPOL) course no. 90 entitled “Police Interviews”, taking place in Stockholm, 
Sweden. Prior to the start of my presentation, I asked the course participants 
to complete the survey (see Appendix D.1). Of most interest to the present 
purposes are the question whether the interviewers were already using the 
eye-closure instruction (question 3D) and whether they thought it would be 
feasible to implement in practice (question 5D). The interviewers received no 
instructions or explanations prior to completing the survey. The surveys were 
distributed and each course participant completed it individually at their desk. 
Once each participant had completed it, all surveys were collected and the 
lecture started. 
 
7.3.2 Results and Discussion 
In this section, only the findings relevant to the present purposes will be 
discussed. However, a complete overview of the survey findings can be found 
in Appendix D.2. Table 7.1 depicts the frequency of use for each of the 
interview methods listed on the survey.  
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Table 7.1 Survey: Use of interview methods. Each number represents the 
number of police interviewers who selected the respective frequency.  
Interview Method 
Frequency of Use 
never 
on rare 
occasion 
some-
times 
often always 
Small talk  0 1 6 6 11 
Report everything 2 4 2 5 10 
Report only if certain 4 6 6 6 1 
Close eyes 9 3 9 2 1 
Other 13 0 2 2 2 
Note. Not all rows add up to N = 24, because some participants failed to 
provide a rating for some of the interview methods. 
 
When asked how often they instructed witnesses to close the eyes while 
reporting about the witnessed event, nine police interviewers indicated that 
they never gave this instruction; twelve interviewers reported that they did so 
on rare occasion or sometimes; and only three interviewers indicated that they 
often or always instructed witnesses to close their eyes. Indeed, the eye-
closure instruction was used less often than any of the other potential 
interview methods mentioned in the survey.  
Table 7.2 shows that most interviewers indicated that implementation 
of the eye-closure instruction would be somewhat or very feasible.  
 
Table 7.2 Survey: Feasibility of interview methods. Each number 
represents the number of police interviewers who selected the respective 
rating on a five-point scale ranging from very infeasible to very feasible. 
Interview Method 
very infeasible Feasibility very feasible 
1 2 3 4 5 
Small talk  0 0 1 5 18 
Report everything 0 4 2 7 10 
Report only if certain 5 6 5 4 4 
Close eyes 1 1 8 8 6 
Note. Not all rows add up to N = 24, because some participants failed to 
provide a rating for some of the interview methods. 
 
Nevertheless, a significant minority reported that the eye-closure 
instruction would be “neither feasible nor infeasible”. The group discussion 
with the police interviewers at the end of the session clarified this fairly 
ambivalent response. A number of police interviewers thought that the eye-
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closure instruction might not be feasible because some eyewitnesses may be 
reluctant to close their eyes. This idea is in line with Doherty-Sneddon et al.’s 
(2001) observation that eye-closure makes participants feel uncomfortable, 
although this observation was not confirmed in the self-report ratings of 
comfort in Experiment 3. However, as suggested by one of the police 
interviewers, the expectations of a real eyewitness are likely to differ 
substantially from the expectations of a research participant, who comes to 
the laboratory prepared to comply with experimental instructions. 
Fortunately, most police interviewers also believed that any potential 
reluctance on the part of the eyewitness can be overcome in most cases by 
explaining to the witness why it helps to close the eyes, and by making it clear 
that the interviewer will remain in his seat (which should reduce the need to 
monitor the environment; cf. Glenberg, 1997). 
 
7.3.3 Conclusion 
The primary aim of the survey was not to provide a representative sample of 
police interviewers in Europe (unfortunately, the sample was too small for this 
purpose), but rather to explore whether the eye-closure instruction could 
make a difference in practice. First of all, only three out of 24 interviewers 
indicated using the instruction often or always, suggesting that there is scope 
for improvement. Second, most interviewers indicated that it would be 
feasible to implement the eye-closure instruction in police interviews, 
particularly if the benefits of eye-closure were explained to the witness. Thus, 
this preliminary investigation suggests that practical implementation of the 
eye-closure instruction would be useful and feasible. 
 
7.4 Limitations 
 
Although the research presented in this thesis made a number of important 
contributions to the previous literature, it also had a number of limitations. 
Most of these limitations have been discussed throughout the thesis, but this 
section will provide an overview of the three most important limitations.  
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7.4.1 Distinction between Distraction and Imagery 
It is difficult to determine the mechanisms underlying the eye-closure effect, 
because the intensity of environmental distractions is probably inversely 
related to (spontaneous) use of mental imagery. Thus, blocking out 
distractions in the environment seems to facilitate mental imagery (Caruso & 
Gino, 2011), and it is unclear to what extent the improvement in recall 
performance associated with eye-closure is due to a reduction in distractions 
per se, as opposed to the increase in mental imagery resulting from that 
reduction. In future research, statistical modelling approaches might be used 
to investigate to what extent the association between eye-closure and recall 
performance is mediated by (self-reported) use of mental imagery (see e.g., 
Baron & Kenny, 1986). Furthermore, future researchers could attempt to 
manipulate the use of mental imagery independently through imagery 
instructions (cf. Paivio, 1969). For instance, the instruction to close the eyes 
and the instruction to form a mental image could be combined in a factorial 
design. Based on previous research combining the eye-closure instruction 
with mental context reinstatement and focused meditation (Wagstaff et al., 
2010; Wagstaff et al., 2011), it is predicted that the eye-closure instruction and 
the imagery instruction will each improve recall performance independently 
(compared to no instructions), but that the combination of both instructions 
will be most effective.  
 Although more sophisticated experimental designs might shed more 
light on the role of mental imagery in the eye-closure effect, the experimental 
study of mental imagery remains problematic. First of all, the concept of 
mental imagery is difficult to define and even more difficult to measure. Many 
studies on mental imagery rely on self-report measures, even though people 
often lack insight into their own cognitive processes (e.g., Loftus & Loftus, 
1980; Merckelbach & Wessel, 1998). Neuroimaging techniques may provide a 
more objective measure of mental imagery (cf. Wais et al., 2010), but because 
complex cognitive processes tend to be associated with complex patterns of 
neural activation, interpretation of these findings can be difficult. Another 
problem with the study of mental imagery is that certain individuals may not 
be able to use mental imagery effectively. For instance, Marks (1973) found 
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that individuals who reported vivid mental imagery performed significantly 
better on a recall test than individuals who reported poor mental imagery. If 
the eye-closure effect is (partly) mediated by mental imagery, then the 
instruction might not be as effective for witnesses who are unable to use 
mental imagery effectively. Future research could compare the effectiveness of 
the eye-closure instruction in groups differing in their ability to use mental 
imagery (which could be measured through both self-report and 
neuroimaging techniques).   
 
7.4.2 Filler Activities 
In the present research, participants engaged in various different activities 
during the interval between the witnessed event and the investigative 
interview. In Experiments 1, 3, and 4, participants were asked to spell animal 
names backwards; in Experiments 2 and 5, participants completed a word 
finder puzzle; and in Experiment 6, participants engaged in casual 
conversation with another person while crossing several busy streets. Each of 
these activities likely involves visual components (i.e., visualising the words to 
spell them backwards, locating existing words amongst a jumble of letters, and 
monitoring social cues and potential dangers on the street, respectively) as 
well as auditory components (i.e., spelling of words; subvocal rehearsal of 
words to be found, and engaging in conversation, respectively). Nevertheless, 
the different types of activities might engage visual and auditory processes to a 
different extent. For instance, if we assume that backwards spelling disrupts 
auditory processes more than visual processes, this might explain why 
participants in Experiments 1, 3, and 4 gave fewer correct responses to 
questions about auditory details than to questions about visual details. 
However, the disadvantage for recall of auditory details was also observed 
when a different, and arguably more visually-oriented, distracter task (a word 
finder puzzle) was used in Experiments 2 and 5. Experiment 6 was the only 
experiment in which an advantage for recall of auditory details was observed, 
which may have been due to the fact that witnesses engaged in a very different 
type of filler activity (i.e., walking on the street while engaging in social 
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interaction), but it may also have been due to the nature of the witnessed 
event (see section 7.2.4.2). In sum, the nature of the distracter task may have 
influenced subsequent recall performance, but the present experiments do 
not provide adequate insight into the nature of this influence.  
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the nature of the distracter 
task may have influenced the effectiveness of eye-closure during the 
subsequent interview. As explained in section 7.2.2.2, there was an 
inconsistency in the eye-closure effect in immediate free recall between 
Experiments 3 and 6. Due to the methodological differences between these 
two experiments, it is impossible to determine the cause of this inconsistency, 
but it may well have been due to the nature and length of the interval between 
the witnessed event and the interview. Thus, participants in Experiment 3 
engaged in a backwards spelling task for two minutes, whereas participants in 
Experiment 6 engaged in casual conversation while crossing streets for 
approximately five minutes. To examine whether the effectiveness of eye-
closure depends more on the length of the delay between the event and the 
interview, or more on the type of activity taking place during that delay, future 
research should disentangle these two confounding factors, while keeping 
other methodological variables (e.g., type of event) consistent. In line with 
previous research showing that retrieval performance is more affected by 
intervening events than by time delay (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1977), it is 
expected that the type of activity will have a larger impact than the length of 
the delay.  
In conclusion, due to confounding factors, the research presented in 
this thesis is poorly equipped to provide insight into the influence of the filler 
activities on subsequent recall performance and the eye-closure effect. Future 
research should investigate this issue in further detail.  
 
7.4.3 Ecological Validity 
A recurring problem in experimental research on eyewitness memory is the 
lack of ecological validity. The types of events to which experimental 
participants are exposed are often highly dissimilar from the types of events 
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typically experienced by real eyewitnesses of violent events. Even though the 
experiments in the present thesis were the first to examine the effect of eye-
closure on recall of violent events (as opposed to mundane events; Perfect et 
al., 2008), the events in Experiments 1 to 5 were videotaped rather than live 
events. Ihlebæk et al. (2003) found that recall of videotaped events tends to be 
more complete and more accurate than recall of live events. Hence, 
experiments studying recall of videotaped events might overestimate the 
recall performance of witnesses of live events. To improve ecological validity, 
unsuspecting witnesses in Experiment 6 were exposed to a forensically 
relevant live event. However, unlike the videotaped events, this event did not 
involve violence. Therefore, the question remains whether eye-closure will be 
effective in improving recall of real-life violent events experienced by real 
eyewitnesses. 
Due to ethical constraints, the limitation discussed above can probably 
not be overcome in experimental research. However, there was an additional 
problem with ecological validity in Experiment 6 that could potentially be 
improved in future research. In Experiment 6, mock witnesses were informed 
prior to the investigative interview that the witnessed altercation had been 
staged. Thus, even though the participants did not know the purpose of the 
study at the time of encoding, they were no longer under the impression that 
they were real eyewitnesses at the time of retrieval. This may have influenced 
their retrieval performance; for instance, they may not have placed much 
importance on providing accurate testimony (despite the incentive of 
potentially winning $50 if they scored in the top 25%). In future research, it 
would be better to debrief participants at the end of the experiment, rather 
than prior to the interview. For instance, participants could be informed that 
the senior experimenter has asked for their testimony about what happened 
during the verbal altercation, in order to determine what the consequences for 
the research assistants should be. If this kind of cover story is used in future 
research, mock witnesses will be aware that their testimony might have 
consequences, just like the testimony of real eyewitnesses. Although these 
consequences might not be as severe as the consequences involved in real 
criminal cases, this experimental set-up would be more realistic than the set-
up used in Experiment 6.  
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7.5 Future Research 
 
The findings obtained in the thesis prompted many questions for future 
research. As mentioned in the previous section, future research is required to 
improve a number of limitations in the research. In addition, a number of new 
research questions may be assessed in future work. In this section, four main 
avenues of potential new research will be outlined. 
 
7.5.1 Eyewitness Identifications 
The experiments presented in the thesis have shown that closing the eyes 
during an interview can help eyewitnesses to remember more details about 
the witnessed event. However, most wrongful convictions do not result from 
erroneous reporting of event details, but rather from mistaken eyewitness 
identifications (Connors et al., 1996; Gross et al., 2005; Rattner, 1988; Scheck et 
al., 2003; Wells et al., 1998). Therefore, it would be highly relevant to 
investigate whether eye-closure can also improve eyewitness identifications. 
To date, only one (unpublished) study has examined the eye-closure effect in 
the context of eyewitness identification (Potts, 2011). The study was designed 
to examine how eye-closure affects verbal overshadowing (i.e., witnesses are 
less likely to make a correct identification if they describe the perpetrator prior 
to the identification; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). In the study, 
participants viewed a brief video clip and were asked to provide a verbal 
description of the woman in the clip, either with eyes open or with eyes 
closed. Eye-closure significantly reduced the number of incorrect statements 
provided about general features (e.g., age, race, height), as well as the number 
of unverified (subjective) statements about facial features, but had no 
significant effect on the number of correct statements provided. Crucially, 
eye-closure during the verbal description had no significant effect on 
subsequent identification accuracy.  
However, eye-closure in the Potts (2011) study was confounded with 
verbal overshadowing. Future research could investigate whether eye-closure 
improves identification accuracy when witnesses are not required to provide a 
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verbal description of the target prior to viewing the line-up. Indeed, various 
studies have found that reinstatement of context prior to the identification 
decision improves identification accuracy (Cutler et al., 1987a; Krafka & 
Penrod, 1985; Malpass & Devine, 1981b; Shapiro & Penrod, 1986), although 
some other studies have failed to replicate this effect (Davies & Milne, 1985; 
Sanders, 1984). Because eye-closure is likely to facilitate mental simulation of 
the witnessed event (Caruso & Gino, 2011; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Wais et 
al., 2010), it is expected that the instruction to close the eyes will render the 
mental context reinstatement procedure more effective. For this reason, it is 
hypothesised that eyewitnesses will be more likely to make a correct 
identification if they close their eyes and reflect on the perpetrator’s 
appearance prior to viewing the line-up. 
 
7.5.2 Misinformation 
Section 2.1.4.2 briefly touched upon the influence of misleading information 
on memory for witnessed events. Thus, when eyewitnesses encounter 
misleading information after the event, for instance in the form of leading 
questions (Loftus, 1975) or another witness (e.g., Luus & Wells, 1994), they 
often incorporate that misinformation into their own testimony (for a review, 
see Loftus, 2005). One interesting avenue for further research is to study the 
impact of eye-closure on the misinformation effect. Given that eye-closure 
tended to enhance testimonial accuracy in the experiments presented in this 
thesis, it is hypothesised that eye-closure during a recall test after exposure to 
misinformation will also reduce the likelihood that the misinformation is 
incorporated into subsequent testimony. Perhaps a more interesting question, 
however, is what happens when witnesses close their eyes while listening to 
the misinformation itself. Two competing hypotheses can be formulated with 
regards to this question.  
If eye-closure facilitates concentration on the task at hand (Glenberg, 
1997; Glenberg et al., 1998), it should help witnesses to detect discrepancies 
between their own memory of the event and the erroneous information 
presented to them (Tousignant et al., 1986). This process should lead to a 
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reduction in susceptibility to misinformation. However, if eye-closure inspires 
visualisation of the presented misinformation (Caruso & Gino, 2011; Wais et 
al., 2010), these vivid mental images may subsequently be more difficult to 
distinguish from the original memory. This process should lead to an increase 
in susceptibility to misinformation. It is possible that the effect of eye-closure 
on susceptibility to misinformation depends on the way in which the 
misinformation is presented. For instance, if the presentation begins with an 
instruction to form a mental image of the presented information, one could 
hypothesise that eye-closure will lead to the formation of vivid images and 
therefore increase susceptibility to misinformation. However, if the 
presentation does not include an imagery instruction, and instead 
commences rather quickly with the presentation of inaccurate items, one 
could hypothesise that eye-closure will enhance witness’s ability to detect 
errors and therefore reduce susceptibility to misinformation. To test these 
predictions, a future study could manipulate the order of presentation of the 
misinformation (imagery instruction first compared to inaccurate items first).  
 
7.5.3 Different Contexts 
The eye-closure instruction has the potential to be useful in any type of 
context in which people are expected to recall information. For instance, in an 
educational context, closing the eyes prior to answering exam questions might 
improve exam performance. For instance, Glenberg et al. (1998) found that 
university students who were instructed to close their eyes performed 
significantly better on general knowledge and mathematics questions than 
students who kept their eyes open (see also Phelps et al., 2006, for similar 
research with 5-year old children). This research could be extended to more 
ecologically valid educational settings. For instance, future research with 
students on a university course could compare a group of students that was 
informed about the benefits of eye-closure during the exam with a group that 
was simply informed about the importance to concentrate during the exam. 
Real grades obtained for (formative) assessments could be compared across 
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groups to examine the effectiveness of eye-closure in a realistic educational 
setting. 
 In medical settings, doctors could advise their patients to close their 
eyes while recounting their medical history. Fisher and Quigley (1992) found 
that the Cognitive Interview significantly improved recall of foods eaten, 
which could be relevant for medical diagnoses of food poisoning or allergies. 
Similarly, the Cognitive Interview has been found to improve recall of daily 
physical activities from the distant past (Fisher, Falkner, Trevisan, & 
McCauley, 2000). However, in these studies, use of the Cognitive Interview 
came with considerable practical costs in terms of interview time, interviewer 
training, and coding of responses. The eye-closure instruction may prove to be 
a more cost-effective method of improving recall in medical contexts. Finally, 
some psychotherapists still use hypnosis to facilitate the retrieval of childhood 
memories (Lindsay & Read, 1995; Poole, Lindsay, Memon, & Bull, 1995). Given 
that, unlike hypnosis, the eye-closure instruction does not seem to increase 
false memories or inflate confidence, it might be a suitable alternative for use 
in psychotherapy. In sum, the eye-closure instruction may prove to be helpful 
in a wide range of settings besides eyewitness testimony. 
 
7.5.4 Field Research 
Perhaps the most important direction for future research is to test the eye-
closure instruction in a field setting. Although laboratory research provides an 
excellent opportunity to test the eye-closure effect in a controlled 
environment (e.g., it allows for an assessment of testimonial accuracy), it does 
not provide sufficient evidence for the effectiveness of the eye-closure 
instruction in real life. For instance, although watching violent videos 
increases physiological arousal (see Experiment 2), laboratory studies cannot 
simulate the levels of arousal experienced by real eyewitnesses of violent 
crime (see also Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). Therefore, it is crucial to establish 
whether the eye-closure instruction is effective with real eyewitnesses, before 
recommending it for use by police interviewers. Future field studies could 
randomly assign real eyewitnesses to receive either the instruction to close 
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their eyes or no instruction. Although it would not be possible to examine the 
effect of eye-closure on the accuracy of eyewitness testimony in real life, it 
would be possible to assess the amount of information obtained from 
witnesses. It is expected that, like experimental participants, real eyewitnesses 
will report more information if they have their eyes closed during the 
investigative interview. 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
Taken together, the experiments presented in this thesis show that closing the 
eyes can substantially increase the amount of accurate information obtained 
from eyewitnesses. The findings suggest that sensory distractions in the 
interview environment demand cognitive resources, causing both general and 
modality-specific impairments in eyewitness recall. Interference from these 
distractions can be overcome by closing the eyes or looking at a blank visual 
field during the interview. The benefits of eye-closure were observed across 
five different experiments: in free and cued recall, for recall of forensically 
relevant videotaped and live events, in different interview locations, across 
different eyewitness samples, for different types of information, and after a 
delay of a week. Although it is not suggested that the eye-closure instruction 
should replace the Cognitive Interview altogether, it could certainly serve as a 
simpler alternative when interview time or police resources are relatively 
limited. In sum, the current findings suggest that the eye-closure instruction 
can make a significant contribution to police interviewing.  
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Appendix  A  
Interview Questions and Example Responses
26
 
 
A.1 Experiment 1, 3, and 4 
A.1.1 Questions Addressing Visual Aspects 
 
1. The woman in the video was watching TV at the start of the clip. On TV, 
there was a lady talking to children. How many children were there? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “four”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “between three and five”. 
c. Incorrect: “one”. 
 
3. When the woman walked into the room, where was the man sitting? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “he was kneeling on the floor by the coffee table”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “on the floor”. 
c. Incorrect: “in a chair”. 
 
4. What did the man’s shirt look like? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “grey body with dark blue sleeves”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “grey”. 
c. Incorrect: “red”. 
 
7.  From where did the man pull his knife? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “from his right jeans pocket”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “from his jeans”. 
c. Incorrect: “from his jacket pocket”. 
 
8. What type of knife did the man have? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “a Stanley knife”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “a knife you use for DIY”. 
c. Incorrect: “a pen knife”. 
 
11.  When the man said “I need to do it”, the woman ran to the door. What 
did the door look like? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “a white frame with glass panes”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “white”. 
c. Incorrect: “brown”. 
 
13. When the man held the woman to the floor, what did he do?  
a. Fine-grain correct: “he ripped her dress, exposing the tattoo”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “he exposed the tattoo”. 
c. Incorrect: “he cut the dress open with the knife”. 
                                                      
26 Question numbers refer to the original order in which questions were asked 
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15.  How did the woman get the man off her? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “she elbowed him in the face”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “she hit him”. 
c. Incorrect: “she kicked him”. 
 
A.1.2 Questions Addressing Auditory Aspects 
2. What sound prompted the woman to walk to the living room? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “breaking glass”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “something breaking”. 
c. Incorrect: “door slamming”. 
 
5. When the woman asked what the man was doing in her house, what did 
he say? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “I know how to fix it”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “I am going to sort it out”. 
c. Incorrect: “I don’t know”. 
 
6. For whom did the man say that he hurt himself? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “for his sister”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “for a woman”. 
c. Incorrect: “for their father”. 
 
9. What did the woman say when the man said that she had to cut her 
tattoo as well? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “okay, give me the knife”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “okay”. 
c. Incorrect: “that she did not want to”. 
 
10. The man and the woman talked about fictional characters: Nathaniel 
and ...? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “Isabel”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “something starting with an ‘I’ ”. 
c. Incorrect: “Janet”. 
 
12. When the man held the woman to the floor, she shouted his name. 
What was his name? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “Billy”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “the name started with a B”. 
c. Incorrect: “John”. 
 
14. When the man held the woman to the floor, he warned her. What did he 
say? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “I’m warning you, this is going to hurt”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “I’m warning you”. 
c. Incorrect: “I will kill you”. 
 
16. What did the woman say on the phone? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “yes, hello, I need an ambulance”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “something about an ambulance”. 
c. Incorrect: “please help me”.  
Appendix A              Interview Questions 
 
234 
 
A.2 Experiment 2 and 5 
A.2.1 “Lost” – violent version
27
 
A.2.1.1 Questions Addressing Visual/Central Aspects 
1.  The clip starts with the four survivors, two of them male. Can you 
describe the hair of each of the men? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “one had black curly hair and one was bald”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “one had black hair”. 
c. Incorrect: “one had blonde hair”. 
 
12. How does the man with the eye patch treat the gunshot wound? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “he takes out the bullet with tweezers and 
stitches up the wound”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “he stitches up the wound”. 
c. Incorrect: “he puts a bandage on it”. 
 
15. How does the fight start? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “the man with the eye patch throws the jug at the 
other man”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “the man with the eye patch starts it”. 
c. Incorrect: “the man with the eye patch kicks the woman”. 
 
16. Once the woman has her rifle pointed at the man with the eye patch, 
what does she do? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “she kicks him in the face”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “she kicks him”. 
c. Incorrect: “she hits him with the back of the rifle”. 
 
20.  When the bald man says he’s checked every nook and cranny of the 
place, what does the curly-haired man do? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “he lifts up the carpet and shows a trap door”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “he shows a trap door”. 
c. Incorrect: “he walks away”. 
 
A.2.1.2 Questions Addressing Visual/Peripheral Aspects 
2.  When they are in the bushes, what are they holding? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “binoculars and guns”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “guns”. 
c. Incorrect: “a torch”. 
 
5.  When the curly-haired man walks to the house, what animal or animals 
does he see? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “a horse and a cat”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “a cat”. 
c. Incorrect: “cows”. 
 
                                                      
27 The “Lost” violent video was used for Experiment 5. 
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6.  Where on his body does the curly-haired man get shot? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “on his left upper arm”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “on his arm”. 
c. Incorrect: “on his leg”. 
 
11. What does the man with the eye patch do to prepare before treating the 
gunshot wound? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “he puts vodka on a cloth and disinfects the 
tweezers with a lighter”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “he uses vodka”. 
c. Incorrect: “he drinks a glass of vodka”. 
 
19. Who ties up the man with the eye patch? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “the woman and the curly-haired man”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “the woman”. 
c. Incorrect: “the bald man”. 
 
A.2.1.3 Questions Addressing Auditory/Central Aspects 
3. When they are in the bushes, what object are they talking about? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “the satellite dish”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “about something on top of the house”. 
c. Incorrect: “a bomb”. 
 
7. What does the curly-haired man shout when he’s on the ground after 
being shot? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “he says his name and that his plane crashed”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “his name”. 
c. Incorrect: “don’t shoot”. 
 
13. According to the curly-haired man, why did the ‘hostiles’ let the man 
with the eye patch stay in his house? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “because he is one of them”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “because he is working with them”  
c. Incorrect: “because they didn’t know he was there”. 
 
14. According to the curly-haired man, why are he and the woman still 
sitting there? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “because he is not alone”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “because there are more of them”  
c. Incorrect: “because they don’t know what to do”. 
 
18. How did the curly-haired man know that the man with the eye patch 
was not alone? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “the stirrups on the horse outside were set up for 
someone much shorter than the man with the eye patch”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “something was set up for a shorter person”  
c. Incorrect: “he sensed it”. 
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A.2.1.4 Questions Addressing Auditory/ Peripheral Aspects 
4. Where does the older woman say she’ll wait for them? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “by the stream”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “by the water”. 
c. Incorrect: “in the cabin”. 
 
8. How many people crashed on the island, according to the curly-haired 
man? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “over 40 people”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “somewhere between 30 and 50 people”. 
c. Incorrect: “200 people”. 
 
9. Where does the man with the eye patch say the medical kit is? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “in the kitchen on the top shelf”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “on the shelf”. 
c. Incorrect: “in the medicine cabinet”. 
 
10. How did the man with the eye patch say that he survived the war? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “by not participating in it”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “he likes being alone” (note: he said this right 
after he said that he survived the war by not participating in it). 
c. Incorrect: “he killed them all”. 
 
17. What does the curly-haired man say once the man with the eye patch is 
knocked out on the floor? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “get some rope”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “we need to tie him up”  
c. Incorrect: “run away”. 
 
 
A.2.2 “Lost” – non-violent version 
A.2.2.1 Questions Addressing Visual/Central Aspects 
1.  The clip starts with the four survivors, two of them male. Can you 
describe the hair of each of the men? 
5.  Once they are inside the house, what does the woman open? 
7.  Once they are inside the house, what does the bald man look at? 
12.  What game is the bald man playing on the computer? 
19.  What do you see on the computer screen after “you win”? 
 
A.2.2.2 Questions Addressing Visual/Peripheral Aspects 
2.  When they are in the bushes, what are they holding? 
6.  What was in the fridge? 
8.  At one point, the bald man is holding some papers – what colour pen 
was used to write comments on it? 
11.  What key does the bald man press to start playing the computer game? 
18.  What does it say on the side of all the white folders that the curly-haired 
man is looking at? 
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A.2.2.3 Questions Addressing Auditory/Central Aspects 
3. When they are in the bushes, what object are they talking about? 
10. What is the purpose of the station? 
15. According to the curly-haired man, why did the ‘hostiles’ let the man 
with the eye patch stay in his house? 
16. According to the curly-haired man, why are he and the woman still 
sitting there? 
17. According to the curly-haired man, what do they see in the cellar? 
 
A.2.2.4 Questions Addressing Auditory/ Peripheral Aspects 
4. Where does the older woman say she’ll wait for them? 
9. How long ago did the man with the eye patch come to the island? 
13. What does the man with the eye patch say about the game? 
14. According to the bald man, what does our ability to cheat make us? 
20. When the bald man enters 38 for mainland communication, what does 
the man on screen say? 
 
A.2.3 “Survivors” – violent version 
A.2.3.1 Questions Addressing Visual/Central Aspects 
2.  When the man meets the boys in the forest, what do you see him do? 
6.  With what weapon do the boys injure the man? 
8.  What do the boys do to the car? 
16.  What is the first thing the boys do as soon as the man walks into the 
house? 
18.  What happens when the tall blond boy does not give the man his knife 
back after he has asked twice? 
 
A.2.3.2 Questions Addressing Visual/Peripheral Aspects 
1.  When the two boys are in the forest, what is the taller boy holding? 
4.  When the group of boys goes to hunt, what is the blond boy in front 
holding? 
7.  Where on his body does the man get shot? 
15.  What have the boys done to the painting next to the door? 
17.  What do the boys do to the man after they have hit him? 
 
A.2.3.3 Questions Addressing Auditory/Central Aspects 
3.  When the man meets the boys in the forest, what does he say? 
11.  What does the man say his job is, as last of the family? 
12.  What does the woman ask when she hears what house it is? 
13.  What does the woman say she needs to do? 
20.  What does the man say to the tall blond boy at the end? 
 
A.2.3.4 Questions Addressing Auditory/Peripheral Aspects 
5.  When the boys say they should eat the rabbit, what does the man say? 
9.  When they’re in the car, what does the woman ask the man? 
10.  What does the man say when he shows the woman the cave? 
14.  Why does the woman think she will be welcome at the house? 
19.  When the small boy has been stabbed, what does the man order the 
boys to get? 
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A.2.4 “Survivors” – non-violent version 
A.2.4.1 Questions Addressing Visual/Central Aspects 
2.  When the man meets the boys in the forest, what do you see him do? 
6.  After the man has said that he will eat them, what do the boys do? 
7.  How does the man escape the boys? 
17.  What does the woman do when she finds out it is not her son? 
18.  What does the boy do after saying that the woman is not his mum? 
 
A.2.4.2 Questions Addressing Visual/Peripheral Aspects 
1.  When the two boys are in the forest, what is the taller boy holding? 
4.  When the group of boys goes to hunt, what is the blond boy in front 
holding? 
8.  Before she encounters the man, what is the woman in the car doing? 
11.  When they are in the cave, where is the man sitting? 
14.  What does the woman take out of her bag and give to the man? 
 
A.2.4.3 Questions Addressing Auditory/Central Aspects 
3.  When the man meets the boys in the forest, what does he say? 
12.  What does the man say his job is, as last of the family? 
13.  What does the woman ask when she hears what house it is? 
15.  What does the woman say she needs to do? 
20.  When they arrive at the house, what does the man say to the boys? 
 
A.2.4.4 Questions Addressing Auditory/Peripheral Aspects 
5.  When the boys say they should eat the rabbit, what does the man say? 
9.  When they’re in the car, what does the woman ask the man? 
10.  What does the man say when he shows the woman the cave? 
16.  Why does the woman think she will be welcome at the house? 
19.  When the man and the woman walk up to the house, what does she say 
to him? 
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A.3 Experiment 6  
A.3.1 Questions Addressing Visual Aspects 
1.  Where did you meet with Sarah and Julia? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “on the corner of 56th street and 10th avenue”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “on the corner”. 
c. Incorrect: “in front of the library”. 
 
2.  What clothes was Julia/Sarah wearing?28 
a. Fine-grain correct: “white jeans and a blue top”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “a blue top”. 
c. Incorrect: “jeans and a red top”. 
4.  Which animals did you see on the papers that Sarah was holding? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “an elephant and a butterfly”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “an elephant”. 
c. Incorrect: “a tiger”. 
 
8.  When Julia and Sarah did not agree on the animal assignment, what did 
you see Julia do? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “she tried to grab the papers and all the papers 
dropped on the floor”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “she tried to look at the papers herself”. 
c. Incorrect: “she pushed her”. 
 
9.  What colours were the papers that dropped on the floor? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “yellow, pink, white and green”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “one was green”. 
c. Incorrect: “blue”. 
 
10.  What happened to the papers after they had dropped on the floor? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “the experimenter picked them up and handed 
them back to Sarah”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “they were picked up”. 
c. Incorrect: “Sarah picked them up”. 
 
12.  Where did the experimenter touch Sarah? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “on her left upper arm”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “on her arm”. 
c. Incorrect: “on her right shoulder”. 
 
16.  What did Sarah do right before she left? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “she handed the experimenter the papers and 
waved”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “she waved”. 
c. Incorrect: “she threw the papers on the floor”. 
 
                                                      
28 Half of the participants were asked about Julia and half about Sarah; interviewers never 
asked about the clothes which their own character had been wearing. 
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A.3.2 Questions Addressing Auditory Aspects 
3.  Once you met with the colleagues, who started to speak to you first and 
what did they say? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “Julia introduced herself and said that they would 
tell us where we would be going for the experiment”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “Julia started”. 
c. Incorrect: “Sarah started”. 
 
5.  Why did they need to know your participant numbers? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “the numbers were linked to animals, which 
represented rooms”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “to assign us to rooms”. 
c. Incorrect: “to keep a record”. 
 
6.  When the first participant gave Sarah his/her number, which animal 
did she assign to him/her? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “tiger”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “some sort of cat”. 
c. Incorrect: “bear”. 
 
7.  And what animal did Julia think he/she should have been assigned? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “turtle”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “some sort of reptile”. 
c. Incorrect: “tiger”. 
 
11.  After the papers were picked up, what did the experimenter say to the 
participants? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “she said sorry and that it did not look very 
professional”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “she apologised”. 
c. Incorrect: “she told us to ignore the research assistants”. 
 
13.  When and where did Sarah say that Julia had been rude to her before? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “this morning over breakfast at Starbucks”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “this morning”. 
c. Incorrect: “yesterday”. 
 
14.  What did Julia call Sarah at the end? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “a big baby”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “a baby”. 
c. Incorrect: “stupid”. 
 
15.  What did Sarah say to the participants right before she left? 
a. Fine-grain correct: “That’s it, I am done, sorry about the drama”. 
b. Coarse-grain correct: “she apologised”. 
c. Incorrect: “she told us to leave”. 
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Appendix  B  
Non-Parametric Tests 
 
B.1 Introduction  
The distributions for some of the variables in the thesis violated assumptions 
of parametric tests. Where possible, I normalised the distributions through 
data transformations or replacement of outliers. However, for a number of 
variables, the distributions could not be normalised. In these cases, non-
parametric tests were conducted in conjunction with parametric tests, to 
verify the parametric findings. The results of these non-parametric tests are 
reported here. Each table shows the type of main effect or contrast that was 
tested, the non-parametric test statistic, the significance value, the effect size, 
and whether the parametric test results were confirmed or not (yes/no). 
 
B.2 Experiment 1  
Table B.1 Experiment 1: Fine-grain correct. 
 
Effect 
Test 
Statistic 
p η
2
 
Parametric 
confirmed? 
Interview Condition (IC) U29 = 362.00 .62 < .01 yes 
Question Modality (QM) T
30
 = 221.50 < .01 .17 yes 
IC * QM interaction      
 IC effect: visual  U = 335.00 .34 .02 yes 
 IC effect: auditory U = 281.00 .06 .06 yes 
Note. Effects displayed in bold are significant at p < .05. 
 
  
                                                      
29 The statistic U refers to the Mann-Whitney test (Mann & Whitney, 1947). 
30 The statistic T refers to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945). 
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B.3 Experiment 2  
Table B.2 Experiment 2: Total correct. 
 
Effect Test Statistic p η
2
 
Parametric 
confirmed? 
Interview Condition (IC) U = 243.00 .01 .11 yes 
Type of Video (TV) T = 541.00 .63 < .01 yes 
Question Modality (QM) T = 45.00 < .01 .59 yes 
Question Centrality (QC) T = 404.00 < .01 .12 yes 
QC * TV interaction      
 QC effect: non-violent  T = 165.00  < .01 .26 yes 
 QC effect: violent  T = 495.00 1.00 < .01 yes 
Note. Effects displayed in bold are significant at p < .05. 
 
 
B.4 Experiment 5  
Table B.3 Experiment 5: Total correct. 
 
 
Effect Test Statistic p 
Parametric 
confirmed? 
1. Interview Condition H(3)31 = 16.66 < .01 yes 
 Question Modality  T = 596.00 .01 yes 
2. Interaction between type of 
distraction (TD) & modality 
   
  TD effect: visual U = 219.50  .59 yes 
  TD effect: auditory  U = 162.00 .29 yes 
3. Blank-screen v. eyes-closed U = 242.50 .24 yes 
Note. Effects displayed in bold are significant at p < .05. 
  
                                                      
31 The statistic H refers to the Kruskal-Wallis test (Kruskal & Wallis, 1952). 
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Table B.4 Experiment 5: Fine-grain correct. 
 
 
Effect Test Statistic p 
Parametric 
confirmed? 
1. Interview Condition H(3) = 16.33 < .01 yes 
 Question Modality  T = 1514.00 < .01 yes 
2. Interaction between type of 
distraction (TD) & modality 
   
  TD effect: visual U = 235.50  .32 yes 
  TD effect: auditory  U = 139.00 .09 yes 
3. Blank-screen v. eyes-closed U = 247.50 .20 yes 
Note. Effects displayed in bold are significant at p < .05. 
 
 
Table B.5 Experiment 5: Coarse-grain correct. 
 
 
Effect Test Statistic p 
Parametric 
confirmed? 
1. Interview Condition H(3) = 3.41 .33 yes 
 Question Modality  T = 193.50 < .01 yes 
2. Interaction between type of 
distraction (TD) & modality 
   
  TD effect: visual U = 190.50  .79 yes 
  TD effect: auditory  U = 220.50 .57 yes 
3. Blank-screen v. eyes-closed U = 156.00 .22 yes 
Note. Effects displayed in bold are significant at p < .05. 
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Table B.6 Experiment 5: Proportion correct. 
 
 
Effect Test Statistic p 
Parametric 
confirmed? 
1. Interview Condition H(3) = 15.41 < .01 yes 
 Question Modality  T = 1216.50 .96 yes 
2. Interaction between type of 
distraction (TD) & modality 
   
  TD effect: visual U = 260.50  .10 yes 
  TD effect: auditory  U = 143.50 .13 yes 
3. Blank-screen v. eyes-closed U = 274.00 .04 no 
Note. Effects displayed in bold are significant at p < .05. 
 
B.5 Experiment 6  
Table B.7 Experiment 6: Proportion correct. 
 
Statements Effect Test Statistic p η
2
 
Parametric 
confirmed? 
Total Interview Condition U = 1134.00 .89 < .01 yes 
 Interview Location  U = 1135.00 .90 < .01 yes 
Visual Interview Condition U = 947.00 .10  .03 yes 
 Interview Location  U = 979.50 .21  .02 yes 
Auditory Interview Condition U = 980.00 .23  .02 yes 
 Interview Location  U = 1068.5 .63 < .01 yes 
Note. None of the effects were significant at p < .05. 
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Appendix  C  
Retrieval Strategies Form 
 
MEMORY RETRIEVAL STRATEGIES 
 
We are interested in what kind of strategies you used to remember the video 
clips. Please tick all strategies that you used for (at least one of) the video clips, 
and write any other strategies in the space provided. 
 
 
Possible Strategies: Used? 
Remembered the main story line and constructed the details from 
there  
 
Concentrated hard on remembering the video clip  
Visualised / pictured the video clip in my mind’s eye  
Replayed the voices and sounds in my head  
Pure guessing  
Didn’t use any memory retrieval strategies  
...  
...  
 
 
Do you think closing your eyes during the interview (would have) helped to 
remember the visual and/or auditory information from the video clip? Please 
tick an answer for each type of information. 
 
Closing my eyes (would have) helped 
For visual 
information 
For auditory 
information 
Yes   
No    
Maybe   
Don’t know   
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Appendix  D  
Survey of Police Interviewers 
D.1 Survey 
Survey on Eyewitness Interviewing 
 
1. Do you have direct experience with interviewing eyewitnesses? 
_____ Yes, am currently involved with interviewing witnesses 
_____ Yes, I have been involved with interviewing witnesses in the past 
_____ No (please go to question 4 on the other side of this page)  
 
2. Please indicate how often you interview (or have interviewed) eyewitnesses at each of 
the following locations. For each, please circle a number.  
(1 = never, 2 = on rare occasion, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always) 
 
A. At the police station in a designated interview space 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
B. At the police station in another space 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. At another location inside (please describe _________________________________ ) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
D. At or near the scene of the crime 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
E. At another location outside (please describe ________________________________ ) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. Please indicate how often you use (or have used) each of the methods listed below in 
eyewitness interviews. For each, please circle a number.       
(1 = never, 2 = on rare occasion, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always) 
 
A. Small talk to get the witness at ease 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
B. Instruct witness to report every single detail 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. Instruct witness to report only details about which (s)he is certain 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
D. Instruct witness to close the eyes while reporting about the witnessed event 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
E. Other  (please describe _________________________________________________ ) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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4. Please indicate whether you think the methods listed below are helpful to improve the 
quality of eyewitness testimony. For each, please circle a number.  
(1 = very unhelpful, 2 = somewhat unhelpful, 3 = neither unhelpful nor helpful,  
4 = somewhat helpful, 5 = very helpful) 
 
A. Small talk to get the witness at ease 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
B. Instruct witness to report every single detail 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. Instruct witness to report only details about which (s)he is certain 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
D. Instruct witness to close the eyes while reporting about the witnessed event 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
E. Other  (please describe _________________________________________________ ) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
5. Please indicate whether you think the methods listed below would be feasible to 
implement in eyewitness interviews. For each, please circle a number. 
(1 = very infeasible, 2 = somewhat infeasible, 3 = neither infeasible nor feasible,  
4 = somewhat feasible, 5 = very feasible) 
 
A. Small talk to get the witness at ease 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
B. Instruct witness to report every single detail 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. Instruct witness to report only details about which (s)he is certain 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
D. Instruct witness to close the eyes while reporting about the witnessed event 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6. About you 
Sex:  M  F  (circle one) 
Age: _________ 
Country of residence: _________________________ 
Number of years employed in law enforcement: ______________________________ 
Number of years experience with witness interviewing: ___________________________ 
Many thanks for completing this survey! 
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D.2 Survey Findings 
 
This section presents the survey findings that were not addressed in Chapter 7.  
 
Table D.1 Question 1: Interviewing experience. Each number represents 
the number of police interviewers who selected the respective frequency.  
 
Experience  
Currently involved  12 
Involved in the past 12 
Not involved 3 
 
 
Table D.2 Question 2: Interview location. Each number represents the 
number of police interviewers who selected the respective frequency.  
 
Interview Location 
Frequency of Use 
never 
on rare 
occasion 
some-
times 
often always 
Designated interview room  3 2 8 10 1 
Other room at police station 3 3 5 6 5 
Other location inside 6 2 2 5 0 
At/near scene of crime 7 4 6 6 1 
Other location outside 7 5 2 5 0 
Note. Not all rows add up to N = 24, because some participants failed to 
provide a rating for some of the interview methods. 
 
 
Table D.3 Question 4: Helpfulness of interview methods. Each number 
represents the number of police interviewers who selected the respective 
rating on a five-point scale ranging from very unhelpful to very helpful. 
 
Interview Method 
very unhelpful Helpfulness very helpful 
1 2 3 4 5 
Small talk  0 1 0 7 16 
Report everything 1 3 0 9 11 
Report only if certain 6 4 5 6 3 
Close eyes 2 1 5 13 3 
Other 15 0 0 2 2 
Note. Not all rows add up to N = 24, because some participants failed to 
provide a rating for some of the interview methods. 
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Glossary 
 
ANOVA analysis of variance 
BIS   behavioural inhibition system 
BAS   behavioural activation system 
BPM  beats per minute 
CA  confidence-accuracy 
cf.  confer (compare) 
CI  cognitive interview 
doi  digital object identifier 
EDA  electrodermal activity 
e.g.  exempli gratia (for example) 
et al.  et alia (and others) 
HF  high frequency 
HRV  heart rate variability 
i.e.  id est (that is) 
LF  low frequency 
M  mean 
MCR  mental context reinstatement 
NV base baseline preceding the non-violent video  
NV video non-violent video 
p.  page 
PPG  photoplethysmography 
SCR  skin conductance response 
SD  standard deviation 
v.  versus (against) 
V base baseline preceding the violent video 
VHF  very high frequency 
VLF  very low frequency 
V video violent video 
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